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Abstract
We study price formation in a large, common-value auction where buyers choose, based
on their private information, between bidding in the auction and an outside option. The
distribution of bidders participating in the auction is determined endogenously in equilib-
rium. We first focus on an outside option whose value is state dependent and positively
correlated with the common-value object on auction. If the outside option’s expected
value is non-negative and its variance is positive, then information is not aggregated in
the auction in any equilibrium. We then turn to a model where bidders choose to partic-
ipate in one of two concurrently operating auction markets. The outside option for one
auction is the equilibrium value of participating in the alternative auction, i.e., outside
options are endogenously determined. If frictions lead to uncertain gains from trade in
the first auction, then information is not aggregated in either market even if the second
auction is frictionless. This is because the two auction markets serve as outside options
with positive variance for each other. Our findings are driven by how bidders self-select
across options: A large disparity in the payoff variance of the two options implies that
optimistic bidders select the option with higher variance while pessimistic bidders select
the option with lower variance. Our results suggest a novel mechanism through which
market imperfections in one market can have widespread effects across all linked markets.
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1. Introduction
Consider a market in which k identical common-value objects of unknown value are sold to
n bidders through a sealed bid auction where the highest k bidders are allocated objects and
pay a uniform price equal to the highest losing bid. In such an auction, if each bidder has an
independent signal about the unknown value of the object, then the equilibrium auction price
converges to the object’s true value as the number of objects and the number of bidders grow
arbitrarily large (see Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) for a precise statement of this result).
Therefore, the auction price reveals the unknown value of the object and thus aggregates all
relevant information dispersedly held by the bidders.
Most previous work on auctions takes the distribution of types who bid in the auction as
exogenously given.1 Yet, in many instances bidders strategically decide whether to trade in a
particular market weighing their other alternatives. In other words, the bidder distribution is
endogenously determined jointly by the set of available alternatives and bidders’ expectations
about the relative attractiveness of these alternatives. In order to focus on such situations, we
study a model where bidders choose, based on their private information, between an auction
(market s) and an outside option (alternative or market r). This framework allows us to
highlight the interplay between self-selection into an auction, bidding behavior in the auction
and the information content of prices.
In what follows, we assume that there are two states that are equally likely a priori and
each object’s common-value (V ), is equal to one in the good state and zero in the bad state.
We first focus on an exogenous outside option that pays u(r|V = v) if the value of the object
is equal to v. Most past work (for example Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997)) assumes that a
bidder’s outside option is equal to zero in each state. In contrast, we assume that u(r|V = v)
is an increasing function of v. Under this assumption, we show that if the object to bidder
ratio (κs := k/n) exceeds a certain threshold κ∗ ∈ (0, 1), then there is no equilibrium where
the auction price converges to the object’s value as the market grows arbitrarily large.2 In
other words, there is no equilibrium which aggregates information. A corollary to this finding
is perhaps more instructive. If the expected payoff of the outside option is equal to zero
(E[u(r|V )] = 12u(r|V = 0) + 12u(r|V = 1) = 0) but the variance is positive (V ar[u(r|V )] > 0),
then there is no equilibrium where information is aggregated. In this case, a bidder who opts
for the outside option faces a loss in the bad state (V = 0). However, pessimistic bidders can
insure against a loss in the bad state by bidding zero in the auction. In fact in equilibrium
more optimistic types choose the outside option, more pessimistic types bid in the auction and
such a pattern of self-selection precludes information aggregation. We provide more detailed
intuition for these findings using a simple example further below.
Our equilibrium characterization and construction further elucidates the mechanism that
leads to prices that fail to aggregate all available information. Moreover, our equilibrium
construction allows us to measure the amount of information impounded by the auction price.
1Papers by Lauermann and Wolinsky (2014) and Murto and Valimaki (2014) are notable exceptions. We
discuss these papers in the literature review.
2The cutoff κ∗ depends on κs, the signal distribution and the value of the outside option but it is independent
of the number of objects and bidders.
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If the outside option is valuable in both states (i.e., u(r|V = v) ≥ 0 for all v), then there is
a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, optimistic types select market s but the expected
number of bidders is less than the number of objects for sale with positive probability in
both states of the world. In this case, information is not aggregated because of a lack of
competition even though the pattern of self-selection drives the auction price towards value.
Alternatively, if the outside option is valuable only in the good state (i.e., u(r|V = 0) < 0
and u(r|V = 1) > 0) and the variance of the outside option is not large, then there are many
equilibria. In all of these equilibria, the expected number of bidders exceeds the number of
objects in both states (i.e., there is sufficient competition) but only the pessimistic types select
market s. In this case, information is not aggregated because of the pattern of self-selection
even though there is sufficient competition.
Next, we turn to a model where bidders choose between two concurrent auction markets:
the endogenous outside option for one is the equilibrium value of participating in the other.
In addition to the frictionless auction market s, we assume that there is another, possibly
frictional auction market r where there are an additional nκr = kr units of the same object
on sale and κs + κr < 1. Our goal here is to understand which markets can generate outside
option payoff profiles that can disrupt information aggregation. If there are frictions in market
r and if the object to bidder ratio in market s exceeds a certain cutoff κ∗ ∈ (0, 1), then there is
no equilibrium where information is aggregated in either market. Frictions in market r inhibit
information aggregation also in the frictionless market because frictions transform market r
into an outside option with positive variance for market s. In turn, the distribution of types
that select market s forces the price to diverge from value in market s and thus market s also
serves as an outside option with positive variance for market r. In contrast if there are no
frictions in market r, then information is aggregated in both markets in every equilibrium.
Therefore, our findings suggest that institutional differences are key for generating outside
options which can hinder information aggregation.
We model frictions in market r as a reserve price c ≥ 0 (the price that a bidder pays
for an object cannot fall below c). The reserve price has various interpretations: (1) It is a
reserve price set by a single auctioneer selling the kr goods. (2) The auction is comprised of kr
non-strategic sellers, the reservation value (or the cost) for these sellers is equal to c and each
seller requires at least c in order to participate in the auction, i.e., there are informational
frictions as in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).3 (3) A government/regulator imposes a
minimum price. Although we focus on a reserve price, other institutional differences can also
be detrimental to information aggregation. In particular, if market r is a “pay-as-you-bid”
auction (as in Jackson and Kremer (2007)) or an “all-pay” auction (as in Chi et al. (2016)),
then market r can generate an outside option for market s which leads to similar consequences
as the reserve price that we discuss in detail in the paper.
For the case where market r is perturbed by a small friction (c > 0 but small), we construct
an equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the expected prices are equalized across the two markets
in each state. Therefore, from the perspective of a bidder who wins an object with probability
3The auction is in fact a double auction with non-strategic sellers who simply bid their valuations c.
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one, the state by state payoff and hence the payoff variance is also equalized across markets.4
The pattern of self-selection is the main force that equalizes prices. A large disparity in the
variance of payoff between the two markets implies that optimistic bidders select the market
with higher variance and pessimistic bidders select the option with lower variance, i.e., market
selection has a cut-off structure. This is because the losses in the bad state are relatively
small in the market with lower variance and hence the more pessimistic bidders opt for this
market. However, if market selection has a cutoff structure and an auction attracts the type
distribution’s upper tail (i.e., the more optimistic types), then we show that prices are driven
towards the object’s value in this auction and therefore payoff variance is low. In contrast, if
an auction attracts the type distribution’s lower tail (i.e., the more pessimistic types), then
prices diverge from value and payoff variance is high. Thus, an equilibrium is sustained by
types self-selecting into markets in a way which equalizes the prices across markets in each
state. Although the equilibrium that we construct is for a special case with binary signals, we
show that all equilibria resemble the equilibrium that we construct if c is lower than a certain
threshold value.
Previous work on information aggregation mainly focuses on homogeneous (or closely-
linked) objects that trade in a single centralized frictionless auction market. However, such a
centralized market is an exception rather than the rule. Fragmentation, the disperse trading
of the same security in multiple markets, is common place: many stocks listed on the New
York Stock Exchange trade concurrently on the regional exchanges (see Hasbrouck (1995)).
Investors, who participate in a primary treasury bond auction, could purchase a bond with
similar cashflow characteristics from the secondary market. Labor markets are linked but also
segmented according to industry, geography and skill. Buyers in the market for aluminum or
steel can choose between the London Metal Exchange or the New York Mercantile Exchange.
Such fragmented markets and exchanges also differ in structure, rules and regulations. In par-
ticular, markets are heterogeneous in terms of the frictions that participants face. The results
that we present in this paper suggest that selection into markets can have important implica-
tions for the information content of prices especially when individuals choose between markets
that differ in terms of institutional detail and therefore frictions. In particular, we demon-
strate how frictions can disrupt information aggregation not only in the market with frictions
but also in frictionless, substitute markets because of how imperfectly informed bidders select
across markets.
1.1. An Illustrative Example. Suppose, before bidding in the auction each bidder receives
a signal that perfectly reveals the value of the object with probability p and receives an
uninformative signal with the remaining probability. A bidder who receives the uninformative
signal continues to believe that V = 1 with probability 1/2. In contrast, a bidder who receives
the perfectly revealing signal knows the object’s value. Information is aggregated in such an
auction as the number of bidders n and the number of object nκ grow arbitrarily large under the
assumption that all bidders participate in the auction: the auction price P converges to 1 and
4A bidder who wins an object with probability one in market m will expect to purchase an object at the
market’s expected price. In this case, the payoff in state v is v − E[Pm|V = v] and the payoff variance is
V ar[V − E[Pm|V ]] where Pm is the random variable that represents the price in market m.
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0 when V = 1 and V = 0, respectively. Assuming that all types participate is innocuous since
each bidder can guarantee a payoff of at least zero by bidding zero in the auction. Therefore,
bidding in this auction is individually rational for each bidder, if a non-participating bidder’s
payoff equals zero, i.e., if each bidder’s outside option is state independent and equal to zero.
Let us continue to assume that the expected payoff of a bidder who does not participate
in the auction is equal to zero. However, let us further suppose that if a bidder chooses the
outside option instead of the auction, then the bidder’s payoff is equal −c if V = 0 and equals
c > 0 if V = 1. Thus the expected value of the outside option is equal to zero and the variance
is equal to c2 > 0. On the other hand, if a bidder chooses the auction instead of the outside
option, then his payoff is equal to V − P if he wins an object from the auction and his payoff
is equal to zero if he fails win an object. We will argue that information cannot be aggregated
with such an outside option in an arbitrarily large auction.
On the way to a contradiction, suppose that information is aggregated in the auction. If
information is aggregated in the auction, then the auction price P converges to 1 if V = 1.
Consider bidder i who has received a perfectly revealing signal. This bidder’s payoff from
participating in the auction converges to zero because the auction price converges to the value
of the object. In contrast, bidder i’s outside option is equal to c > 0 if V = 1. Therefore, any
bidder who receives the perfectly informative signal will opt for the outside option if V = 1 and
will submit a bid equal to 0 in the auction if V = 0 in a sufficiently large auction. However,
if no bidders other than the uninformed submit non-trivial bids that exceed zero, then all the
uninformed bidders would submit a bid equal to 1/2, their valuation for the object. Thus, the
price cannot converge to 1 when V = 1 contradicting our initial assumption of information
aggregation in the auction. The main result that we present is general and shows that the
insight highlighted by this example does not depend on our restriction to two states or to the
special signal structure.
Continuing with the example, we now argue that such an outside option can be generated
by an alternative auction market r with a reserve price c = 1/2. Suppose that the information
structure is as in the above discussion and further assume that p < κr = κ < 1/2. An
uninformed bidder’s expected value for the object in either market is equal 1/2 because both
states are equally likely. Uninformed bidders choose market r only if the expected price in
this market is equal to c irrespective of the state. This is because the minimum price, c,
is equal to the bidder’s expected value for the good by assumption. On the other hand, if
no uninformed bidder bids in market r, then the expected number of bidders in market r is
fewer than the number of goods in either state. This is because the number of goods, nκr,
exceeds the expected number of informed bidders, np, by assumption. So, once again market
r’s expected price is equal to c in both states and completely uninformative. Interestingly,
the price in market s does not aggregate information either. This is because the equilibrium
value from bidding in market r is identical to the exogenous outside option discussed in the
previous paragraph. Thus, information is not aggregated in market s. Again, the findings that
we present show that the insight provided by the above example generalizes to a setting with
multiple states, multiple markets and arbitrary signal distributions.
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1.2. Relation to the literature. Whether prices aggregate information is a central
question in economic theory which was first studied in the context of rational expectation
models (see for example Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) and Grossman (1981)). This
paper however is most closely related to earlier work which studies information aggregation
in large, common-value auctions. Wilson (1977) studied second-price auctions with common
value for one object for sale, and Milgrom (1981) extended the analysis to any arbitrary number
of objects. Both of these papers show that as the number of bidders gets arbitrarily large,
price converges to the true value of the object, but only provided that there are bidders with
arbitrarily precise signals about the state of the world. Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) further
generalized the analysis to the case where there are no arbitrarily precise signals. They showed
that prices converge to the true value of a common-value object in all symmetric equilibria
if and only if both the number of identical objects and the number of bidders who are not
allocated an object grow without bound.5 Our model is closest to the auction model studied
by Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997).6
We make four main contributions to the literature on information aggregation in multi-
object common-value auctions. (1) We are the first to study bidding behavior in a multi-
object common-value auction where bidders have outside options and the distribution of types
is endogenously determined. (2) In this context, we highlight a new mechanism, based on
self-selection, that can lead to the failure of information aggregation. (3) We introduce a new
method, based on a local limit theorem, a central limit theorem and the theory of moderate
deviations, that allows us to analytically solve for equilibria. (4) We show that information
is aggregated if people choose between multiple, frictionless auction markets. In this case,
the argument of Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) does not necessarily apply because the equi-
librium bidding function need not be strictly increasing. Nevertheless, using the pattern of
self-selection across markets, we establish that information is aggregated in all auction markets.
Our paper is closely related to recent work on single-unit common-value auctions by Lauer-
mann and Wolinsky (2014) and Murto and Valimaki (2014).7 The novel feature of Lauermann
and Wolinsky (2014)’s model is that the auctioneer knows the value of the object but must so-
licit bidders for the auction and soliciting bidders is costly. Therefore, the number of bidders in
the auction is endogenously determined by the auctioneer. Our paper differs from Lauermann
and Wolinsky (2014) because (1) We study a multi-unit multi-market auction while they study
5Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000) generalizes the analysis in Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) to a mixed
private, common-value environment. Kremer (2002) shows that the information aggregation properties of
auctions are more general than the particular mechanisms studied before; he does this by providing a unified
approach that uses the statistical properties of certain order statistics. See Hong and Shum (2004) for a
calculation of the rate at which price converges to the true value in large common-value auctions. Jackson
and Kremer (2007) show that the result of Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) does not generalize to an auction
with price discrimination. See Kremer and Skrzypacz (2005) for related results concerning the link between
information aggregation and the properties of order statistics.
6There is extensive work on information aggregation and the role of prices in various other market contexts.
For example, see Reny and Perry (2006) and Cripps and Swinkels (2006) for large double auctions; Vives (2011)
and Rostek and Weretka (2012) for markets for divisible objects; Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990), Wolinsky
(1990), Golosov et al. (2011), Ostrovsky (2012), Lauermann and Wolinsky (2015) and Lambert et al. (2016)
for search markets and markets with dynamic trading.
7Also, see Lauermann and Virág (2012) who study the incentives of an auctioneer to release information
in a single-unit common-value auction where bidders who do not win an object from the auction receive an
outside option.
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a single-object single-market auction and Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997)’s analysis implies
that the information aggregation properties of a multi-unit auctions differ substantially from
the information aggregation properties of an auction with a single object. (2) In our model
the distribution of types is determined by the participation decision of the bidders while in
their paper the auctioneer’s solicitation strategy determines the number of bidders. This im-
plies that in our model participation decisions are type dependent while in theirs it is type
independent but state dependent. In Murto and Valimaki (2014)’s model, potential bidders
must pay a cost to participate in the auction. This creates type dependent participation as
in our model. However, in contrast to this paper, they focus on a single-object, single-market
auction, mainly focus on characterizing equilibria with two bidders and their emphasis is not
on information aggregation.
Lauermann and Wolinsky (2014) and Atakan and Ekmekci (2014) also present models
where information aggregation can fail in a large common-value auction.8 In both of these
papers, information aggregation fails because there is an atom in the bid distribution (i.e.,
many types submit the same pooling bid) and the auction price is equal to this atom (pooling
bid) with positive probability in both states of the world. In this paper, although the bid
distribution may feature atoms, the failure of information aggregation is not caused by these
atoms. In fact, we show that information aggregation fails either because the auction is not
sufficiently competitive9 or because, although the auction is competitive, the same set of types
determine the price in every state due to the pattern of self-selection.10 In the equilibrium that
we construct, we show that the limit price distribution is atomless over a non-trivial interval
of prices which occur with positive probability in every state.
The literature on competition between mechanism designers or auctioneers is also related
to this paper. See for example past work by McAfee (1993), Peters and Severinov (1997) and
Burguet and Sákovics (1999). These papers study the competition between auctioneers who
compete for bidders by offering different selling mechanisms or by choosing different reserve
prices. These papers differ from the analysis here because their focus is on competition between
auctioneers in an independent private values framework whereas our focus is on information
aggregation in an auction with common but unknown values.
Finally, there is growing literature on fragmented markets where an independent, private
value asset is traded in many different exchanges instead of just one central exchange (see for
example Ellison et al. (2004), Malamud and Rostek (2014) and Peivandi and Vohra (2016)).
Our focus in this paper is different as we study a common-value environment and we focus
on information aggregation. However, our results suggest a mechanism through which frag-
mentation may reduce the informational efficiency of prices if agents self-select across multiple
8Also, see Axelson and Makarov who study a model where the winner of a single-object common-value
auction must make an ex-post investment in order to put the object into productive use which is related to
Atakan and Ekmekci (2014).
9Information aggregation fails because self-selection into the auction implies that the number of bidders
who are not allocated objects is finite with positive probability in both states, i.e., Pesendorfer and Swinkels
(1997)’s double-largeness conditions fails.
10In this case the number of bidders who are not allocated objects is infinite with probability one in both
states, i.e., Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997)’s double-largeness conditions is satisfied, but information aggre-
gation nevertheless fails.
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markets which differ in institutional details.
2. The Model
We study a sealed-bid, uniform-price auction with n bidders and bκsnc = ks identical
objects where κs ∈ (0, 1).11 Each bidder has unit demand and puts value V on a single object,
and value 0 on any further objects. Each of the ks highest bidders receives an object and pays
a price P . Thus, a bidder who wins a good at price P enjoys utility V − P .
The value V (or the state) is common across players, but is unknown. The value is drawn
from a finite set V ⊂ [0, 1] according to a common prior pi(v) = 1/|V| where v denotes an
arbitrary element of V. We focus on a uniform prior which puts equal probability on all value
for expositional simplicity only and none of our results depend on this assumption. For much
of the paper we assume that V = {0, 1}. In section 5, we discuss the case where V is an
arbitrary finite subset of [0, 1].
Each bidder receives a signal θ ∈ [0, 1] according to a continuous, increasing cumulative
distribution function F (θ|V = v) := F (θ|v) which admits a density function f (θ|v).12 Con-
ditional on V = v, the signals are identically and independently distributed. After observing
their private signal, bidders can choose to submit a bid in the auction market, they can select
their outside option, or they can choose neither and receive a payoff equal to zero. We will
ignore the agents’ option of choosing “neither” since this option is dominated by bidding zero
in the auction market.13 We consider both exogenous outside options and endogenous
outside options. The endogenous outside option’s value is determined in auction markets that
run parallel to the auction under consideration. We will describe the outside options in more
detail in the relevant sections.
A bidder does not observe anything beyond her private signal when deciding which bid to
choose in the auction. The goods are sold using a closed-bid uniform-price auction where the
auction price is equal to the highest losing bid if there are more bidders than there are goods.
If the number of bidders is less than or equal to the number of goods, then the auction price
is equal to zero. Ties are broken uniformly and randomly.
We assume that signals contain a bounded amount of information, i.e., there is a
positive constant η such that
1
η
< f(θ|v) < η
for all θ ∈ [0, 1] and all v ∈ V. Also, we assume that the signals satisfy the monotone
likelihood ratio property (MLRP) which we formally define below.
11The largest integer not greater than x is denoted by bxc.
12For any half open interval (θ′, θ′′], we use F ((θ′, θ′′]|v) := F (θ′′|v)−F (θ′|v), i.e., slightly abusing notation,
we also use F to denote the measure induced (by Lebegue’s theorem) by the cumulative distribution function.
13Ignoring the option of choosing “neither” is justified because we focus on the symmetric equilibrium of
the model. If we allowed for the option of choosing “neither,” then this option would not be chosen by any
type in any symmetric equilibrium of the model. Therefore, the set of symmetric equilibrium outcomes with
this option is the same as the set of symmetric equilibrium outcomes without this option. The reasoning is as
follows: if a positive mass of types were to choose “neither” in a symmetric equilibrium, then any bidder who
submits a bid equal zero in the auction would win an object with strictly positive probability in state V = 1.
Thus, all types who choose “neither” and receive a payoff equal to zero would rather bid zero in the auction
and receive a strictly positive expected payoff.
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Definition 2.1 (MLRP). The signals satisfy MLRP if (1) the likelihood ratio,
l(v, v′|θi = θ) := f (θ|v)
f (θ|v′) ,
is nondecreasing in θ for any v > v′; and (2) the signals contain some information, i.e., the
signals satisfy the following two conditions:
a. l(v, v′|θi = 1) > l(v, v′|θi = 0);
b. l(v, v′|θi = θ) is continuous at θ = 0 and θ = 1.
Definition 2.2 (Strict MLRP). The signals satisfy strict MLRP if the likelihood ratio
l(v, v′|θi = θ) is increasing in θ for any v > v′.14
2.1. Strategies and Equilibrium. After observing their signal, each bidder submits a bid
in auction m ∈ M where M is the finite set of markets and m is an arbitrary element of
M .15 We allow for an arbitrary finite set of options denoted by M even though we focus
mainly on the case where M = {s, r}. We represent strategies by distributional strategies.
A distributional strategy is a measure H on [0, 1] ×M × [0,∞) with marginal distribution
F (θ) =
∑
v pi(v)F (θ|v) on its first coordinate (see Milgrom and Weber (1985)). A symmetric
strategy profile is one in which all players use the same distributional strategy H and we
refer to a symmetric strategy profile by simply the strategy H. For a given strategy H, we
define the distribution of signals in auction m as Fm(θ) := H ([0, θ]× {m} × [0,∞)), we
set F¯m(θ|v) = Fm(1|v) − Fm(θ|v) and we define a selection function am : [0, 1] → [0, 1] as
the function such that Fm(θ) =
∫ θ
0 am(θ)dF (θ).
16 In words, am(θ) is the probability that an
agent chooses to bid in auction m when she receives signal θ. A symmetric bidding strategy
in market m is pure if there is function b : [0, 1] → [0,∞) such that H({θ,m, b(θ)}θ∈[0,1]) =
H ([0, 1]× {m} × [0,∞)) = Fm(1).17
The notation PrH represents the joint probability distribution over states of the world,
signal and bid distributions, allocations, market choices, and prices, where this distribution
is induced by the symmetric strategy H. We denote by uH(m, b|θ) the payoff to type θ from
bidding b in auction m ∈M if players are using strategy H and we denote by uH(θ) type θ’s
payoff under strategy H. We denote by Y n(k) the kth highest signal out of n signals. Also,
we let Y nm(k) denote the kth highest signal in auction m and we set Y nm(k) equal to zero if
there are fewer than k bidders in auction m.
We focus on the symmetric Nash equilibria of the game Γ and we refer to a symmetric Nash
equilibrium simply as an equilibrium.18 We also find it convenient to define an auction where
14Under strict MLRP signals contain information as a consequence of the strict monotonicity assumption.
Therefore, we do not need to impose a further requirement that signals contain some information as we did in
the definition of MLRP (i.e., conditions (2) a. and b. are superfluous).
15If the chosen option is an exogenous outside option, then the player’s bid has no payoff or equilibrium
consequence.
16Mathematically a is the Radon-Nikodym derivate of Fs with respect to F and is unique up to almost every
θ ∈ [0, 1]. The distributional strategy’s definition implies that Fs is absolutely continuous with respect to F .
17If b represents H, then so does any function that is equal to b at almost every θ ∈ [0, 1].
18Also, we say that H is a bidding equilibrium in market s if H(· × {s}× ·) is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
for the auction Γs where the distribution of participating types is given by Fs.
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participation in the auction is exogenously determined by a function Fm(·) that is absolutely
continuous with respect to F (·). More precisely, given Fm we define am : [0, 1] → [0, 1] as
the function such that Fm(θ) =
∫ θ
0 am(θ)dF (θ) and we denote by Γˆ(Fm) the auction where
each player of type θ is allowed to bid in the auction with probability am(θ) and assigned a
payoff equal to zero with the remaining probability 1 − am(θ). We say that H is a bidding
equilibrium for market m if H (· × {m} × ·) is a Nash equilibrium for the auction Γˆ(Fm) where
participation is determined by Fm(θ) := H ([0, θ]× {m} × [0,∞)). Intuitively, in a bidding
equilibrium H, the market selection of players implied by H need not be a best response to
the strategy profile but the bidding behavior of players implied by H is a best response to the
bidding strategies of others given the exogenously fixed participation decisions.19
The lemma further below allows us to work exclusively with pure and nondecreasing bid-
ding strategies. Let E(θ′) = {θ : l(v, v′|θi = θ) = l(v, v′|θi = θ′), ∀v, v′ ∈ V} . Each set E(θ′) is
comprised of types who receive signals which have the same information content. If E(θ′) is
not a singleton, then H may involve a range of bids given a signal in E(θ′). However, it is
easily seen that for any such H, there is another strategy which is pure and increasing on each
E(θ′), such that this strategy yields the same payoff to the player, and is indistinguishable to
any other player. Strategies which differ only in their representation over sets E(θ′) generate
the same joint distribution over values, bids, and equilibrium prices. In what follows we choose
a representation of H which is pure and increasing over sets E(θ′).
Lemma 2.1. If signals satisfy MLRP, then any bidding equilibrium H for market m can be
represented by a nondecreasing bidding function b.
2.2. Information Aggregation, Sequences and Pivotal Types. We study a sequence
of games Γn where the nth game has n bidders and bnκmc = km objects for sale in auction m.
Along the sequence games Γn, the state space, the good to bidder ratio (κm) signal distribution
and payoffs (i.e., all primitives except the number of objects and the number of bidders) are
kept the same. The behavior in the sequence of games is described by a sequence of strategies
H = {Hn}∞n . We say that H is an equilibrium sequence if Hn is an equilibrium of Γn for each
n.
The random variable Pns describes the price in an auction where bidder behave according
to strategy Hn. Our definition of information aggregation is given below:20
Definition 2.3 (Information Aggregation.). (Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) and Kremer
(2002)) A sequence of strategies H aggregates information in market s if Pns
p→ V , i.e., if
Pns converges in probability to 0 and 1 whenever V = 0 and 1, respectively.
Lemma 2.1 showed that bidding is monotone in equilibrium. This implies that we can
define a certain type θHs (v) for each state v such that the expected number of players who
submit a bid above this type’s bid in state v, i.e, F¯Hs (θHs (v)|v), is exactly equal to the number
19Note that if H is an equilibrium of Γ, then H (· × {s} × ·) is a Nash equilibrium for the auction Γˆ(Fs) where
participation is determined by Fs(θ) := H ([0, θ]× {s} × [0,∞)) and therefore H is also a bidding equilibrium
for market s.
20In the appendix we also study a weaker notion of information aggregation that is termed informativeness
(Definition B.2) also used in Kremer (2002) and Atakan and Ekmekci (2014).
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of goods in market s. We refer to θHs (v) as the pivotal type in state v because the types
that determine the auction price are concentrated around θHs (v) in a large market by the
law of large numbers (see Lemma B.1 for a precise statement of this fact). The pivotal
types are particularly important for our analysis because understanding whether information
is aggregated reduces to understanding whether the bids of the types which determine the
price converge to v. The pivotal types and some other concepts, which we use frequently, are
defined below.
Definition 2.4 (Pivotal types). For any symmetric strategy H and market m ∈M define the
pivotal type θHm(v) in state v and market m as the type such that
θHm(v) = max
{
θ : F¯Hm (θ|v) = κm
}
and we set θHm(v) = 0 if the set is empty.21 Also, let θFm(v) be the type such that F¯ (θFm(v)|v) =
κm, in words, θFm(v) is the pivotal type in state v if all types where to bid in the auction m.22
Definition 2.5 (Value and belief conditional on being pivotal). Define the likelihood of being
pivotal as follows:
l(Y n−1m (k) = θ, θi = θ) = l(θi = θ)
2
(
Fnm(θ|1)
Fnm(θ|0)
)n−k−1( F¯nm(θ|1)
F¯nm(θ|0)
)k−1
where
l(θi = θ) :=
f(θ|1)
f(θ|0) .
Define the value of a type conditional on being pivotal, i.e., E[V |Y n−1m (k) = θ, θi = θ], as
follows:
βnm(θ) =
l(Y n−1m (k) = θ, θi = θ)
1 + l(Y n−1m (k) = θ, θi = θ)
. (2.1)
Note that the bidding function βnm(θ) involves bidding one’s value condition being pivotal
and is identical to the bidding function described by Wilson (1977), Milgrom (1979) and
Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997).
Definition 2.6 (Sequences and limits). For any sequence of strategies {Hn} we will denote
each θHnm (v) simply by θnm(v), we let θm(v) = limn θnm(v) and Fm(θ|v) = limFnm(θ|v) whenever
such limits exist.23 For Fm(θ|v) = limFnm(θ|v), we define am : [0, 1] → [0, 1] as the function
such that Fm(θ|v) =
∫ θ
0 am(θ)dF (θ|v).24
21The equation F¯Hm (θ|v) = κm can have multiple solutions if FHm is flat over a range of θ (it is nondecreasing
but not necessarily increasing.) However, the function F¯Hm (θ|v) is continuous because it is absolutely continuous
with respect to F¯ (θ|v). Hence, the set {θ : F¯Hm (θ|v) = κm} ⊂ [0, 1] is compact and has a unique maximal
element if it is nonempty.
22In this case F¯ (θ|v) = κm has a unique solution because F is increasing.
23Such limits always exist possibly along a subsequence. This is because the sequence {θn(v)} is a subset
of [0, 1] and because {Fnm(θ|v)} is a sequence of nondecreasing, continuous and bounded functions that has a
subsequential limit by Helly’s theorem.
24The fact that each an is uniformly bounded implies that Fs(θ|v) is a absolutely continuous with respect to
F (θ|v) and therefore the function a is well defined.
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3. Information Aggregation with an Exogenous Outside Option
In this section, we focus on the case where each player chooses between bidding in auction s
and an exogenously given outside option r. The definition below summarizes the assumptions
that we make on the outside option.
Definition 3.1 (Exogenous Outside Options). If a player selects the exogenous outside option,
then the player’s payoff is equal to u(r|v) := u(r|V = v) which is nondecreasing in v. We
define
E[u(r|V )] =
∑
v∈V
u(r|v)
|V|
V ar[u(r|V )] =
∑
v∈V
u(r|v)2
|V| − E[u(r|V )]
2
We assume that
E[u(r|V )|θi = 1] =
∑
v∈V
u(r|v) f(1|v)∑
v∈V f(1|v)
> 0,
i.e., the outside option is valuable for at least some types sufficiently close to θ = 1.
On the other hand, if a player selects market s and wins an object, then his payoff is equal
to V −Ps and if the player chooses the auction but is unsuccessful in winning an object, then
his payoff is equal to zero.25
The main assumption that we make is that the outside option’s state dependent value
is positively correlated with the auctioned object’s value. This assumption is natural in our
setting because it is satisfied by the endogenous outside option that we discuss in the next
section and because this assumption generates the more interesting dynamics. However, our
analysis easily extends to the case where u(r|v) is nonincreasing and we discuss the unique
equilibrium of the auction under this assumption as Corollary 3.2 in subsection 3.2.
This section’s main theorem shows that an outside option with positive variance will disrupt
information aggregation if the fraction of goods in the auction, κs, exceeds a certain cutoff κ∗.
The corollary to this theorem then argues that if, in addition to the variance, the expected value
of the outside option is also positive, then information is not aggregated in market s in any
equilibrium irrespective of the fraction of goods in market s. In the following subsection, we
turn to characterizing equilibria in an auction with an exogenous outside option. In particular,
in Proposition 3.1 we show that the game has a unique equilibrium if u(r|0) ≥ 0. In Proposition
3.2, we characterize the properties of all equilibria for the case where u(r|0) < 0 if the variance
of the outside option is smaller than a cutoff.
25Note that the outside option is no longer available to bidders in market s who are unable to win an object
from the auction. This assumption is motivated by a situation where the outside option is generated in a
market that runs concurrently with market s (such as our model with an endogenous outside option). Also,
this assumption is sensible if the outside option is viewed as an entry cost into the auction. This assumption
might not be satisfied in other conceivable circumstances. However, our conclusions related to the failure of
information aggregation (presented as Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1) continue to hold true even if the outside
option is available to bidders who bid in auction s but are unable to win an object.
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3.1. Failure of Information Aggregation. In order to state our main theorem, we first
define a cutoff κ∗ for the fraction of goods in auction s which we will use in the statement of
our theorem.
Definition 3.2. For any θ′ ∈ [0, 1), let
κ∗(θ′) = max
θ∈[0,θ′]
{
F (θ′|1)− F (θ|1) : F (θ′|1)− F (θ|1) ≥ F (θ′|0)− F (θ|0)}
and let κ∗(θ′) = 0 if the set over which the maximum is taken is empty. Note that κ∗(θ′) < 1.26
To better understand the above definition, consider a strategy H where all types greater
than θ′ select the outside option r while all types smaller than θ′ bid in the auction s. The
cutoff κ∗(θ′) is defined so that, if the fraction of goods in market s is greater than κ∗(θ′),
then the pivotal type in state v = 0, θHs (0), exceeds the pivotal type in state v = 1, θHs (1).
Such an ordering of pivotal types is ruled out by MLRP if all types participate in the auction.
However, given strategy H, MLRP implies that the measure of players selecting the auction
is smaller in state v = 1 than in state v = 0. This implies that κ∗(θ′) is always less than one
and therefore there is an open interval (κ∗(θ′), 1) such that if κ ∈ (κ∗(θ′), 1), then the ordering
of the pivotal types is reversed, i.e., θHs (0) > θHs (1). In fact, our main theorem argues that
information cannot be aggregated in an equilibrium where the order of the pivotal types is
reversed. See Figure 3.1 for a graphical depiction of κ∗(θ′). Our main theorem also shows
that if the fraction of goods is less than the cutoff κ∗(θ′) and if the variance of the outside
option is lower than a certain cutoff u¯ (formally defined by equation (D.1)), then information
is aggregated by every equilibrium sequence.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that MLRP is satisfied. Suppose that players have access to outside
options as defined by Definition 3.1 and let θ′ = inf{θ : E[u(r|V )|θi = θ] > 0}.
i. If κs > κ∗(θ′), then no equilibrium sequence H aggregates information.
ii. Let u¯ be the constant defined by equation (D.1) in the appendix. Suppose that strict
MLRP is satisfied and that V ar[u(r|V )] < u¯.27 If κs < κ∗(θ′), then any equilibrium
sequence H aggregates information.
Corollary 3.1. Suppose that players have access to outside options as defined in Definition
3.1. Assume that strict MLRP is satisfied. If E[u(r|V )] ≥ 0 and V ar[u(r|V )] > 0, then
κ∗(θ′) = 0 and therefore there is no equilibrium sequence H that aggregates information for
any κ > 0. Alternatively, assume that MLRP is satisfied. If E[u(r|V )] > 0, then κ∗(θ′) = 0
and therefore there is no equilibrium sequence H that aggregates information for any κs > 0.28
26Suppose that the set under consideration is non-empty. Under strict MLRP, there is a unique point where
the functions F (θ′|1)−F (θ|1) and F (θ′|0)−F (θ|0) cross and κ∗(θ′) is equal to the value at this point. Under
MLRP the two functions may coincide over a range of θs. In such a case κ∗(θ′) is equal to the highest value
where F (θ′|1)− F (θ|1) and F (θ′|0)− F (θ|0) are equal.
27The assumption of strict MLRP can be relaxed and replaced by the likelihood ratio function l(θ) being
increasing at the type θ such that l(θ) = 1, i.e., that strict MLRP be satisfied locally around θ such that
l(θ) = 1.
28To see that κ∗ = 0. Note that if E[u(r|V )] ≥ 0 and V ar[u(r|V )] > 0, then E[u(r|V )|θi = θ] > 0 for all
types for which l(θi = θ) > 1; and if E[u(r|V )] > 0 and V ar[u(r|V )] > 0, then E[u(r|V )|θi = θ] > 0 for all
types for which l(θi = θ) ≥ 1. Therefore, F (θ′|1)− F (θ|1) < F (θ′|0)− F (θ|0) for all θ < θ′ and hence κ∗ = 0.
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Pr(θi ∈ [θ, θ′])
θ
g(θ|1) = F (θ′|1)− F (θ|1)
g(θ|0) = F (θ′|0)− F (θ|0)
κ∗
θ(κ∗)
κ
θHs (1) θ
∗
θHs (0)
Figure 3.1: The cutoff κ∗. The function g(θ|v) depicts the fraction of types above θ that bid in
auction s in state v given that all types θ > θ′ take the outside option. Note that MLRP and
θ′ < 1 implies that g(0|0) = F (θ′|0) > g(0|1) = F (θ′|1). Also, note that g(θ|1) and g(θ|0) can
cross at most once under strict MLRP because the ratio of their slopes −f(θ|1)f(θ|0) is decreasing
in θ. We define κ∗ as the value of g at the point where the two functions cross. Therefore, if
κ > κ∗, then the pivotal type in state v = 0 exceeds the pivotal type in state v = 1. If the
functions never cross, then g(θ|0) > g(θ|1) for all θ < θ′ and we then define κ∗ = 0. In this
case θHs (0) > θHs (1) for any κ.
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Remark 3.1. Theorem 3.1 is stated under the assumption that V = {0, 1}. In section 5, we
discuss the case where V is any arbitrary finite subset of [0, 1] and we show that the findings
presented in Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 fully generalize.
We now provide some intuition for Theorem 3.1: If information is aggregated in market
s, then the equilibrium payoff of submitting any bid b in market s is equal to zero. This is
because the price in this market converges to the object’s value in each state and therefore
no bidder can make a profit in this market. First, suppose that 0 ≤ u(r|0) < u(r|1). In this
case, the expected value of the outside option is positive for all types θ. However, if the payoff
from the outside option is positive and if information is aggregated in market s, then no player
would choose market s in equilibrium. This implies that information cannot be aggregated in
market s under the assumption that 0 ≤ u(r|0) < u(r|1).
Instead suppose that u(r|0) < 0 < u(r|1). In this case, the value of the outside option is
positive for all types that exceed a certain cutoff θ′ = inf{θ : E[u(r|V )|θi = θ] > 0}. This is
because of a single crossing property: We know that E[u(r|V )|θi = θ] > 0 for a certain
subset of types θ because we assume E[u(r|V )|θi = 1] > 0. Moreover, E[u(r|V )|θi = θ] > 0 for
all θ > θ′ because all types θ > θ′ put more weight on state V = 1 than θ′ as a consequence
of MLRP. If information is aggregated in market s, then all types above θ′ would select the
outside option because the value of the outside option is positive for these types while the
equilibrium value from bidding in market s is zero for all types. For example, if E[u(r|V )] = 0,
then θ′ is the type such that l(θi = θ′) = 1. In this case the value of the outside option is
negative for all θ < θ′ because l(θi = θ) < 1 implies that E[u(r|V )|θi = θ] < E[u(r|V )] = 0
and positive for all θ > θ′ because l(θi = θ) > 1 implies that E[u(r|V )|θi = θ] > E[u(r|V )] = 0
The final step in the argument concludes that all types that exceed θ′ opting for option
r and information aggregation in market s taken together are incompatible with bidders be-
having according to a monotone bidding function as we claimed that they must in Lemma
2.1 if κ > κ∗(θ′). More precisely, if all types that exceed θ′ select the outside option then
we find that θs(0) > θs(1) under our assumption that κ > κ∗(θ′) (see figure 3.1). Our as-
sumption of information aggregation in market s implies that limn→∞ bns (θns (1)) = 1 and
limn→∞ bns (θns (0)) = 0. However, this provides the contradiction that proves the result. The
findings that limn→∞ bns (θns (1)) = 1 and limn→∞ bns (θns (0)) = 0, and θs(0) > θs(1) together
contradict that the bidding function is nondecreasing in θ for all n.
Returning to the example where E[u(r|V )] = 0 we find that only types with l(θi = θ) < 1
would select market s. However, if l(θi = θ) < 1 for all types in market s, then we have that
θs(0) > θs(1). To see this, note that θs(0) is the type such that
∫ θ∗
θs(0)
f(θ|0)dθ = κ. But, we
know
∫ θ∗
θs(0)
f(θ|1)dθ < ∫ θ∗θs(0) f(θ|0)dθ because l(θi = θ) = f(θ|1)f(θ|0) < 1 for all θ < θ∗. Therefore,
we conclude that
∫ θ∗
θs(0)
f(θ|1)dθ < κ which establishes θs(1) < θs(0).
3.2. Equilibrium Construction and Characterization. Theorem 3.1 showed that in-
formation is not aggregated in market s. However, the proof of the theorem was by contradic-
tion and therefore did not provide much insight into actual equilibrium behavior. Propositions
3.1 and 3.2 aim to describe equilibrium behavior in an auction with an outside option in greater
detail. Proposition 3.3 further below constructs an equilibrium for the case where the outside
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option is valueless for a subset of types.
3.2.1. An Outside Option which is Valuable for all Types. In Proposition 3.1 below, we
assume that u(r|0) > 0, i.e., we focus on the case where the outside option’s value is strictly
positive for all types. In this case, there is a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, all types
above a certain cutoff, i.e., the more optimistic types, select the auction market s and bid
according to a strictly increasing bidding function. In particular, each type submits a bid
which is equal to that type’s value conditional on the event that they win an object from the
auction at a price equal to their own bid, i.e, βns (θ) = E[V |Y n−1s (k) = θ, θi = θ] defined in
equation 2.1. This bidding function is identical to the bidding function of Pesendorfer and
Swinkels (1997).
Proposition 3.1. Assume that MLRP is satisfied and that players have access to outside
options as defined by Definition 3.1. If u(r|0) > 0, then the auction Γn has a unique equilibrium
Hn for all n. In the unique equilibrium sequence H, the following properties are satisfied:
i. There is a certain cutoff type θˆn such that all types θ < θˆn opt for the outside option.
ii. All types θ > θˆn bid in the auction according the increasing bidding function βns (θ).
iii. All bids converge to one, i.e., βns (θ)→ 1 for all θ > θˆ = lim θˆn.
iv. Moreover, lim |Fns (1|1)− κ|
√
n = x <∞ and Fs(1|0) < κ.
v. If V = 0, the price converges to zero almost surely. If V = 1, then the price converges to
a random variable which is equal to zero with probability q > 0 and equal to one with the
remaining probability. Moreover, q = E[u(r|V )|θi = θˆ] l(θi=θˆ)1+l(θi=θˆ) if the function l(θi = θ)
is continuous at θi = θˆ.29
It is worthwhile highlighting some properties of the equilibrium identified by the above
proposition: If a bidder bids in the auction, then the bidder behaves as he does in the equi-
librium of the auction without an outside option (item ii). Therefore, the bid of the pivotal
type in state V = 1 and also the bids of all types that exceed θs(1) must converge to one.
This further implies that if there are many bidders in the auction, then the payoff of these
bidders would converge to zero. Hence, only types above the pivotal type θs(1) participate
in the auction but all types who participate bid aggressively (Items iii and iv). In fact, the
number of bidders in the auction is less than the number of goods with probability one in state
V = 0 and with probability q > 0 in state V = 1.30 Bidders who participate in auction s are
compensated for foregoing the outside option by occasionally winning a good at a price equal
to zero in state V = 1. Information aggregation fails because there are fewer bidders than
29In the appendix we study a weaker notion of information aggregation that is termed informativeness. A
sequence of equilibria in a large auction is termed informative (Definition B.2), if an outside observer can learn
the state asymptotically by simply observing the equilibrium price. Note that the equilibrium price is not
informative either. This is because the price is equal to zero with positive probability in both states.
30The probability q can be viewed as the amount of information not contained in the auction price. Note
that item v implies that as the value of the outside option becomes small for all types, q converges to zero. In
other words, if the auction is perturbed by an outside option whose value is small, then the information lost
in the auction is also small.
15
there are goods with positive probability, i.e., information aggregation fails because of a lack
of competition for objects.31,32 Moreover, although information aggregation fails, a price
close to one is fully revealing because such a price occurs with positive asymptotic probability
only if V = 1.
Remark 3.2. If u(r|0) = u(r|1) > 0, then the auction that we study is equivalent to an auction
with costly entry. However, the analysis here differs from Murto and Valimaki (2014)’s analysis
of a common-value auction with costly entry. In contrast to this paper, Murto and Valimaki
(2014) assume that the object’s value is positive in the bad state and exceeds the cost of entry.
Under this assumption, information cannot be aggregated since if it were, then no bidder
would have an incentive to pay the entry cost. However, our equilibrium characterization does
not cover the case considered by Murto and Valimaki (2014). This is because under their
assumption bidders would have an incentive to pay the entry cost and bid in the auction if
the expected number of bidders is less than the number of objects on auction in the bad state
as we find in Proposition 3.1.
Throughout this paper we assume that the value of the exogenous outside option is posi-
tively correlated with the object on auction. We maintain this assumption because the endoge-
nous outside options that we discuss in the next section generate such correlations. However,
the characterization that we provided in Proposition 3.1 also covers the case where the outside
option is negatively correlated with the object on auction. The following corollary discusses
this case.
Corollary 3.2. Assume that MLRP is satisfied and that the value of the exogenous outside
option is u(r|v) is nonincreasing in v. If E[u(r|V )|θi = θFs (1)] > 0, then the unique equilib-
rium of the auction is the equilibrium described by Proposition 3.1. Therefore, the equilibrium
sequence H does not aggregate information. If instead E[u(r|V )|θi = θFs (1)] < 0, then the
unique equilibrium of the auction is described by Proposition 3.1 item i and ii. In this case,
the equilibrium sequence H aggregates information.
3.2.2. An Outside Option which is Valuable for a Subset of Types. The following proposition
focuses on the case where the outside option is valuable for some bidders and possibly valueless
for others (u(r|0) < 0). In this case, there are a large number of equilibria and it is difficult to
describe all equilibria succinctly. However, if the outside option’s value is small for all types,
i.e., if the variance of the outside option V ar[u(r|V )] is less than a certain cutoff value u¯ > 0
(which depends on the signal distribution and κs), then it is possible to characterize equilibria.
The exact expression for u¯ is given in the appendix as equation (D.1). In the next proposition,
we focus on the case where V ar[u(r|V )] < u¯ and we outline the properties of all equilibria
under this restriction. In the next subsection, we construct an equilibrium with the properties
described in the proposition below.
31The failure of information aggregation can be related to a failure of the double largeness concept introduced
by Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997). Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) showed that information is aggregated
if and only if the number of goods and the number of losers not allocated goods converge to infinity. They
termed this double largeness. In the unique equilibrium described by Lemma 3.1 double largeness fails with
probability one in state v = 0 and it fails with positive probability in state V = 1.
32A similar indeterminacy also arises in the take-over model presented in Ekmekci and Kos (2016) although
the decisions are binary in their model.
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Proposition 3.2. Assume that MLRP is satisfied and that players have access to outside
options as defined by Definition 3.1. Suppose that u(r|0) < 0, κ > κ∗(θ′) and V ar[u(r|V )] < u¯
where θ′ and u¯ are defined in Theorem 3.1 and equation (D.1), respectively. Then, along every
equilibrium sequence H,
i. Fs(1|v) ≥ κ for v = 0, 1. Moreover, if E[u(r|V )|θi = 0] < 0, then Fs(1|v) > κ for
v = 0, 1.
ii. lim
√
n|Fns (θns (1)|v)−Fns (θns (0)|v)| <∞ for v = 0, 1, i.e., the distance between the pivotal
types is at the order of 1/
√
n.33
It is worthwhile highlighting some of the properties of the equilibria described by Propo-
sition 3.2: Theorem 3.1 shows that information is not aggregated in market s under the
hypothesis of Proposition 3.2. Proposition 3.2 further shows that the expected number of
bidders who are not allocated a good converges to infinity in both states. Therefore, the fail-
ure of information aggregation is not caused by a lack of competition as in Proposition 3.1.34
Proposition 3.2 also argues that the pivotal types in state v = 0 and v = 1 are arbitrarily close
to each other. This is a consequence of the way in which types self-select into market s in
equilibrium. Information aggregation fails because the auction clears at the bids of the same
set of types in all states and this is exactly because the pivotal types are arbitrarily close to
each other in equilibrium. Interestingly and in contrast to Proposition 3.1, this configuration
of pivotal types implies that there are no fully revealing prices: any set of prices that occur
with positive probability in state V = 0 also occur with positive probability in state V = 1 and
vice versa. Therefore, the posterior belief of an outside observer about the state will remain
strictly bounded away from zero and one after observing the price in market s.
A central finding of Proposition 3.2 is that the pivotal types converge to each other as
n grows large. The argument for this is as follows: If the pivotal types do not converge to
each other, then two alternative limiting outcomes are possible: (1) The pivotal types do not
submit the same pooling bid and therefore their bids converge to two distinct values, i.e.,
lim bn(θns (1)) > lim b
n(θns (0)). However, then information is aggregated which is ruled out by
Theorem 3.1. (2) The pivotal types submit the same pooling bid. In this case, a key argument
shows that the pooling price must remain larger than a uniform and positive lower bound in
order for pooling to be possible. A high pooling price implies that in state V = 0 the bidders’
loss at the pooling bid exceeds their loss if they choose outside option r. This however implies
that market selection has a cutoff structure: optimistic types above a threshold choose market
s and all other more pessimistic types choose option r. But such a selection implies that
information is aggregated in market s which is again incompatible with Theorem 3.1. Ruling
33In the appendix we study a weaker notion of information aggregation that is termed informativeness. Our
finding that Fs(1|v) > κ for v = 0, 1 and the fact that information is not aggregated in market s together imply
by applying Lemma B.3 that the price in market s is not informative according to Definition B.2 either.
34The finding Fns (1|v) > κ for v = 0, 1 implies that the double largeness condition of Pesendorfer and
Swinkels (1997) is satisfied in equilibria. This condition would have implied information aggregation if there
were no selection effects. However, information is not aggregated in spite of the fact that double largeness
is satisfied in equilibrium. Thus, Lemma 3.2 shows that the information aggregation failure is caused purely
through selection in instances where the outside option is only valuable for a subset of agents.
17
out these two alternative outcomes leaves only the equilibrium configuration where that pivotal
types must be arbitrarily close to each other.
3.2.3. Summary of the Equilibrium Characterization Results. Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 out-
lined two different ways in which information aggregation fails in equilibrium: if u(r|0) ≥ 0,
then information aggregation fails because of a lack of competition. On the other hand,
if u(r|0) < 0 and V ar[u(r|V )] < u¯, then information aggregation fails because the pivotal
types are arbitrarily close to each other.
The case where u(r|0) < 0 and the outside option’s variance is large, i.e., V ar[u(r|V )] > u¯,
is not covered by these two propositions. In this case, there are a large number of other
equilibrium configurations which lead to the failure of information aggregation. One of these
configurations that does not appear in the previous two propositions is a situation where the
pivotal types do not converge to each other as in Proposition 3.2 but information aggrega-
tion nevertheless fails because the pivotal types pool at the same bid. We discuss such an
equilibrium in Example D.1 presented in appendix.
3.2.4. Equilibrium Construction with Binary Signals. In this subsection, we construct an
equilibrium with the properties described by Proposition 3.2. For the construction we focus
on a setup with a binary signal structure. In particular, we assume the following:
Definition 3.3. All signals θ ∈ [0, 12 ] = E(0) provide the same bad news about the state while
all signals θ ∈ [12 , 1] = E(1) provide the same good news. Agents receive a good signal, i.e., a
signal θ ∈ [12 , 1] with probability fh in state V = 1 and probability fl < fh in state V = 0.
Therefore, l(θi = θ) = fh/fl for θ ∈ [12 , 1] and l(θi = θ) = (1− fh)/(1− fl) for θ ∈ [0, 12 ].
The following proposition describes the equilibrium that we construct.
Proposition 3.3. Assume that the signals satisfy Definition 3.3 and agents have access to an
exogenous outside option with u(r|0) = −c and u(r|1) = c. There exists a constant c∗ such
that if c ∈ (0, c∗), then there exists an N such that for all n > N , there is an equilibrium Hn
with the following properties:
i. There is a cutoff type θn1 >
1
2 such that types θ > θ
n
1 select market r and all other types
select market s.
ii. There is a cutoff type θnp ∈ (0, 1/2) and a pooling bid bnp such that bns (θ) = bnp if θ < θnp ,
i.e., all types below θnp submit the pooling bid and all types θ > θnp bid according to the
increasing bidding function βns (θ) defined in equation 2.1.
iii. The cutoff type θnp is the unique θ ∈ (0, 1/2) that satisfies the following equality:
l(Y n−1s (k) = θ, θi = θ) = l(Y
n−1
s (k) ≤ θ, θi = θ) (3.1)
iv. The price in market s converges to a random variable Ps(v) for v = 0, 1. The random
variables {Ps(v)}v=0,1 both have atomless distributions over the interval (bp, 1] with full
support and atoms at bp where bp = lim bnp .
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Remark 3.3. Although we assume a binary signal structure in Proposition 3.3 for simplicity, our
equilibrium construction is more general. In fact, an identical equilibrium can be constructed
using the steps that we follow if there are finitely many signals and if κs is sufficiently large.
The equilibrium constructed in Proposition 3.3 provides further insight into equilibrium
behavior under the assumptions of Proposition 3.2. The proposition describes both equilibrium
bidding behavior as well as the pattern of sorting across options. In particular, equilibrium
bidding has the following properties: (1) the bidding function bns is strictly increasing for
θ > θnp . Therefore, types θ > θnp who bid in market s submit a bid equal to their valuation
conditional on being pivotal. (2) The bidding function has a pooling region. In fact, all types
θ ≤ θnp submit a bid equal to the pooling bid bnp , i.e., the pooling region extends from 0 to θnp .
(3) Pooling starts at the unique type such that the belief of type θnp conditional on observing
that the price is equal to the pooling bid (i.e., l(Y n−1s (k) ≤ θnp , θi = θnp )) is equal to this type’s
belief conditional on the price being equal to βn(θnp ) > bnp , (i.e., l(Y n−1s (k) = θ, θi = θ)) (4)
At the limit, the auction clears at a price equal to the pooling price with strictly positive
probability in both states. In fact, lim
√
n|Fs(θns (v)|v) − Fs(θnp |v)| < ∞, i.e., the type θnp is
arbitrarily close to the pivotal type in both states. (5) The limit price distributions have full
support over the set [bp, 1] where
lim bnp = lim
l(Y n−1s (k) ≤ θnp , θi = θnp )
1 + l(Y n−1s (k) ≤ θnp , θi = θnp )
= lim
l(Y n−1s (k) = θnp , θi = θnp )
1 + l(Y n−1s (k) = θnp , θi = θnp )
= limβn(θnp ) ∈ (0, 1)
in both states. Therefore, a continuum of prices are possible in both states.
To better understand the equilibrium price distribution note that all types θ > θs(0)
submit a bid equal to one at the limit and all θ < θs(0) submit the pooling bid at the limit.
However, the equilibrium price is determined by θn which are within a finite number of standard
deviations of θns (0), i.e., types θn such that z(θ) = lim
√
n|Fns (θn|0)−Fns (θns (0)|0)| <∞. Note
that z(θ) < ∞ implies lim√n|Fns (θn|1) − Fns (θns (1)|1)| < ∞. Therefore, the same set of
types are within a finite number of standard deviations of θns (1) and hence determine the
price when v = 1. Figure 3.2a focuses on such types and depicts bidding behavior for types
which are within z standard deviations of θs(0) and therefore θs(1). Also, applying a central
limit theorem allows us to characterize the distribution of the price in closed-form. Figure 3.3
depicts the cumulative price distribution for a particular parametric example.
The proposition also shows that selection in equilibrium has a cutoff structure: types above
the cutoff θn1 select the outside option while the remaining types select market s. Proposition
3.2 established that the pivotal types converge to each other at the limit in any equilibrium,
i.e., θs(1) = θs(0). However, θs(1) = θs(0) implies that the limit of the cutoff types, θn1 , is
equal to 1+κ2 and the pivotal types converge to
1−κ
2 . Therefore, in this equilibrium a portion of
the agents who receive high signal, i.e., those above 1+κ2 , select market r while others with the
high signal select market s. Hence, agents who receive the high signal are indifferent between
the two options, i.e., un(s, bns (θ)|θ) converges to u(r|θ = 1) for all types θ ∈ [1/2, 1]. On the
other hand, the payoff of the agents who receive the low signal (θ ∈ [0, 1/2]) converges to zero.
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Bid bs(z)
z
z = −1.39
bp = 0.06
(a) Bidding Function: Types with z <
−1.39 submit the pooling bid and all types
with z > −1.39 bid according to the strictly
increasing function β(z) = limβn(θn).
z
Likelihood Ratio
l(z) L(z)
z = −1.39
(b) Likelihood Functions and the determination
of θnp : l(z) = lim l(Y n−1s (k) = θn, θi = θn),
L(z) = lim l(Y n−1s (k) ≤ θn, θi = θn) and the
two curves cross at a unique z = −1.39.
Pr(bp wins|P=bp,v=1)
Pr(bp wins|P=bp,v=0)
z
z = 2.73
1
Pooling possible / no winner’s curse
(c) Loser’s and Winner’s Curse at the Pooling bid: The y-axis is the rela-
tive likelihood of winning at the pooling bid if all bidders below z submit
the pooling bid. For z > 2.73 there is winner’s and loser’s curses at pooling
(i.e., lim Pr(bp wins|P=bp,V=1)
Pr(bp wins|P=bp,V=0) > 1) therefore pooling cannot be sustained. For
z < 2.73 there is no winner’s or loser’s curse (lim Pr(bp wins|P=bp,V=1)
Pr(bp wins|P=bp,V=0) < 1) and
hence pooling can be sustained.
Figure 3.2: Equilibrium Construction: In this example fh = 0.6, fl = 0.4 and κ = 0.5. Types
are on the x-axis and measured by their distance, in standard deviations, from the pivotal
type θs(0), i.e., z = lim
√
n
κ(1−κ)(F
n
s (θ
n|0)− Fns (θns (0)|0)).
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Pr[P ≤ p|v]
p
v = 0
v = 1
Figure 3.3: Limit Cumulative Price Distribution of V = 0 and V = 1.
For these agents, the outside option is valueless by assumption. In market s these types do
not obtain any payoff either. This is because these types are willing to submit the pooling bid
and the probability of winning an object at the pooling bid converges to zero.
A key difficulty in the equilibrium construction arises from the fact that l(Y n−1s (k) =
θ, θi = θ) is decreasing for all θ < θs(0) for sufficiently large n (see figure 3.2b). Lemma 2.1
implies that the bidding function must be nondecreasing. Moreover, if the bidding function
is increasing for some θ, then the bid of this θ must be equal to βns (θ) =
l(Y n−1s (k)=θ,θi=θ)
1+l(Y n−1s (k)=θ,θi=θ)
(this fact is well known and follows from Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997)). However, if the
likelihood function is decreasing at θ, then the bidding function cannot be equal to βns (θ)
because if it were to equal βns (θ), then it would be decreasing contradicting Lemma 2.1. Thus
we conclude that there must be pooling in the range of types where l(Y n−1s (k) = θ, θi = θ) is
decreasing.
In constructing the equilibrium, we choose the type where pooling ends, i.e., type θnp , so
that this type is exactly indifferent between submitting the pooling bid and outbidding the
pooling bid just slightly. In a key step of the construction, we argue that this choice of pooling
region ensures that l(Y n−1s (k) = θ, θi = θ) is increasing (and therefore βns (θ)) beyond the
pooling region. See figure 3.2b for a depiction. When constructing the equilibrium we also
argue that the pooling region that we choose ensures that there is no winner’s curse at pooling,
i.e., winning an object from pooling is more likely when v = 1. See figure 3.2c for a depiction.
In order to construct an equilibrium, we show that there is a value for lim
√
n|Fns (θns (0)|0)−
Fns (θ
n
s (1)|0)| which ensures that the high types are indifferent between market s and the outside
option r for sufficiently large n. In particular, we argue if lim
√
n|Fns (θns (0)|0)− Fns (θns (1)|0)|
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is sufficiently large, then (1) the pooling price is small, (2) the expected price is close to zero
if V = 0 and the expected close to 1 if V = 1. In this case the high types’ payoff is close
to zero in market s. On the other hand, if lim
√
n|Fns (θns (0)|1) − Fns (θns (1)|1)| is sufficiently
small, then we show that the expected price in state V = 1 is small and the high types’ profit
in market s dominates the outside option. Therefore, we are able to apply the intermediate
value theorem to conclude that there is a value for lim
√
n|Fns (θns (0)|0) − Fns (θns (1)|0)| which
leaves the high types exactly indifferent between the two options for all n sufficiently large.
We use results from moderate deviations theory (See, for example, Lesigne (2005)) in order
to construct this equilibrium. In particular, a central limit theorem and a local limit theorem
imply that the density and the cumulative distribution of the random variable
√
n(Fns (Y
n−1(k)|v)−
Fns (θ
n
s (v)|v)) are approximated well by the normal density and the normal cumulative distribu-
tion for sufficiently large n. Moreover, the pivotal types that set the price are arbitrarily close
to each other in the equilibrium that we construct, or more precisely, lim
√
n|Fns (θns (1)|v) −
Fns (θ
n
s (0)|v)| <∞. We use these key facts to approximate the functions l(Y n−1s (k) ≤ θ, θi = θ),
l(Y n−1s (k) = θ, θi = θ) and therefore the increasing bidding function βns (θ). Moderate devi-
ations theory implies that l(Y n−1s (k) = θn, θi = θn) converges to the likelihood ratio of two
normal densities and l(Y n−1s (k) ≤ θ, θi = θ) converges to the likelihood ratio of two nor-
mal cumulative distributions which have the same variance but have means which differ by
lim
√
n|Fns (θns (1)|0)−Fns (θns (0)|0)|. Also, moderate deviations theory allows us to approximate
the relative probability of winning at the pooling bid using the reciprocal Mill’s ratio for the
normal distribution (see Sampford (1953) for a discussion of the reciprocal Mill’s ratio and
figure 3.2c for a depiction). Moreover, moderate deviations theory further implies that the
convergence of the above mentioned functions is uniform over all sequences {θn} such that
lim
√
n|Fns (θn|0) − Fns (θns (0)|0)| < ∞. We then use these insights to solve for an equilibrium
at the limit and then argue that there is an equilibrium for all n above a cutoff N because the
convergence of all functions that are relevant to constructing an equilibrium is uniform over
all sequences {θn} such that lim√n|Fns (θn|0)− Fns (θns (0)|0)| <∞.
4. Information Aggregation with an Endogenous Outside Option
In this section, we focus on the case where each player chooses between two actual concur-
rent auction markets. Our aim is to demonstrate how frictions in one market can endogenously
generate the outside option payoff profile which can hinder information aggregation in another
frictionless market.
We assume that there are bnκrc objects for sale in market r in additional to the bnκsc
objects that are on auction in market s and κs + κr < 1. The objects for sale in the two
markets are identical. The auction format in market r is identical to the auction format in
market s except for a reserve price c ≥ 0. The following definition summarizes our assumption
on the reserve price.
Definition 4.1 (Endogenous Outside Options). The uniform price in market r is equal to the
maximum of c and the highest losing bid in market r if there are more bidders than objects
and the price is equal to c otherwise. We assume that the reserve price is known by all players
and that c < Pr(v = 1|θi = 1), i.e., we assume that there are some types who would want to
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purchase the object at the reserve price.
This section’s main theorem shows that market r, which has a reserve price c > 0, serves
as an outside option with positive variance for market s. Therefore, if the fraction of goods
in market s, i.e., κs, exceeds a certain cutoff κ∗(θ∗) which we describe further below, then the
logic of Theorem 3.1 implies that information is not aggregated in market s in any equilibrium
sequence. The theorem also considers two additional cases: (1) the reserve price in market r
is equal to zero and (2) the fraction of goods κs < κ∗(θ∗). In such cases the theorem argues
that information is aggregated in market s. In the next subsection we turn to characterizing
equilibrium behavior and constructing an equilibrium when the reserve price in market r is
not large.
Before stating our main theorem, we first need to define a certain cutoff type θ∗ which we
will use in the theorem.
Definition 4.2. Recall that θFr (1) is the type such that 1− F (θFr (1)|1) = κr.35 Let
θ∗ = max
{
θFr (1), inf{θ : Pr(V = 1|θi = θ) > c}
}
.
To better understand the definition, consider a hypothetical sequence of strategiesH where
all types greater than θ∗ select auction r while all types lower than θ∗ bid in auction s.
Moreover, suppose that in the sequence H all types who select market r bid according to a
strictly increasing bidding function. Given such a sequence H, the type θ∗ is defined as the
smallest type who makes a positive profit in market r in an arbitrarily large auction. Note
that θ∗ must be at least as large as θFr (1) because only those types greater than θFr (1) can
actually win an object in the auction in state V = 1. Also, note that any type θ > θFr (1)
will make a profit in market r only if Pr(V = 1|θi = θ) > c because any such type will win
an object with probability one given H in both states and will pay a price which is at least
equal to c. The definition of this lowest type is more delicate than the similar definition used
in Theorem 3.1 because in order to define the lowest type who makes a profit in market r we
need to consider the fact that profits depend on the equilibrium bid distribution.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that MLRP is satisfied. Suppose that the outside option r is the
auction market described by Definition 4.1 and let κ∗(θ∗) < 1 denote the cutoff defined by
Definition 3.2.
i. If c > 0 and if κs > κ∗(θ∗), then no equilibrium sequence H aggregates information in
either market.
ii. If c = 0, then any equilibrium sequence H aggregates information in both markets.
iii. Let c¯ denote the cutoff defined in equation (E.1) in the appendix. Suppose that strict
MLRP is satisfied and that 0 < c < c¯. If κs < κ∗(θ∗), then any equilibrium sequence H
aggregates information in market s.
35 In words, θFr (1) is the pivotal type in state 1 if all types where to bid in the auction r.
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Item i of Theorem 4.1 shows that information aggregation fails in market s if there is an
alternative market r with a reserve price. The failure of information aggregation in market r
is straightforward: price cannot converge to value if V = 0 by assumption because the reserve
price is positive. The price cannot converge to value if V = 1 either. This is because if it
did, then any bidder who bought a good from this market would make a loss. The failure of
information aggregation in market s is driven by two main forces identified in Theorem 3.1
and Lemma 3.2: (1) Market r provides an outside option with positive variance for market
s, (2) The fact that κs > κ∗(θ∗) implies that the value of participating in market r is non-
negative for a sufficiently large portion of the bidders. Item ii of the theorem further argues
that without the reserve price, i.e., if market r is also frictionless, then information aggregation
is restored in both markets. Therefore, market r cannot generate the outside option payoff
profile that results in a failure of information aggregation without a reserve price. Finally, the
theorem argues that if the fraction of goods in market s is less than the cutoff value κ∗(θ∗),
then information is aggregated in market s for all small enough values of the reserve price.
Remark 4.1. This theorem is one example of an alternative market which provides an outside
option that can hinder information aggregation. There are many other institutional configu-
rations that could result in a similar outcome. Suppose that the alternative market r uses a
different auction format and in particular suppose that (1) Market r is pay-as-you-bid (dis-
criminatory price) auction as in Jackson and Kremer (2007), where all bidders who win an
object from the auction pay their own bid, or (2) Market r is an all-pay-auction as in Chi et al.
(2016). The payoff distribution in these alternative auction formats have similar properties to
the payoff distribution in market r as described by Theorem 4.1: payoffs are negative in state
V = 0 and positive in state V = 1. Therefore, our analysis suggests that information would
not be aggregated in market s because of the existence of an outside option which would lead
to only certain types selecting auction market s.
Remark 4.2. Theorem 4.1 assumes that the set of options available to bidders is M = {s, r}.
In the appendix we show that if there is a market r with a possible reserve price c ≥ 0 and an
arbitrary number of markets without reserve prices, then the conclusions of Theorem items i
and ii continue to hold, that is information is not aggregated in any market M \ r if c > 0
and if
∑
m∈M\r κm exceeds a certain threshold and information is aggregated in all market if
c = 0.
Intuitively, information aggregation fails in market s under the assumptions of item i even
though this market is frictionless because bidders with lower signals, i.e., more pessimistic
bidders, self select into market s. This, in turn, implies that there are many more bidders who
are willing to pay at least the bid of θs(1) in the bad state, i.e., the demand for goods is higher
in the bad state. The fact that the demand is high at the bid of θs(1) exactly when people
do not value the goods implies that market s cannot clear properly. Thus, information is not
aggregated in this market because this selection effect overwhelms competitive forces.
In order to provide more precise intuition suppose that c is less than Pr(V = 1|θFr (1)) so
that θ∗ = θFr (1). On the way to a contradiction, assume that information is aggregated in
market s: that is, the price converges to one in state 1 and zero in state 0. Therefore, the
24
payoff of any type that bids in market s is equal to zero.
We first argue that the market selection function has a cutoff structure with all types that
exceed θ∗ opting for market r: At the limit, bidders face a choice between market s, where
their payoff is equal to zero, and market r, where their payoff is strictly negative if v = 0. The
choice is essentially identical to the choice that bidders faced in the case where they had an
exogenously given outside option as in Theorem 3.1. Therefore, the argument for Theorem
3.1 implies a single crossing property, i.e., all types that exceed θ∗ opt for market r.
The final step in the argument concludes that all types that exceed θ∗ opting for market r
and information aggregation in market s taken together are incompatible with bidders behaving
according to a monotone bidding function as we claimed that they must in Lemma 2.1. More
precisely, if all types that exceed θ∗ select market r and if κ > κ∗(θ∗), then we find θs(0) >
θs(1) (see figure 3.1). Our assumption of information aggregation in market s implies that
limn→∞ bns (θns (1)) = 1 and limn→∞ bns (θns (0)) = 0. However, this provides the contradiction
that proves the result. The findings that limn→∞ bns (θns (1)) = 1 and limn→∞ bns (θns (0)) = 0,
and θs(0) > θs(1) together contradict that the bidding function is increasing for all n.
The argument for item ii depends on an intermediate result that shows that if θm(1) >
θm(0) in a particular market and if the measure of types bidding in this market when V = 1
is greater or equal to the measure of bidders when V = 0 , i.e, Fm(1|1) ≥ Fm(1|0), then
information is aggregated in marketm. This intermediate result implies that information must
be aggregated in at least one market. This is because if, say, information is not aggregated
in market s and if Fr(1|1) < Fr(1|0), then Fs(1|1) > Fs(1|0). Also, using MLRP we observe
that Fs(1|1) > Fs(1|0) implies θs(1) > θs(0). But then Fs(1|1) > Fs(1|0) and θs(1) > θs(0)
together imply that information is aggregated in market s.
If information is aggregated in market s, then the payoff to bidders in market s is equal to
zero. The fact that information is not aggregated in market r means that the price is greater
than zero with positive probability if V = 0. Thus, the payoff in market r is strictly negative if
V = 0. But then a single-crossing property implies that all types that exceed θr(1) would opt
for market r. Consequently, applying MLRP we establish that 1−F (θr(1)|1) > 1−F (θr(1)|0).
This, however, contradicts the fact that θr(1) ≤ θr(0) because 1 − F (θr(1)|1) = κr implies
that 1− F (θr(1)|0) < κr and thus θr(1) > θr(0) .
4.1. Equilibrium Characterization and Construction. In this subsection, we provide
a characterization for all equilibria under the assumption that κ > κ∗(θ∗) and the reserve price
is below a certain cutoff c¯. The cutoff c¯ is a function of the signal distribution f(·|v) and the
fractions of goods in the two markets κs and κr. An explicit formula for the cutoff c¯ can be
found in the appendix as equation (E.1). We then construct an equilibrium that displays the
properties described by the characterization in an environment where there are two distinct
signals.
Proposition 4.1 (Characterization). Suppose that MLRP is satisfied and that the outside
option r is the auction market described by Definition 4.1 Let c¯ denote the cutoff defined in
equation (E.1). Assume that κs > κ∗(θ∗) and that c < c¯. For any sequence of equilibria,
i. In market r, lim
√
n|Fnr (1|1)− κr| <∞ and Fr(1|0) < κr.
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ii. If V = 0, then the price in market r converges to c with probability one. If V = 1, then
the price in market r converges to a random variable which is equal to c with probability
q > 0 and equal to one with the remaining probability.
iii. The expected prices are equal across states and markets. In particular, limE[Pns |V =
0] = limE[Pnr |V = 0] = c and limE[Pnr |V = 1] = limE[Pns |V = 1].
iv. Expected payoffs limun(θ) = 0 for all θ < min{θs(1), θr(1)} and
limun(θ) = Pr[V = 1|θi = θ](1− limE[Pnr |V = 1])− cPr[V = 0|θi = θ]
for all θ > min{θs(1), θr(1)}.
v. In market s, the distance between the pivotal types converges to zero at rate
√
n, more
precisely, lim
√
n|Fs(θns (1)|1)− Fs(θns (0)|1)| <∞.
This characterization shows that equilibrium behavior in market r is identical to the equi-
librium we described in Proposition 3.1 while equilibrium behavior in market s is similar to the
equilibrium that we described in Proposition 3.2. In market r, equilibrium bidding is strictly
increasing and information aggregation fails because of a lack of competition, i.e., because the
number of bidders in the market is less than the number of objects in both states of the world
with positive probability. In market s, in contrast, the number of bidders exceeds the number
of objects with probability one in both states. However, information aggregation fails because
the bids of same set of types determine the auction price in both states and this is a result of
the pattern of self selection across markets.
Remark 4.3. Price converging to value is a strong form of information aggregation. In fact,
since the reserve price exceeds the object’s value in state V = 0, information aggregation in
market r is ruled out by assumption. In the appendix we study a weaker notion of informa-
tion aggregation that is termed informativeness also used by Kremer (2002) and Atakan and
Ekmekci (2014). A sequence of equilibria is termed informative (Definition B.2), if an outside
observer can learn the state asymptotically by simply observing the equilibrium price.36 The
results presented in Proposition 4.1 imply that the prices are not informative either. Propo-
sition 4.1, item i implies that Fns (1|v) > κs for v = 0, 1. However, Fns (1|1) > 0 and the fact
that information is not aggregated in market s together imply by applying Lemma B.3 that
the price in market s is not informative according to Definition B.2. Also, Proposition 4.1,
item iii, i.e., the fact that the price is equal to zero with positive probability in both states,
implies that the price in market r is not informative either.
Remark 4.4. Theorem 4.1 showed that an outside observer would not learn the state with
certainty after observing the prices in the two markets separately. The above characterization
theorem further implies that an outside observer could not deduce the state with certainty
even if she observed the price in both markets. This is because the price is equal to the reserve
36A reserve price does not necessarily rule out an equilibrium sequence from being informative according to
Definition B.2.
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price with strictly positive probability in both states and the support of the price distribution
in market s is identical across both states.37
4.1.1. Equilibrium Construction with Binary Signals. In this subsection, we construct an
equilibrium with the properties described by Proposition 4.1. For the construction, we again
focus on a setup with a binary signal structure as in Proposition 3.3.
Proposition 4.2 (Construction). Suppose that MLRP is satisfied and that the outside option
r is the auction market described by Definition 4.1 Assume that the signals satisfy Definition
3.3. There exists a constant c∗ such that if κs > fh−κrfh and if c ∈ (0, c∗), then there exists an
N such that for all n > N , there is an equilibrium Hn with the following properties:
i. All types θ ∈ [0, 1] are indifferent between the two markets. Moreover, there are cutoffs
1 > θn1 >
1
2 and 0 < θ
n
0 <
1
2 such that types θ ∈ (θn0 , θn1 ) select market s and the remaining
types select market r.
ii. In market s, there is a cutoff type θnp ∈ (θn0 , 1/2) which satisfies equation (3.1) and a
pooling bid bnp such that all types θ ∈ (θn0 , θnp ), submit the pooling bid bnp and all types
θ ≥ θnp bid according to the increasing bidding function βns (θ) defined in equation (2.1).
iii. Types in market r bid according to the increasing function βnr (θ) defined in equation (2.1)
and limn βnr (θ) = 1 for all types θ that submit a bid in market r.
iv. The price in market s converges to a random variable Ps(v) for v = 0, 1. The random
variables {Ps(v)}v=0,1 both have continuous distributions over the interval (bp, 1] with
full support and atoms at bp where bp = lim bnp .
Behavior in market r was described precisely by Proposition 4.1. The equilibrium construc-
tion above provides further insight into behavior in market s. In particular, the construction
shows that (1) the bidding function bns is strictly increasing for θ > θnp . Therefore, types θ > θnp
who bid in market s submit a bid equal to their valuation conditional on being pivotal. (2)
The bidding function has a pooling region. In fact, all types θ ≤ θnp submit a bid equal to the
pooling bid bnp , i.e., the pooling region extends from 0 to θnp . (3) At the limit, the auction clears
at a price equal to the pooling price with strictly positive probability in both states. In fact,
lim
√
n|Fs(θns (v)|v)− Fs(θnp |v)| <∞, i.e., pooling starts at a type which is arbitrarily close to
the pivotal type in both states. Therefore, the bottom of the price distribution mimics the
price distribution in market r (4) The limit price distributions have full support over the set
[bp, 1] where bp < 1 in both states. Therefore, a continuum of prices are possible in both states.
In fact, it is possible to calculate the price distributions by applying a version of the central
limit theorem. We provide more detail about the limit price distributions in the appendix.
37To be more precise, the probability lim Pr(Y
n
s (k)=θ
n|V=1,(κr−Fnr (1|v=1))
√
n≥y)
Pr(Y ns (k)=θ
n|V=0,(κr−Fnr (1|v=0))
√
n≥y) ∈ (0,∞) for any y > 0 and
any sequence of θn such that
√
n|Fns (θn|v) − Fns (θns (v)|v)| < ∞ because of the central limit theorem. Note
that the likelihood ratio is the probability that the price is equal to the bid of θn given that the auction
clears at the reserve price in market r. Moreover, the pivotal type is the limit of a sequence of θn such that√
n|Fns (θn|v)− Fns (θns (v)|v)| <∞ with probability one for v = 0, 1.
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5. Multiple States
In this section we generalize Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 to the case where V is an
arbitrary finite set. In order to do so, we first begin by introducing a cutoff level for the
fraction of objects in market s which is analogous to the κ∗ introduced in Definition 3.2.
Definition 5.1. For θ′ < 1, let
κ∗v(θ
′) = max
θ∈[0,θ′]
{
F (θ′|v)− F (θ|v) : F (θ′|v)− F (θ|v) ≥ F (θ′|v′)− F (θ|v′) for all v′ < v}
where κ∗v(θ′) = 0 if the set over which the maximum is taken is empty. Let κ∗(θ′) =
minv∈V κ∗v(θ′).
To better understand the above definition, consider a strategy H where all types greater
than θ′ select the outside option r while all types lower than θ′ bid in the auction s. The
cutoff κ∗v(θ′) is defined so that, if the fraction of goods in market s is greater than κ∗, then
the pivotal type in state v, θHs (v), is less than the pivotal type in state v′, θHs (v′) for some
pair of states v′ < v. Such an ordering of pivotal types is ruled out by MLRP if all types
participate in the auction. However, given strategy H, MLRP implies that the measure of
players selecting the auction is smaller in state v than in state v′. This implies that κ∗v(θ′) is
always less than one and such a reversal of ordering occurs between state v and v′ whenever
κs > κ
∗
v(θ
′). The cutoff κ∗(θ′) is defined as the minimum over all κ∗v(θ′). Therefore there is
an open interval (κ∗(θ′), 1) such that if κs ∈ (κ∗(θ′), 1), then there is v > v′ such that the
ordering of the pivotal types is reversed in these states, i.e., θHs (v′) > θHs (v). In fact, our main
theorem will again argue that information cannot be aggregated if the order of the pivotal
types is reversed between any two states in equilibrium.
Theorem 5.1. Assume that V ⊂ [0, 1] is a finite set of states and MLRP is satisfied. Suppose
that players have access to outside options as defined by Definition 3.1 and let θ′ = inf{θ :
E[u(r|V )|θi = θ] > 0}. If κs > κ∗(θ′), then no equilibrium sequence H aggregates information.
Proof. Given Definition 5.1, the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 5.1. Suppose that players have access to outside options as defined in Definition
3.1. Assume that strict MLRP is satisfied. If E[u(r|V )] ≥ 0 and V ar[u(r|V )] > 0, then κ∗ = 0
and therefore there is no equilibrium sequence H that aggregates information for any κ > 0.
Alternatively, assume that MLRP is satisfied. If E[u(r|V )] > 0, then κ∗ = 0 and therefore
there is no equilibrium sequence H that aggregates information for any κ > 0.
Proof. The proof is in the main text below.
We will now provide the argument for Corollary 5.1. If information is aggregated in market
s, then we will argue below that we reach a contradiction. Suppose that strict MLRP is
satisfied and assume that E[u(r|V )] = 0 and V ar[u(r|V )] > 0. Consider any type θˆ such that
l(v, v′|θi = θˆ) = f(θˆ|v)/f(θˆ|v′) > 1 for any two states v > v′, i.e., θˆ is a signal that is more
likely in higher states than in lower states. For example, θ = 1 is such a type. Note that
E[u(r|V )|θi = θˆ] > 0 because θˆ puts uniformly more weight on higher states than on lower
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states as compared to the prior (i.e., the posterior of θˆ first order stochastically dominates the
prior). Therefore, if information is aggregated in market s any such type θˆ would opt for the
outside option r. Now pick the highest type θ′ who selects market s. Note that for this type
θ′, there exists a pair of states v > v′ such that l(v, v′|θi = θ′) ≤ 1 because otherwise this type
would select the outside option. Also, note that for any type θ < θ′ we have l(v, v′|θi = θ) < 1
because of strict MLRP and hence we find that l(v, v′|θi = θ) < 1 for all types who select
market s. However, if l(v, v′|θi = θ) < 1 for all types in market s, then we have that θs(v′) >
θs(v). To see this, note that θs(v′) is the type such that
∫ θ′
θs(v′) f(θ|v′)dθ = κ. But, we know∫ θ′
θs(v′) f(θ|v)dθ <
∫ θ′
θs(v′) f(θ|v′)dθ because l(v, v′|θi = θ) =
f(θ|v)
f(θ|v′) < 1 for all θ < θ
′. Therefore,
we conclude that
∫ θ′
θs(v′) f(θ|v)dθ < κ which shows that θs(v) < θs(v′). However, if information
is aggregated in market s, then limn→∞ bns (θns (v)) = v and limn→∞ bns (θns (v′)) = v′. However,
this provides the contradiction that proves the result. The findings that limn→∞ bns (θns (v)) = v,
limn→∞ bns (θns (v′)) = v′ and θs(v′) > θs(v) together with v > v′ contradict that the bidding
function is nondecreasing for all n.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
The results that we presented in the paper argued that the price in a large, uniform-price
common-value auction may not aggregate all available information if bidders have access to an
outside option whose value is correlated with the common-value object on auction. We showed
that exogenous as well as endogenous outside options can hinder information aggregation
because of the pattern of type dependent market selection that such outside options generate.
However, our discussion so far has not touched upon a number of issues that we will comment
on in conclusion. In particular, in this section we discuss (1) Equilibrium existence in the
model that we study, (2) Welfare properties of equilibria, (3) The amount of information
impounded by prices.
6.1. Equilibrium Existence. To the best of our knowledge, equilibrium existence in the
framework that we consider is not guaranteed by any result already in the literature. However,
if we restrict bids in all markets to a finite grid B = {0,∆, 2∆, ...,∞} where ∆ > 0 is the
fineness of the grid so that a symmetric distributional strategyH∆ is a probability measure over
[0, 1]×M×B, then equilibrium existence follows immediately from Milgrom and Weber (1985).
Also, all our information aggregation and information non-aggregation findings continue to
hold if we use the following definition: Let {Γn,∆} denote a sequence of auction with n bidders
where the fineness of the grid is ∆ and suppose that behavior in these auctions is described by
a sequence of strategies H = {Hn,∆}. The sequence H aggregates information in market
m if limn→∞ lim∆→0 P
n,∆
m = V where convergence refers to convergence in probability.
6.2. Efficiency. Our focus throughout the paper has been on the informational efficiency
of prices and we have not commented on equilibrium welfare. Typically, in common-value
auctions, welfare considerations are not particularly interesting because such auctions are
efficient as long as all objects are allocated to bidders. This is also true in auction that we study:
given the set of agents that participate in auction s, any allocation of objects to bidders where
all objects are allocated in state V = 1 is efficient. However, the market selection strategy
that players use in equilibrium has welfare implication. In fact, if information is aggregated in
29
market s, then every equilibrium outcome of the model that we study is asymptotically efficient
as the market grows arbitrarily large. On the other hand, if information is not aggregated in
market s, then the equilibria characterized in Propositions 3.2 and 4.1 remain inefficient even
as the market grows large.
In particular, assume an exogenous outside option with u(r|0) < 0 < u(r|1) < 1 and
consider a planner, with no knowledge of the state or the realized signals, who chooses a
market selection strategy µ : [0, 1] → {s, r}. That is, the planner chooses s or r for each
bidder only as a function of that bidder’s type θ. Recall that θ′, defined in Theorem 3.1, is
the smallest type θ such that E[u(r|0)|θi = θ] > 0. Assume that F (θ′|1) > κs. In this case,
the planner’s would optimally choose µ(θ) = r for all θ > θ′ and µ(θ) = s for all θ ≤ θ′. The
findings that we presented as Proposition 3.2 implies that all equilibria are inefficient under the
hypothesis of this proposition. In fact, the equilibrium that we construct in Proposition 3.3 is
inefficient because there is over entry into market s. Prices in market s remain bounded away
from the object’s value because bidders refrain from bidding the price higher in order to avoid
winning an object at a high price when V = 0. The fact that price remains bounded away from
the object’s value in market s implies that this market remains profitable for optimistic types.
However, this implies that inefficiently many optimistic bidders choose market s instead of
market r. In contrast, under the hypotheses of Theorem 3.1 item ii, information is aggregated
in market s, profits in market s are dissipated and types θ ≥ θ′ opt for the outside option in
every equilibria. Therefore such equilibrium outcomes are asymptotically efficient.38
The situation is similar for the case of an endogenous outside option. Recall that θ∗ is the
type introduced by Definition 3.2. Under the hypotheses of Proposition 4.1, a planner would
assign all types θ ≥ θ∗ to market r and the remainder to market s. However, Proposition 4.1
shows that this is not how types sort themselves across the two markets in equilibrium and
therefore the equilibrium outcomes are asymptotically inefficient. On the other hand, under
the hypotheses of Theorem 3.1 item iii, information is aggregated in market s and types θ ≥ θ∗
opt for market r in every equilibria. Therefore such equilibrium outcomes are asymptotically
efficient.
6.3. Continuity. Our results show that the equilibrium price does not aggregate informa-
tion under certain assumptions. However, we should stress that these results do not imply
that prices contain little or no information as the market grows large. In fact, our equilibrium
characterization and construction results imply that if the variance of the outside option is
small, then the information that is not incorporated into the equilibrium price is also small.
In other words, the equilibrium price in market s is close to the object’s value if the market is
perturbed by a “small” outside option. To be more price, in the case of an exogenous outside
option, Proposition 3.3 implies that limc→0 limn→∞ E[Pn,cs |V ] = V where Pn,cs denotes the
equilibrium price when u(r|1) = −u(r|0) = c. Moreover, in the case of an endogenous outside
option, Proposition 4.1 implies that limc→0 limn→ E[Pn,cm |V ] = V for m = r, s where Pn,cm de-
notes the price when the reserve price in market r is equal to c. Therefore, equilibrium price
converge to full information aggregation in a continuous way as the variance of the outside
38Under the hypotheses of Proposition 3.1, the unique equilibrium identified in this proposition is asymp-
totically efficient.
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option converges to zero.
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A. The Appendix: Preliminary Results
We first begin by stating a number of statistical results (with the relevant references) that
we will apply in our arguments.
Proposition A.1. (Chernoff’s Inequality) Suppose that X ∼ bi(n, p), i.e., X is a binomial
random variable with probability of success equal to p, then for any z ≥ 0
Pr (X ≥ np+ z) = 1−Bi(np+ z;n, p) ≤ exp
(
− z
2
2(np+ z3)
)
,
Pr (X ≤ np− z) = Bi(np− z;n, p) ≤ exp
(
− z
2
2np
)
.
Proof. See Janson et al. (2011, Theorem 2.1).
In the proofs, we use the following version of Chernoff’s Inequality. For any δ ∈ (0, 1),
Pr (X ≥ (1 + δ)np) ≤ exp
(
− δ
2np
2 + δ
)
,
Pr (X ≤ (1− δ)np) ≤ exp
(
−δ
2np
2
)
.
Proposition A.2. (Local Limit Theorem and Moderate Deviations Estimate for the Binomial
Distribution) For X ∼ bi(n, p), set
Pr (X = k) = bi(k;n, p) =
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k = 1 + δn(p)√
2pip(1− p)nφ
(
k − np√
p(1− p)n
)
where φ denotes the standard normal density. Then for t < 2/3, we have
lim
n→∞ supp:|np−k|<nt
δn(p) = 0,
i.e., the binomial density converges to the normal density uniformly over the set of p and k
such that |np− k| < ntfor t < 23 .
Proof. See Lesigne (2005, Proposition 8.2).
Proposition A.3. (Central Limit Theorem) Suppose, X ∼ bi(n, p), set an = k−np√
np(1−p) and
suppose that lim an = a. Then,
Pr (X ≤ k) = Bi(k;n, p)→ Φ (a)
where Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution. Moreover, the convergence is
uniform over all a ∈ (−∞,∞).
Proof. See Lesigne (2005, Proposition 8.3).
Proposition A.4. (Properties of the Mill’s Ratio) Define the reciprocal Mill’s ratio (or the
hazard function) for the standard normal as h(z) = φ(z)1−Φ(z) . Then the following inequalities
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are satisfied
h′(z) = h(z)(h(z)− z) ∈ (0, 1)
h′′(z) = h(z)((h(z)− z)(2h(z)− z)− 1) > 0
Proof. See Sampford (1953).
B. Bidding Equilibria
Recall that we say H is a bidding equilibrium for market m if H(×, {m},×) is a Nash
equilibrium for auction Γˆ(Fm) where Fm(θ) = H([0, θ]×{m}× [0,∞)). Fix a strategy H and
recall that uH(m, b|θ) denotes the payoff to type θ from submitting b to market m. Note that
if m = r and if r is an exogenous outside option, then uH(r, b|θ) = E[u(r|V )|θi = θ].
Proof of Lemma 2.1: Bidding is nondecreasing in any bidding equilibrium. The argument for
this lemma closely follows Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997, Lemmata 3-7). Fix a bidding equi-
librium H for market m.
Suppose there is a positive probability under H of a bid strictly above V = 1. Then there
is a positive probability that k + 1 bids, and thus the price is strictly larger than 1. But any
bid that wins with positive probability at a price above 1 is strictly worse than a bid of 1 and
we can conclude that bids are always less than 1.
Suppose there is a positive probability under H of a bid strictly below V = 0. Then a bid
of 0 wins with strictly greater probability if V = 1 than any bid strictly below 0 and makes
strictly positive profit if V = 1. We can then conclude that bids are always greater than 0.
Take any b′ < b < 1, let Y (b, b′) denote the event where a player wins an object with bid
b and does not win an object with bid b′ and suppose Pr(Y (b, b′)) > 0. Take any θ > θ′ such
that θ /∈ E(θ′). Note that θ > θ′ and θ /∈ E(θ′) implies that l(θi = θ′) < l(θi = θ). We argue if
u(b|θ′) ≥ u(b′|θ′), then u(b|θ) > u(b′|θ) where the reference to market m in the function u has
been suppressed for simplicity. Writing the utility that type θ′ enjoys from submitting bid b
we obtain
u(b|θ′) = u(b′|θ′) + Pr(Y (b, b′)|θ′)(E[V − P |Y (b, b′), θ′]).
Observing that
Pr(Y (b, b′)|θ′)(E[V − P |Y (b, b′), θ′]) = Pr(V = 0|θ′) Pr(Y (b, b′)|0)(0− E[P |Y (b, b′), 0]))
+ Pr(V = 1|θ′) Pr(Y (b, b′)|1)(1− E[P |Y (b, b′), 1])
we obtain
u(b|θ′)− u(b′|θ′) = Pr(V = 1|θ′) Pr(Y (b, b′)|1)(1− E[P |Y (b, b′), 1])+
Pr(V = 0|θ′) Pr(Y (b, b′)|0)(0− E[P |Y (b, b′), 0])) ≥ 0.
Note that u(b|θ′) − u(b′|θ′) ≥ 0 and Pr(Y (b, b′)) > 0 together imply that Pr(Y (b, b′)|1)(1 −
E[P |Y (b, b′), 1]) > 0. Because l(θi = θ′) < l(θi = θ) implies that Pr(1|θ)Pr(0|θ) > Pr(1|θ
′)
Pr(0|θ′) and because
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Pr(Y (b, b′)|1)(1− E[P |Y (b, b′), 1]) > 0 we obtain the following inequality
Pr(1|θ) Pr(Y (b, b′)|1)(1− E[P |Y (b, b′), 1]) + Pr(0|θ) Pr(Y (b, b′)|0)(0− E[P |Y (b, b′), 0])) > 0.
However, this implies that u(b|θ)− u(b′|θ) > 0.
Suppose θ∗ ∈ [0, 1] and b∗ ∈ [0, 1]. The argument above immediately implies that if
H([0, θ∗]× [b∗, 1]) > 0, then H((θ∗, 1]× [0, b∗)) = 0. The conclusion of the lemma then follows
directly from Lemma 6 in Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997).
B.1. Information Aggregation in Bidding Equilibria. In this subsection, we study
information aggregation in bidding equilibrium. The following lemma shows that the bids of
the pivotal types determine the auction clearing price in any bidding equilibria of a sufficiently
large auction.
Lemma B.1. Assume that MLRP is satisfied. If H = {Hn} is a convergent sequence of
bidding equilibria for market m, then for every  > 0,
lim Pr(Pnm ∈ [bnm(θnm(v)− ), bnm(θnm(v) + )]|V = v) = 1
Proof. The law of large numbers implies that lim Pr(Y nm(κn+ 1) ≥ θnm(v)− |v) = 1 for every
 > 0. However, if Y nm(κn + 1) ≥ θnm(v) − , then pnm = bnm(Y nm(κn + 1)) ≥ bnm(θnm(v) − )
because bnm is nondecreasing by Lemma 2.1. Therefore, Pr(pnm ≥ bnm(θnm(v) − )|V = v) ≥
Pr(Y nm(κn + 1) ≥ θnm(v) − |V = v) and taking limits proves the first part of the claim. We
establish lim Pr(Y nm(κn+ 1) ≤ θnm(ω) + |V = v) = 1 using the same idea.
We now introduce some notation. Given strategy H, denote by Pr(b wins|Pn = b, V =
v, θi = θ) the conditional probability that bidder i wins an object with a bid equal to b given
that the auction price is equal to b, the state is equal to v and bidder i receives a signal
equal to θ. Our assumptions that the signals are conditionally independent given the state
v and the strategy H is symmetric together imply that Pr(b wins|Pn = b, V = v, θi = θ) =
Pr(b wins|Pn = b, V = v). This is because once one conditions on the state, the individual
signal of bidder i, θi = θ, does not provide any additional information about the signals and
therefore the bids of other players (conditional independence). Moreover, this probability is
independent of the identity of the bidder that we consider, i.e., bidder i, because we focus on
symmetric strategies.
Definition B.1. We say that there is pooling by pivotal types in market m if there is a
sequence of pooling bids bnp with θ
n
p = inf{θ : bnm(θ) = bnp} < θnp = sup{θ : bnm(θ) = bnp} such
that
√
n(Fnm(θ
n
p |v) − Fnm(θnp |v)) → ∞, lim Pr(Pnm = bnp |v) > 0 for v = 0, 1, θp := lim θnp ≤
min{θm(1), θm(0)} and θp := lim θnp ≥ max{θm(1), θm(0)}. We say that there is no pooling
by pivotal types in market m if no such sequence exists.
Lemma B.2. Assume that MLRP is satisfied and fix a convergent sequence of bidding equi-
libria H = {Hn} for market m. Suppose that there is pooling by pivotal types in market m
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and suppose θp > θp. If θm(v) ∈ [θp, θp], then
lim Pr(bn wins|Pn = bn, V = v) = κm − (Fm(1|v)− Fm(θp|v))
Fm(θp|v)− Fm(θp|v)
=
κm − F¯m(θp|v)
Fm(θp|v)− Fm(θp|v)
Therefore, if θm(v) ∈ (θp, θp], then
lim Pr(Pn = bn, bn wins|V = v) = κm − (Fm(1|v)− Fm(θp|v))
Fm(θp|v)− Fm(θp|v)
=
κm − F¯m(θp|v)
Fm(θp|v)− Fm(θp|v)
Proof. We show if θm(v) ∈ [θp, θp), then
lim Pr(bn wins|Pn = bn, v) = κm − (Fm(1|v)− Fm(θp|v))
Fm(θp|v)− Fm(θp|v)
.
Note that lim Pr(Y n−1m (bnκc) ∈ (θm(v)− 1, θm(v) + 1)|Pn = bn, V = v) = 1 for every 1 > 0.
Let yn denote the random variable equal to the fraction of bidders who submit a bid equal to
bn including bidder i. Let gn denote random variable equal to the fraction of goods allocated
to the bidders bidding bn. Note that E[gn/yn|Pn = bn, V = v] = Pr(bn wins|Pn = bn, V = v).
Also let
x =
κm − (Fm(1|v)− Fm(θp|v))
Fm(θp|v)− Fm(θp|v)
.
For every  > 0, there is some 1 > 0 such that:
lim Pr
(
gn/yn ∈ (x− , x+ ) |Y n−1m (bnκc) ∈ (θm(v)− 1, θm(v) + 1), V = v
)
= 1.
This follows from the observation that for each of the bnκmc people who received signals above
some θ, the number of people who received a signal above θnp has a binomial distribution and the
LLN applies because θnp → θp and delivers that the fraction of people receiving signals above
θnp converges to the κ times the the probability that a bidder receives a signal above θp divided
by the probability that a bidder receives a signal above θ. Note that lim Pr(Y n−1m (bnκmc) ∈
(θm(v)− 1, θm(v) + 1)|Pn = bn, V = v) = 1 for every 1 > 0. Therefore,
lim Pr (gn/yn ∈ (x− , x+ ) |Pn = bn, V = v) = 1.
The fact that lim Pr (gn/yn ∈ (x− , x+ ) |Pn = bn, V = v) = 1 implies that limE[gn/yn|Pn =
bn, V = v] = x = lim Pr(bn wins|Pn = bn, V = v) which establishes the result.
We now consider the case where θm(v) = θp. We argue that
lim
Pr(Pn = bn, bn wins|V = v)
Pr(Pn = bn|V = v) = lim Pr(b
n wins|V = v, pn = bn) = 0.
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Notice that lim Pr(Y n−1m (bnκmc) ≥ θm(v)− |V = v, Pn ∈ [b(θnp ), b(θnp )]) = 1 for every  > 0.
Hence, for every  > 0 the following two equations are satisfied
lim Pr(yn > Fm(θp|v)− Fm(θp|v)− |V = v, Pn = bn) = 1
lim Pr(gn < |V = v, Pn = bn) = 1
Therefore,
Pr(bn wins|v, pn = bn) < Pr
(
yn > Fm(θp|v)− Fm(θp|v)− , gn < |V = v, Pn = bn
)
Fm(θp|v)− Fm(θp|v)− 
+ Pr(gn ≥ |V = v, Pn = bn)
Since lim Pr(gn ≥ |v, pn = bn) = 0 and since the inequality is true for all  > 0, we conclude
that lim Pr(win|V = v, Pn = bn) = 0.
If θm(v) ∈ (θp, θp), then lim Pr(Pn = bn|v) = 1 by LLN. Using the fact that lim Pr(Pn =
bn|V = v) = 1 and applying Bayes’ rule we find that
lim Pr(Pn = bn, bn wins|V = v) = lim Pr(Pn = bn|V = v)× lim Pr(bn wins|Pn = bn, V = v)
= lim Pr(bn wins|Pn = bn, V = v) = κm − (Fm(1|v)− Fm(θp|v))
Fm(θp|v)− Fm(θp|v)
,
if θm(v) ∈ (θp, θp). On the other hand, if θm(v) = θp, then Bayes’ rule and the LLN implies
that
lim Pr(Pn = bn, bn wins|V = v) = 0 = κm − (Fm(1|v)− Fm(θp|v))
Fm(θp|v)− Fm(θp|v)
,
completing the proof.
B.2. Information Aggregation and Informative price. Below we introduce a weaker
definition which was also used by Atakan and Ekmekci (2014). In particular, we say that a
sequence of equilibria in a large auction is informative, if an outside observer can learn the
state asymptotically by simply observing the equilibrium price. In other words, this definition
does not require that price converge to value but requires only that the price identify the state.
The precise definition is as follows:
Definition B.2. (Kremer (2002) and Atakan and Ekmekci (2014)) Let
l(v′, v|Pns = p) :=
Pr(V = v′|Pns = p)
Pr(V = v|Pns = p)
A sequence of strategies H is informative if for any v 6= v′ and any  > 0,
lim
n→∞Pr
(
Pns ∈
{
p : l(v′, v|Pns = p) ≤ 
} |V = v) = 1.
That is, the random variable l(v′, v|Pns ) converges in probability to zero in state v. We denote
this by l(v′, v|Pns ) p→ 0.39
39Kremer (2002) terms an auction informative if E[V |Pns ] − V p→ 0. This definition by Kremer (2002) and
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Remark B.1. Note that a reserve price c > 0 in market r rules out an equilibrium sequence
from aggregating information in market r according to Definition 2.3. However, such a reserve
price does not necessarily rule out an equilibrium sequence from being informative according
to Definition B.2.40
The following lemma relates Definition 2.3 and Definition B.2 in the current context with
an auction with endogenous participation. The lemma shows that if a sequence aggregates
information, then it is also informative. This part of the lemma follows from Kremer (2002).
The second part of the lemma also provides a partial converse: if the expected number of
bidders participating in the auction exceeds the number of goods, then informativeness also
implies information aggregation.
Lemma B.3. Fix an equilibrium sequence H.
i. If H aggregates information, then H is informative.
ii. If H is informative and Fnm(1|1) > κ, then H aggregates information in market m.
Lemma B.4 further below proves Lemma B.3 and also establishes some results that we will
use in our subsequent proofs. In particular, item i of Lemma B.4 shows that if a sequence is
informative, then the expected number of people who receive signals in between the signals
of the two pivotal types must converge to infinity at the order of
√
n. This implies that for
any price that one observes in state v one can reject the hypothesis that this price was the
bid of the k + 1st highest type in state v′ = v. The proof applies the central limit theorem
for quantiles and shows that if the κmth quantile in each state, i.e., the pivotal types, are not
sufficiently separated, then one cannot reject the hypothesis that the market clears at the bid
of the k + 1st highest type in state v even though the state is v′. Item ii of the lemma shows
that if there are many bidders between the pivotal types and the pivotal types do not pool
(as in Definition B.1), then an equilibrium sequence is informative. Hence, item ii is a partial
converse of item i. Item iii of the lemma argues that if the expected prices do not converge to
zero, then informativeness implies information aggregation. Intuitively, if bidders are paying
a positive price for a good in state V = 1, then it must be that the bidders are competing
for goods in state V = 1. However, if they know that they are in state V = 1 conditional
on winning an object, then the bidders will be willing to compete the auction price up to the
value of the object. Under the hypothesis that the price is informative, a sufficient condition
for competition to result in information aggregation is Fm(1|1) > κ, that is, for there to be
many bidders who are unable to buy an object in the auction.
Lemma B.4 (Proof of Lemma B.3 and related results). Assume that MLRP is satisfied and
fix a convergent sequence of bidding equilibria H = {Hn} for market m.
the above definition are equivalent.
40For another contrast between the two definitions in the context of a pay-as-you-bid auction (also referred to
as a discriminatory price auction), see Jackson and Kremer (2007). As noted by Jackson and Kremer (2007), in
a pay-as-you-bid auction, prices do not converge to value, however, in such an auction format any equilibrium
sequence is informative.
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i. If the sequence H is informative, then
√
n|Fnm[θnm(v)|v] − Fnm[θnm(v′)|v]| → ∞ for all
v′ 6= v and Pnm p→ 0 in state v = 0.
ii. If
√
n|Fnm[θnm(v)|v]−Fnm[θnm(v′)|v]| → ∞ for all v′ 6= v and there is no pooling by pivotal
types, then the sequence H is informative.
iii. If H is informative and limn max{E [Pnm|V = 0] ,E [Pnm|V = 1]} > 0, then H aggregates
information. Therefore, if H is informative and Fm(1|1) > κ, then H aggregates infor-
mation.
Proof. Fix an equilibrium bidding sequence H which is informative according to definition
B.2.
Claim.
√
n|Fnm(θnm(v)|v)− Fnm(θnm(v′)|v)| → ∞.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that F¯nm(θnm(v)|v) ≤ F¯nm(θnm(v′)|v) and assume that√
n(F¯nm(θ
n
m(v)|v) − κ) → ∞. We return to the case of
√
n(F¯nm(θ
n
m(v)|v) − κ) → x < ∞ at
the end of the claim’s proof. Suppose, on the way to a contradiction that
√
n|F¯nm(θnm(v)|v)−
F¯nm(θ
n
m(v
′)|v)| = x. The fact that f(θ|v)/f(θ|v′) ∈ (1/η, η) implies that √n|F¯nm(θnm(v)|v′) −
F¯nm(θ
n
m(v
′)|v′)| = x′ for some finite x′. Set σ = √κ(1− κ). Pick y > 0 and let
An =
{
p : p = bn(θ), |F¯nm(θ|v)− κ| ≤ σy/
√
n
}
,
i.e., An is the set of bids submitted by types in {θ′ : |F¯nm(θ′|v)− κ| ≤ σy/
√
n}. Note that the
Central Limit Theorem implies that
lim Pr (pn = p ∈ An|V = v) ≥ 2Φ (y)− 1,
the inequality does not necessarily hold with equality because types other than types in {θ′ :
|F¯nm(θ′|v)− κ| ≤ σy/
√
n} may also choose a bid in An also. Therefore,
lim
n
Pr
(
pn = p ∈ An|V = v′) ≥ Φ (y′ − x′)+ Φ (y′ + x′)− 1 > 0
where y′ = ηy (this follows from the fact that f(θ|v)/f(θ|v′) ∈ (1/η, η)). Hence,
lim Pr (pn = p ∈ An|V = v) > 0 and lim Pr (pn = p ∈ An|V = v′) > 0.
In other words, the auction price is in the setAn with strictly positive probability in both states.
We now derive a contradiction to information aggregation by showing that the likelihood ratio,
conditional on any price in the set An, is uniformly bounded away from 0 and∞. Proposition
A.2 implies that
lim
n
Pr(F¯nm(Y
n(k + 1)|v)− F¯nm(θn(v)|v) = z σ√n |V = v)
Pr(F¯nm(Y
n(k + 1)|v′)− F¯nm(θn(v)|v′) = z′ σ√n |V = v′)
=
φ (z)
φ(z′ + x′)
.
38
For each z ∈ [0, y] and each z′ ∈ [0, y′]
0 <
minz∈[0,y] φ (z)
maxz′∈[0,y′] φ (z′ + x′)
<
φ (z)
φ (z′ + x′)
<
maxz∈[0,y] φ (z)
minz′∈[0,y′] φ (z′ + x′)
<∞.
For any p ∈ An, if p is not part of an atom that extends beyond z ∈ [0, y] eventually along the
sequence, then
minz∈[0,y] φ (z)
maxz′∈[0,y′] φ (z′ + x′)
< lim
Pr (Pn = p|v)
Pr (Pn = p|v′) <
maxz∈[0,y] φ (z)
minz′∈[0,y′] φ (z′ + x′)
and if p is part of an atom that extends beyond z ∈ [0, y] infinitely often, then
0 < min
z∈[−x− y2 ,y]
{
Φ(z)− Φ(z − y
2
)
}
≤ lim Pr (P
n = p|V = v)
Pr (Pn = p|V = v′)
≤ 1
min
z′∈
[
−x− y′
2
,y′
] {Φ(z′)− Φ(z′ − y′2 )} <∞.
However, the inequalities above together with the fact that lim Pr (Pnm = p ∈ An|V = v) > 0
contradicts that the sequence H is informative.
We now return to the case of
√
n(F¯nm(θ
n
m(v)|v) − κ) → x < ∞. In this case, the cen-
tral limit theorem implies that the probability that the number or goods in the auction
exceeds the number of bidders is strictly positive in state v and therefore the probability
that the auction price is the minimum price (i.e, pn = c = 0) is strictly positive in state v.
More formally, 0 < limn Pr (Y n(k + 1) = 0|V = v) = Φ (x) . However, applying the central
limit theorem once again implies that if limn
√
n
σ |F¯nm(θnm(v)|v′) − F¯nm(θnm(v′)|v′)| = y′, then
limn Pr (Y
n(k + 1) = 0|V = v′) = Φ (x′ + y′) > 0 and therefore limn Pr (Pn = 0|V = v′) ≥
Φ (x′ + y′) > 0.
Claim. If
√
n|Fnm[θnm(v)|v] − Fnm[θnm(v′)|v]| → ∞ for all v′ 6= v and there is no pooling by
pivotal types, then the sequence H is informative.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that θnm(v) < θnm(v′). Set
sn(v) = sup {θ : bn(θ) = bn(θnm(v))} ,
sn(v′) = inf
{
θ : bn(θ) = bn(θnm(v
′))
}
and sn be the type such that Fnm(sn|0) − Fnm(sn(v)|v) = Fnm(sn(v′)|0) − Fnm(sn|v). Note that√
n|Fnm[θnm(v)|v] − Fnm[θnm(v′)|v]| → ∞ for all v′ 6= v and the fact that there is no pooling
by pivotal types together imply that
√
n|Fnm[sn|v] − Fnm[θnm(v)|v]| → ∞ and
√
n|Fnm[sn|v′] −
Fnm[θ
n
m(v
′)|v′]| → ∞. Therefore, lim Pr(Pns ≤ bn(sn)|V = v′) = 0, lim Pr(Pns ≥ bn(sn)|V =
v) = 0 and moreover lim Pr(Pns ≥ bn(sn)|V = v′) = 1, lim Pr(Pns ≤ bn(sn)|V = v) = 1. Hence,
the sequence is informative.
Claim. Suppose that v > v′. If limn max{E [Pn|V = v′] ,E [Pn|V = v]} > 0, then θn(v) −
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θn(v′) > 0 for sufficiently large n. Therefore,
√
n(Fnm(θ
n
m(v)|v)− Fnm(θnm(v′)|v))→∞.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that θnm(v′) − θnm(v) ≥ 0 for all n. Above we established that√
n|F¯nm(θnm(v)|v) − F¯nm(θnm(v′)|v)| → ∞. Therefore, θnm(v′) − θnm(v) > 0 for all n sufficiently
large. Set
sn(v) = sup {θ : bn(θ) = bn(θnm(v))}
sn(v′) = inf
{
θ : bn(θ) = bn(θnm(v
′))
}
.
An argument analogous to the previous claim’s implies that
√
n
∣∣F¯nm(sn(v)|v)− F¯nm(θnm(v′)|v)∣∣→∞ and√
n
∣∣F¯nm(θnm(v)|v)− F¯nm(sn(v′)|v)∣∣→∞.
There are two cases to consider:
Case 1:
√
n
∣∣F¯nm(sn(v)|v)− F¯nm(sn(v′)|v)∣∣→∞
Case 2:
√
n
∣∣F¯nm(sn(v)|v)− F¯nm(sn(v′)|v)∣∣ = x <∞.
Informativeness of the sequence, θnm(v′) − θnm(v) > 0, and the monotonicity of the bidding
function together imply that bn(θnm(v′)) > bn(θnm(v)) for all n sufficiently large. Consider
a bidder who submits a bid equal to41 bn = bn
(
sn(v)+sn(v′)
2
)
if we are in case 1 and bn =
bn(θnm(v))+b
n(θnm(v
′))
2 if we are in case 2. Note that in both cases b
n(θnm(v
′)) > bn > bn(θnm(v))
and the probability of such a bidder winning an object in states v and v′ converge to one and
zero, respectively.42 Therefore, the utility, at the limit, from submitting such a sequence of
bids is as follows
lim
n
un(m, bn|θi = θ) = v − limE[Pn|V = v]
for any θ. However, the utility of a type who wins an object with positive probability in state
v′ is strictly worse than the above expression because 0 < max{limE[Pn|V = v], limE[Pn|V =
v′]} ≤ limE[Pn|V = v′]. This however leads to a contradiction.
Claim. If
√
n(Fnm(θ
n
m(1)|v) − Fnm(θnm(0)|v)) → ∞, then lim Pr(Pn ≤ 1 − δ|V = 1) = 0 and
lim Pr(Pn ≥ δ|V = 0) = 0 for all δ > 0. Therefore, if limn max{E [Pn|V = 0] ,E [Pn|V = 1]} >
0, then H aggregates information.
Proof. Let
An = {θ ∈ [sn(0), sn(1)] : Fnm(θ|0)− Fnm(sn(0)|0) = Fnm(sn(1)|0)− Fnm(θ|0), bn(θ) ≥ δ}
41If any one type θ′ deviates from equilibrium, this deviation does not change the limiting price distribu-
tion nor the probability of winning an object at the limit because these depend on the order statistics and
limn Pr(Y
n(nκ+ 1) ≤ θ) = limn Pr(Y n−1(nκ) ≤ θ) for any θ.
42In case 2, the probability of such a bidder winning an object in state 1 converges to one because bn >
bn(θ) for any θ < sn(1) and because
√
n |sn(1)− sn(0)| = x and √n |θn(1)− sn(0)| → ∞ together imply√
n |θn(1)− sn(1)| → ∞. The probability of such a type winning an object in state 0 converges to zero because
bn < bn(θ) for any θ > sn(0) and because
√
n |θn(0)− sn(0)| → ∞.
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Assume that limn Pr[Pn = bn(θ), θ ∈ An|V = 0] > 0. Note that any θ ∈ An such that
θ 6= sn(1) wins with probability converging to zero if V = 1. Therefore, the profit of any such
a type θ is strictly negative for sufficiently large n leading to a contradiction.
Let An = {θ : bn(θ) ≤ 1− δ}. Assume to the contrary that limn Pr[pn = bn(θ), θ ∈ An|V =
1] > 0. For type θnm(0) bidding one does strictly better than bidding bn(θnm(0)). This is because
the bid bn(θnm(0)) wins with positive probability in state 0 at a price equal to zero (from the
above paragraph) and never wins in state 1 and therefore makes zero profit at the limit. In
contrast, a bid equal to one wins and makes positive profit equal to δ with strictly positive
probability in state 1 and makes exactly zero profit in state 0.
The previous claim implies that if
lim
n
max{E [Pn|V = 0] ,E [Pn|V = 1]} > 0,
then
√
n(Fnm(θ
n
m(1)|v) − Fnm(θnm(0)|v)) → ∞. Combining this with the above finding we con-
clude that if limn max{E [Pn|V = 0] ,E [Pn|V = 1]} > 0, then H aggregates information.
We complete the proof by noting that if Fnm(1|1) > κ, then
lim
n
max{E [Pn|V = 1] ,E [Pn|V = 0]} > 0.
Because if limn max{E [Pn|V = 1] ,E [Pn|V = 0]} = 0, then any type who does not win an
object with probability one has an incentive to submit a bid equal to one. Moreover Fnm(1|1) >
κ implies that there are many types who do not win an object with probability one.
In the definition below, we define θˆm as the smallest type which wins a good in auction m
with positive probability if V = 0 at the limit as n grows large, i.e., this type is the smallest
“active” type in state v = 0. The definition is somewhat involved as we need to define type θˆm
at the limit of a sequence of strategies as n grows arbitrarily large and the pivotal type θm(0)
could be pooling with other types along such a sequence.
Definition B.3. Assume that MLRP is satisfied. Fix a sequence of symmetric distributional
strategies {Hn} that can be represented by increasing bidding functions bnm. If Fm(1|0) ≥ κm,
let
θnm() := inf{θ : Hn([0, 1]×m× (bnm(θ), 1]|0) < κm − }
θˆm() := lim sup θ
n
m()
θˆm := inf
>0
θm().
If Fm(1|0) < κm, let θˆm = inf{θ : Fm(θ|0) > 0} and θˆm = 1 if the set is empty.
Suppose that Fm(1|0) ≥ κm. The definition above simply selects type θˆm = θm(0) if the
bidding function bnm is strictly increasing at θnm(0) for n sufficiently large. The definition has
more bite if, on the other hand, θnm(0) submits a pooling bid. If θnm(0) submits a pooling bid,
then there are types θnp ≤ θnm(0) ≤ θnp who submit the same bid as θnm(0). There are two cases
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θnp θ
n
m(0) θ
n
p
...
. . . . .
.
θp θˆm = θm(0) = θp
(a) The pivotal type converges to the
upper-bound of the pooling region.
θnp θ
n
m(0) θ
n
p
...
...
...
θˆm = θp θm(0)
θp
(b) The pivotal type remains in the
interior of the pooling region.
Figure B.1: Implications of Definition B.3. Suppose that bnm(θ
n
p ) = b
n
m(θ
n
m(0)) = b
n
m(θ
n
p ) along
some sequence. In subfigure (a), θm(0) = lim θnp and therefore θˆm = θm(0). In subfigure (b)
θm(0) < lim θ
n
p and therefore θˆm = lim θ
n
p .
to consider: In the first case θm(0) = lim θnp . Then the definition selects θˆm = θm(0). In the
second case, if θm(0) < lim θnp , then the definition selects θˆm = lim θ
n
p . Also, see figure B.1 for
an illustration.
The following lemma explores information aggregation in a certain market m where there
are more bidders than goods in state v = 1, that is, the case where Fm(1|1) > κm. The lemma
argues that if there are more “active” players in state 1 than in 0, i.e., if there are more bidders
above θˆm when V = 1 than when V = 0 (more precisely, if F¯m(θˆm|1) > F¯m(θˆm|0)), then
pooling by pivotal types cannot be sustained. Moreover, if F¯m(θˆm|1) > F¯m(θˆm|0), then the
pivotal types are ordered and distinct, that is, F¯m(θˆm|1) > F¯m(θˆm|0) implies that θm(1) >
θm(0). The lemma thus concludes that information is aggregated in market m under the
assumption that F¯m(θˆm|1) > F¯m(θˆm|0) because the pivotal types do not pool and because
they are distinct. The lemma also provides two sufficient conditions for F¯m(θˆm|1) > F¯m(θˆm|0)
that are repeatedly used in our subsequent analysis.
Lemma B.5. Assume MLRP. Fix a convergent sequence of bidding equilibria H = {Hn} for
market m. Suppose Fm(1|1) > κm. If F¯m(θˆm|1) > F¯m(θˆm|0), where θˆm is the type introduced
in Definition B.3, then there is no pooling by pivotal types (see Definition B.1). Therefore, if
F¯m(θˆm|1) > F¯m(θˆm|0), then H aggregates information (by Lemma B.4 item (ii)). Moreover,
i. If Fm(1|1) ≥ Fm(1|0) and θm(1) > θm(0) or
ii. If lim anm(θ) = 1 for all θ > θˆm,
then F¯m(θˆm|1) > F¯m(θˆm|0).
Proof. The hypotheses that Fm(1|1) ≥ Fm(1|0) and θm(1) > θm(0) or the hypothesis that
lim anm(θ) = 1 for all θ > θˆm both separately imply that F¯m(θˆm|1) > F¯m(θˆm|0). These
are straightforward consequences of MLRP. Also, note that if F¯m(θˆm|1) > F¯m(θˆm|0), then
θm(1) > θm(0). This is because θm(0) ≥ θˆm by definition, F¯m(θ|1) > F¯m(θ|0) for any θ > θˆm
by MLRP and thus F¯m(θm(0)|1) > F¯m(θm(0)|0) = κ showing that θm(1) > θm(0).
We show that pooling by pivotal types is incompatible with equilibrium behavior if F¯m(θˆm|1)
exceeds F¯m(θˆm|0) because bidders are subject to the loser’s curse at the pooling bid for n large
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enough. Existence of a loser’s cruse means that bidders have a profitable deviation to some
bid above bn. For details, see Lemma 7 and Corollary 3 in Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997).
More precisely, we will show that
lim
Pr(pn = bn, bn wins|V = 1)
Pr(pn = bn, bn wins|V = 0) < lim
Pr(pn = bn|V = 1)
Pr(pn = bn|V = 0) < lim
Pr(pn = bn, bn loses|V = 1)
Pr(pn = bn, bn loses|V = 0) .
Pooling by pivotal types implies that θp ≤ θm(0) < θm(1) ≤ θp. There are three cases to
consider: (1) θp < θm(0) and θp > θm(1); (2) θp = θm(1) and θp < θm(0); and (3) θp = θm(0). If
θp = θm(1) and θp < θm(0), then Lemma B.2 implies that lim Pr(pn = bn, bn wins|V = 1) = 0
and lim Pr(pn = bn, bn wins|V = 0) > 0 showing that the above inequality is satisfied. If
θp = θm(0), then B.2 implies that lim Pr(pn = bn, bn wins|V = 0) = 1 and lim Pr(pn =
bn, bn wins|V = 1) < 1 again showing that the above inequality is satisfied.
We now turn to the case of θp < θm(0) and θp > θm(1). Note that in this case θˆm = θp.
In this case, the following equalities are satisfied:
lim Pr(Pn = bn|V = 1) = lim Pr(Pn = bn|V = 0) = 1, (B.1)
lim Pr(Pn = bn, bn loses|V = v) = F¯m(θp|v)− κ
Fm(θp|v)− Fm(θp|v)
, (B.2)
by Lemma B.2. We argue that
lim
Pr(pn = bn, bn loses|V = 1)
Pr(pn = bn, bn loses|V = 0) > 1,
i.e., that the following inequality is satisfied:
F¯m(θp|1)− κ
F¯m(θp|0)− κ
>
Fm(θp|1)− Fm(θp|1)
Fm(θp|0)− Fm(θp|0)
.
Our assumption that F¯m(θp|1)− κ ≥ F¯m(θp|0)− κ > 0 implies that
F¯m(θp|1)− κ
F¯m(θp|0)− κ
≥ F¯m(θp|1)
F¯m(θp|0)
. (B.3)
Moreover, MLRP implies that g(θ)f(θ|1)g(θ)f(θ|0) is increasing in θ for any function g(θ). Hence, we
conclude that
F¯m(θp|1)
F¯m(θp|0)
=
∫ 1
θp
am(θ)f(θ|1)dθ∫ 1
θp
am(θ)f(θ|0)dθ
≥
∫ θp
θp
am(θ)f(θ|1)dθ∫ θp
θp
am(θ)f(θ|0)dθ
=
Fm(θp|1)− Fm(θp|1)
Fm(θp|0)− Fm(θp|0)
. (B.4)
Therefore, combining inequalities (B.3) and (B.4) establishes the claim.
C. The Market Selection Lemmata.
In this section we prove two central lemmata which characterize market selection. The
first lemma and its corollary below characterizes market selection for any n (not necessarily
at the limit). Under the assumption that there is a minimum price in market r and the payoff
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in market s is equal to zero for all types, the corollary shows that the upper tail of the type
distribution selects market r.
Lemma C.1 (Single Crossing Lemma). Assume that MLRP is satisfied. Suppose that aHm(θ′) >
0 for some type θ′ in an equilibrium H. If
uH(m, b(θ′)|V = 0) < min
b,m′ 6=m
uH(m′, b|V = 0),
then aHm(θ) = 1 for all θ > θ′ such that θ /∈ E(θ′).
Proof. Fix an equilibrium H. For the remainder of the proof we suppress reference to equilib-
rium H.
We begin by noting that u(m, b|θ, v) = u(m, b|v) for any b, θ and v. Writing down the
profits for any type θ and any bid b we obtain u(m, b|θ) = u(m, b|V = 0) Pr(V = 0|θ) +
u(m, b|V = 1) Pr(V = 1|θ). Therefore,
u(m, b(θ′)|θ′)− u(m′, b|θ′)
Pr(V = 0|θ′) =
u(m, b(θ′)|V = 0)− u(m′, b|V = 0) + l(θi = θ′)(u(m, b(θ′)|V = 1)− u(m′, b|V = 1)).
Moreover,
u(m, b(θ′)|θ)− u(m′, b|θ)
Pr(V = 0|θ′) −
u(m, b(θ′)|θ′)− u(m′, b|θ′)
Pr(V = 0|θ′) =
(l(θi = θ)− l(θi = θ′))(u(m, b(θ′)|V = 1)− u(m′, b|V = 1))
for any two types θ and θ′.
Our initial assumption that am(θ′) > 0 implies
u(m, b(θ′)|θ′)− u(m′, b|θ′) ≥ 0
for all b and all m′ 6= m. Fix a b and m′ 6= m. Our assumption that u(m, b(θ′)|V = 0) <
minb,m′ 6=m u(m′, b|V = 0) implies that
u(m, b(θ′)|V = 0)− u(m′, b|V = 0) < 0.
Combining the inequalities above we conclude that u(m, b(θ′)|V = 1) − u(m′, b|V = 1) > 0.
Therefore, if θ > θ′ and θ /∈ E(θ′), then
u(m, b(θ′)|θ)− u(m′, b|θ)
Pr(V = 0|θ) −
u(m, b(θ′)|θ′)− u(m′, b|θ′)
Pr(V = 0|θ′) =
(l(θi = θ)− l(θi = θ′))(u(m, b(θ′)|V = 1)− u(m′, b|V = 1)) > 0
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because l(θi = θ) > l(θi = θ′) by MLRP. Hence,
u(m, b(θ′)|θ)− u(m′, b|θ)
Pr(V = 0|θ′) >
u(m, b(θ′)|θ′)− u(m′, b|θ′)
Pr(V = 0|θ′) ≥ 0
proving that u(m, b(θ′)|θ)−u(m′, b|θ) > 0. Since b and m′ 6= m are arbitrary, we can conclude
that am(θ) = 1.
Corollary C.1. Assume that MLRP is satisfied. Suppose that players have access to outside
options as defined by Definition 3.1. Fix an equilibrium H. If uH(s, b(θ′)|V = 0) < u(r|V = 0)
and if as(θ′) > 0 for some θ′, then as(θ) = 1 for all θ > θ′.
Suppose that θˆm denotes the smallest type which wins a good in auction m with positive
probability in state 0, i.e., the type defined by Definition B.3. Also, suppose that the expected
price in state 0 converges to zero in market m′ 6= m while the expected price in state 0 and
market m remains bounded away from zero. Under these assumptions, the lemma presented
below argues that all types θ > θˆm would select market m with probability one in equilibrium.
Lemma C.2. Assume that MLRP is satisfied. Suppose that for an equilibrium sequence H we
have that limE(Pnm′ |0) = 0, limE(Pnm|0) > 0 for m 6= m′, then lim anm(θ) = 1 for any θ > θˆm.
Proof. Without loss of generality suppose thatm′ = s andm = r. The fact that limn E(Pns |V =
0) = 0 implies that limun(s, b|V = 0) = 0 for any b.
Pick θ > θˆr. The fact that θ > θˆr implies that there exists  > 0 such that θˆr ≤ θˆr() < θ.
Note that lim θˆnr () ≤ θˆr() < θ for any convergent subsequence. Pick θn ∈ [θˆnr (/2), θˆnr ()]
such that anr (θn) > 0. The probability that Pnr ≤ bnr (θn) converges to one in state 0. The
probability that θn wins an object in state 0 and market m converges to at least /2 (see
Lemma B.2 for this lower bound). Therefore,
limu(r, bnr (θ
n)|V = 0) ≤ 
2
limE(0− Pnr |V = 0) < 0.
Let θ′ = lim θn be any possibly sub-sequential limit and note θ′ < θ. For such θ′, we find
limu(r, bnr (θ
n)|θ′) = limu(r, bnr (θn)|θn) ≥ limu(s, b|θn) = limu(s, b|θ′)
for any b because anr (θn) > 0. Also,
limu(r, bnr (θ
n)|V = 0) < limun(s, b|V = 0) = 0
for any b. The argument in Lemma C.1 then implies that limu(r, bnr (θn)|θ) > limu(s, b|θ)
for any b and any type θ > θ′ such that θ /∈ E(θ′). Therefore, ar(θ) = 1 for type θ /∈ E(θ′)
and θ > θ′. Also, anr (θ′) > 0 implies that anr (θ) = 1 for each θ ∈ E(θ′). This is because we
focus without loss of generality on a pure and increasing representation of strategies over each
E(θ′).
Lemma C.3. Suppose that MLRP is satisfied. Suppose that there is a type θ∗ < 1 such that
lim anr (θ) = 1 for all θ > θ∗. If κs > κ∗(θ∗), then either θs(0) > θs(1) or κs > Fs(1|1).
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Alternatively, if κs < κ∗(θ∗) and Fs(1|1) > κs, then θs(0) ≤ θs(1). Moreover, if strict MLRP
is satisfied, then θs(0) < θs(1).
Proof. We argue that lim anr (θ) = 1 for all θ > θ∗, κs ≤ Fs(1|1) and κs > κ∗(θ∗), together
imply that θs(0)− θs(1) > 0. Let L1 denote the set of measurable functions α : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
and consider the following optimization problem:
W (κs, θ
∗) = max
α∈L1
∫
[0,θ∗] α(θ)dF (θ|1)∫
[0,θ∗] α(θ)dF (θ|0)
s.t.
∫
[0,θ∗]
α(θ)dF (θ|1) ≥ κs
Choose the unique θ′ such that F (θ∗|1) − F (θ′|1) = κs. MLRP implies that the maximized
value
W (κs, θ
∗) =
F (θ∗|1)− F (θ′|1)
F (θ∗|0)− F (θ′|0) .
If κs > κ∗(θ∗), then κs = F (θ∗|1) − F (θ′|1) > κ∗(θ∗). Moreover, the inequality F (θ∗|0) −
F (θ′|0) > F (θ∗|1) − F (θ′|1) is satisfied by the definition of κ∗(θ∗). Therefore, κs > κ∗(θ∗)
implies that the maximized value W (κs, θ∗) < 1.
The fact that lim anr (θ) = 1 for all θ > θ∗ implies that no type θ greater than θ∗ will bid in
market s at the limit. Therefore, limFns (1|v)− Fns (θ∗|v) = Fs(1|v)− Fs(θ∗|v) = 0. Let as(θ)
be such that Fs(θ|v) =
∫
[0,θ] as(θ)dF (θ|v) and note that such a function exists because Fs is
absolutely continuous with respect to F . Choosing a function α(θ) which is equal to zero for
all θ ≤ θs(1) and equal to as(θ) for all θ > θs(1) we obtain
lim
Fns (1|1)− Fns (θns (1)|1)
Fns (1|0)− Fns (θns (1)|0)
=
Fs(1|1)− Fs(θs(1)|1)
Fs(1|0)− Fns (θs(1)|0)
=
∫
[θs(1),θ∗] as(θ)dF (θ|1)∫
[θs(1),θ∗] as(θ)dF (θ|0)
=
κs∫
[θs(1),θ∗] as(θ)dF (θ|0)
=
∫
[0,θ∗] α(θ)dF (θ|1)∫
[0,θ∗] α(θ)dF (θ|0)
≤ W (κs, θ∗) < 1
where the third equality is satisfied by the definition of θs(1), the fourth equality is satisfied
by the definition of the function α and the final inequality is satisfied because the function
α is feasible in the maximization problem. Therefore,
∫
[θs(1),θ∗] as(θ)dF (θ|0) > κ and hence
θs(0) > θs(1). However, θs(0) > θs(1) implies that θns (0)−θns (1) > 0 for all n sufficiently large.
We now argue that if κs < κ∗(θ∗) and Fs(1|1) > κs, then θs(0) ≤ θs(1). Suppose that θ′ is
such that F (1|1)−F (θ′|1) = y+x where y = 1−F (θ∗|1). Consider the following minimization
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problem
W (y, x) = min
α∈L1
∫
[θ′,1] α(θ)dF (θ|1)∫
[θ′,1] α(θ)dF (θ|0)
s.t.
∫
[θ′,1]
α(θ)dF (θ|1) = x
MLRP implies that the optimized value of the above program is as follows:
W (y, x) =
F (θ∗|1)− F (θ′|1)
F (θ∗|0)− F (θ′|0)
Also, the definition of κ∗(θ∗) implies that if x < κ∗(θ∗), then W (y, x) ≥ 1. Moreover, if strict
MLRP is satisfied, then W (y, x) > 1. Therefore, if κs < κ∗(θ∗), then W (y, κs) ≥ 1 where
the inequality is strict if strict MLRP holds. However, Let as(θ) be such that Fs(θ|v) =∫
[0,θ] as(θ)dF (θ|v) and note that such a function exists because Fs is absolutely continuous
with respect to F . We choose a function α(θ) which is equal to zero for all θ ≤ θs(1) and
equal to as(θ) for all θ > θs(1). Observing that θ′ ≤ θs(1) and assuming that strict MLRP is
satisfied we obtain
Fs(1|1)− Fs(θs(1)|1)
Fs(1|0)− Fs(θs(1)|0) =
∫
[θs(1),1]
as(θ)dF (θ|1)∫
[θs(1),1]
as(θ)dF (θ|0)
=
∫
[θ′,1] α(θ)dF (θ|1)∫
[θ′,1] α(θ)dF (θ|0)
≥ W (y, κr) > 1
where the last inequality follows from the same logic as above. Thus we have θs(1) > θs(0) if
strict MLRP is satisfied and θs(1) ≥ θs(0) if weak MLRP is satisfied.
D. Exogenous Outside Option Proofs
In this section we provide proofs for all our findings that relate to exogenous outside options
except for the equilibrium construction which we do in subsection F.2.
D.1. Information Aggregation Failure.
Proof of Theorem 3.1, item i. On the way to a contradiction suppose that an equilibrium se-
quence H aggregates information in auction s.
If H aggregates information, then un(s, b|θ) → 0 for all θ and all b. Let θ′ be the type
defined in the theorem, i.e., θ′ = inf{θ : E[u(r|V )|θi = θ] > 0}. The fact that un(s, b|θ) → 0
for all θ and all b implies that all types θ > θ′ would opt for the outside option. This is because
E[u(r|V )|θi = θ] > 0 for all θ > θ′ by MLRP. However, the fact that κs > κ∗(θ′) implies that
θs(0) > θs(1) or Fs(1|1) < κs because of Lemma C.3.
Note that if Fs(1|1) < κs, then information is not aggregated because the price is equal
to zero with probability one whenever v = 1 because there are more goods than the expected
number of bidders.
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We now show θs(0) > θs(1) is not compatible with information aggregation. Pick  > 0
such that θs(0) −  > θs(1) + . We know that lim Pr(Pns ≥ bns (θs(0) − )|V = 0) = 1 and
lim Pr(Pns ≤ bns (θs(1) + )|V = 1) = 1 by Lemma B.1. However, lim bns (θs(1) + ) = 1 >
lim bns (θs(0)− ) = 0 because Pns → V . However, lim bns (θs(1) + ) = 1 > lim bns (θs(0)− ) = 0
contradicts Lemma 2.1, i.e., contradicts the bidding function being nondecreasing.
Proof of Theorem 3.1, item ii. Let x := κ − F¯ (θFs (1)|0). Note that θFs (1) is the pivotal type
under the assumption that all types are in a market. Therefore, x is independent of n and any
equilibrium under consideration. Moreover, the constant x > 0 due to MLRP. Let
u¯ :=
l(θi = 0)
1 + 2l(θi = 0)
x (D.1)
Fix an equilibrium sequence H. We will argue below that if 2
√
V ar[u(r|V )] < u¯, then H
aggregates information.
In any equilibrium, the set of types that choose r is a subset of {θ ≥ θ′}. This is because
E[u(r|V )|θi = θ] < 0 for any θ < θ′. Below we argue that our maintained assumption of
κs < κ
∗(θ′) implies that Fs(1|1) > κs. Also, strict MLRP, κs < κ∗(θ′) and Fs(1|1) > κs
together imply that θs(1) > θs(0) by Lemma C.3. Claims D.1 - D.3 in the proof of Proposition
3.2 (further below in the next subsection) imply that there cannot be pooling by pivotal types
if 2
√
V ar[u(r|V )] < u¯. However, θs(1) > θs(0) and no pooling by pivotal types together imply
that information is aggregated by Lemma B.4, item ii.
We now show that κs < κ∗(θ′) implies Fs(1|1) > κs. The fact that κs < κ∗(θ′) and the
definition of κ∗(θ′) together imply that there is a certain type θ′′ < θ′ such that
κ∗(θ′) = F (θ′|1)− F (θ′′|1) = F (θ′|0)− F (θ′′|0) > κs.
As we mentioned above, the set of types that choose r is a subset of {θ ≥ θ′} and hence all
types θ < θ′ choose market s. This implies that
F¯s(θ
′′|1) > κs
which establishes that Fs(1|1) > κs.
D.2. Characterization.
Lemma D.1 (Another Single Crossing Lemma). Assume that MLRP is satisfied, players have
access to outside options as defined by Definition 3.1 and u(r|V = 0) > 0. If a(θ′) > 0, then
a(θ) = 1 for all θ > θ′.
Proof. Let θ = sup(θ : F¯s(θ|v) = F¯s(0|v)). Pick any θ′ > θ with a(θ′) > 0. First, we note that
b(θ′) > 0 since there cannot be pooling at a bid equal to zero. This is because if there was
pooling at zero any type pooling at zero would have an incentive to outbid the pooling bid
and win with probability one conditional on the price being equal to the pooling bid.
Let Y denote the event that the price is less than or equal to b(θ′) and bidder i who bids
b(θ′) wins an object. Note that E[Ps|Y, v] > 0 because Fs(θ′|v)−Fs(θ|v) > 0 by the definitions
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of θ′ and θ and because b(θ) > 0 for any θ ∈ (θ, θ′]. The fact that type θ′ bids b(θ′) in the
auction instead of choosing the outside option implies the following inequality
u(s, b(θ′)|θ′)− E[u(r|V )|θ′] =
− Pr(V = 0|θ′)(Pr(Y |V = 0)(E[Ps|Y, V = 0] + u(r|0))+
(Pr(Y |V = 1)(1− E[Ps|Y, V = 1])− u(r|1)) Pr(V = 1|θ′) ≥ 0.
Note that because −(Pr(Y |V = 0)E[Ps|Y, V = 0] + u(r|0)) < 0 we must have (Pr(Y |V =
1)(1 − E[Ps|Y, V = 1]) − u(r|1)) > 0 for the above inequality to be satisfied. MLRP implies
that if θ > θ′ and θ /∈ E(θ′), then
0 ≤ −Pr(V = 0|θ′)(Pr(Y |V = 0)E[Ps|Y, V = 0] + u(r|0))+
(Pr(Y |V = 1)(1− E[Ps|Y, V = 1])− u(r|1)) Pr(V = 1|θ′)
< −Pr(V = 0|θ)(Pr(Y |V = 0)E[Ps|Y, V = 0] + u(r|V = 0))+
(Pr(Y |V = 1)(1− E[Ps|Y, V = 1])− u(r|1)) Pr(V = 1|θ)
= u(s, b(θ′)|θ)− E[u(r|V )|θ]
Therefore, if any θ′ bids in the auction, then any θ > θ′ with θ /∈ E(θ′) would also choose to
bid in the auction. This establishes that entry into the auction has a cutoff structure.
Lemma D.2. Assume that MLRP is satisfied and players have access to outside options as
defined by Definition 3.1. Suppose that a(θ′) > 0 implies a(θ) = 1 for all θ > θ′, i.e., entry
into the auction has a cutoff structure. Then the bidding function b(θ) is strictly increasing
and b(θ) = βns (θ).
Proof. This follow immediately from the arguments that can be found in Pesendorfer and
Swinkels (1997).
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We argue that there is a type θˆn such that E[v|Y n−1(k) ≤ θ, θ] <
E[u(r|V )|θ] for all θ < θˆn and E[V |Y n−1(k) ≤ θ, θ] > E[u(r|V )|θ] for all θ > θˆn. In particular,
we will show that the function
f(θ) =
E[V |Y n−1(k) ≤ θ, θ]− E[u(r|V )|θ]
Pr(0|θ) = l(θ)(Pr(Y
n−1(k) ≤ θ|1)− u(r|1))− u(r|0)
can cross zero at most once. Let θˆn = inf{θ : f(θ) ≥ 0} and set θˆn = 1 if the set is empty.
Note that if f(θ′) ≥ 0 for some θ′, then f(θ) > 0 for all θ > θ′ because l(θ) is nondecreasing
and Pr(Y n−1(k) ≤ θ|1) is strictly increasing in θ. Therefore, f(θ) > 0 for all θ > θˆn. A similar
argument implies f(θ) < 0 for all θ < θˆn; proving the result.
Claim. Recall that we showed in Lemma D.1 that entry has a cutoff structure. We will now
argue that this cutoff θ is equal to θˆn, i.e., all types above θ = θˆn bid in the auction and all
types below θ = θˆn take the outside option.
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Proof. Case i. Suppose that θ > θˆn and therefore that E[V |Y n−1(k) ≤ θ, θ] > E[u(r|V )|θ]. If
θ < θ, then a(θ) = 0 for all θ and thus u(s, b = 0|θ) = E[V |Y n−1(k) ≤ θ, θ] ≤ E[u(r|V )|θ] for
all θ < θ. Then we have
E[V |Y n−1(k) ≤ θ, θ] = Pr(Y n−1(k) ≤ θ|V = 1) Pr(V = 1|θ) < E[u(r|V )|θ]
for all θ < θ because Pr(Y n−1(k) ≤ θ|V = 1) is strictly increasing in θ. This however implies
that E[V |Y n−1(k) ≤ θ, θ] < E[u(r|V )|θ] for all θ < θ contradicting the definition of θˆn.
Case ii. Suppose that θ < θˆn and therefore that E[V |Y n−1(k) ≤ θ, θ] < E[u(r|V )|θ].
If θ′ > θ, then a(θ′) = 1 and thus u(s, b(θ′)|θ′) ≥ E[u(r|V )|θ′]. Moreover, u(s, b(θ′)|θ) ≥
E[u(r|V )|θ] for θ ≥ θ′ because of MLRP (see Lemma D.1). Therefore, limθ′↓θ u(s, b(θ′)|θ) =
E[V |Y n−1(k) ≤ θ, θ] ≥ E[u(r|V )|θ] for all θ > θ. Consequently,
E[V |Y n−1(k) ≤ θ, θ] = Pr(Y n−1(k) ≤ θ|V = 1) Pr(V = 1|θ) > E[u(r|V )|θ]
for all θ > θ because Pr(Y n−1(k) ≤ θ|V = 1) is strictly increasing in θ. This however implies
that E[V |Y n−1(k) ≤ θ, θ] > E[u(r|V )|θ] for all θ > θ contradicting the definition of θˆn.
Note that the claim above and Lemma D.1 together prove item i of the proposition. More-
over, item ii of the proposition follows from Lemma D.2.
We now prove items iii and iv of the proposition. In particular, we show that lim
√
n(κ−
Fns (1|1)) = lim
√
n(κ − F¯ns (θˆn|1)) = x ∈ (−∞,∞]. Therefore κ > limFns (1|0) by MLRP. A
direct calculation shows that there is a sufficiently small  > 0 such that if θ > θs(1)− , then
limβns (θ) = 1. If
√
n(κ − F¯ns (θˆn|1)) → −∞, then the price would converge in probability to
1 if v = 1. This is because lim Pr[Y n−1s (k) ≥ max{θˆn, θs(1) − }|1] = 1 because lim
√
n(κ −
F¯ns (θˆ
n|1))→ −∞ and limβns (max{θˆn, θs(1)− }) = 1. However, then no type would choose to
bid in the auction because the payoff in the auction converges to zero. Therefore, lim
√
n(κ−
F¯ns (θˆ
n|1)) = x ∈ (−∞,∞] and the probability that there are more goods than bidders in
market s in state v = 1 converges to a positive constant, i.e., the probability that the price is
equal to zero if v = 1 is positive. Also, the fact that lim θˆn ≥ θs(1) implies that limβns (θ) = 1
for all θ > lim θˆn.
We now prove item v. If v = 1, then the price converges in probability to a binary random
variable which is either equal to one or equal to zero. This is because all bids converge to 1
hence there are only two possible values that the price can take at the limit: the price is equal
to one if the auction clears at the bid of any bidder and the price is equal to zero if there
are fewer bidders than there are objects. Moreover, the price is equal to zero almost surely if
v = 0. The calculation for the value of q ensures that the type θˆ is indifferent between the two
options and verifying the formula is straightforward.
Proof of Corollary 3.2. Suppose that u(r|0) > 0. Note that Lemmata D.1 and D.2 do not
depend on the assumption that u(r|V = v) is nondecreasing in v and therefore continue to
remain valid if u(r|V = v) is nonincreasing v. Suppose instead that u(r|0) ≤ 0. Then no
type would select the outside option in equilibrium and therefore the two lemmata are again
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satisfied trivially. Therefore, the corollary follows directly from the proof given for Proposition
3.1 above.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Fix an equilibrium sequence H. Let x := κ− F¯ (θFs (1)|0). Note that
θFs (1) is the pivotal type under the assumption that all types are in a market. Therefore, x is
independent of n and the equilibrium under consideration. Moreover, the constant x > 0 due
to MLRP. Recall that
u¯ :=
l(θi = 0)
1 + 2l(θi = 0)
x
Assume that lim
√
n|F¯ns (θns (1)|v) − F¯ns (θns (0)|v)| → ∞. We will argue below that if
2
√
V ar[u(r|V )] < u¯, then pooling by pivotal types (see Definition B.1) cannot be sustained.
However, if there is no pooling by pivotal types and if lim
√
n|F¯ns (θns (1)|1)−F¯ns (θns (0)|1)| → ∞,
then information is aggregated by Lemma B.4. Therefore, once we conclude that pooling can-
not be sustained, this conclusion and Theorem 3.1’s finding that information is not aggregated
together imply that lim
√
n|F¯ns (θns (1)|1)− F¯ns (θns (0)|1)| <∞. Suppose that there is a pooling
region. As in Definition B.1, let θnp = inf{θ : bnm(θ) = bnp} < θnp = sup{θ : bnm(θ) = bnp},
bp = lim b
n
p , and lim θni = θi for i = 0, 1.
Claim D.1. Suppose that lim
√
n|F¯ns (θns (1)|v) − F¯ns (θns (0)|v)| → ∞. If lim Pr(Pns ≤ bnp |V =
1) = 1 and lim Pr(Pns < bnp |V = 0) = 0, then there cannot be pooling by pivotal types.
Proof. If lim Pr(Pns ≤ bnp |V = 1) = 1, then the limit of the pooling price must satisfy the
following inequality because otherwise all types who choose the outside option would instead
prefer to bid just above the pooling bid and win an object with probability one instead of
choosing the outside option:
(1− bp) f(1|θ)
f(1|θ) + f(0|θ) − bp
f(0|θ)
f(1|θ) + f(0|θ) ≤ u(r|1)
f(1|θ)
f(0|θ) + f(1|θ) + u(r|0)
f(0|θ)
f(0|θ) + f(1|θ)
(1− bp)l(θi = θ)− bp ≤ u(r|1)l(θi = θ) + u(r|0)
≤ u(r|1)l(θi = θ)
Note that |u(r|v)| ≤ 2√V ar[u(r|V )] for each v. Therefore,
bp ≥ (1− 2
√
V ar[u(r|V )]) l(θi = θ)
1 + l(θi = θ)
≥ (1− 2
√
V ar[u(r|V )]) l(θi = 0)
1 + l(θi = 0)
.
However, this lower bound on the pooling price implies that bp > −u(r|0) if 2
√
V ar[u(r|V )] <
u¯ < l(θi=0)1+2l(θi=0) because
bp ≥ (1− 2
√
V ar[u(r|V )]) l(θi = 0)
1 + l(θi = 0)
> 2
√
V ar[u(r|V )] > −u(r|0).
Note that any type θ > θp that bids in market s wins an object with probability one
and pays a price at least equal to bp if V = 0. However, then we find that all θ > θp
would select market s by Corollary C.1 because bp > −u(r|V = 0). We now look at two
cases to show that pooling by pivotal types is not possible under our initial assumptions that
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lim Pr(Pns ≤ bnp |V = 1) = 1 and lim Pr(Pns < bnp |V = 0) = 0.
Case 1. lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |v) − F¯ns (θns (0)|v)| < ∞. If lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |v) − F¯ns (θns (0)|v)| < ∞,
then the type θˆs defined in Definition B.3 is equal to θp (intuitively, θˆs is the smallest type
that wins an object in state 0 in market s). Moreover, any type θ > θp selects market s by
the argument in the previous paragraph. This however, leads to a contradiction because if all
θ > θp select market s and if lim |F¯ns (θnp |v)− F¯ns (θns (0)|v)| = 0, then θs(1) > θs(0) by MLRP
and hence θs(1) > θp contradicting that lim Pr(Pns ≤ bnp |V = 1) = 1.
Case 2. lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |v) − F¯ns (θns (0)|v)| = ∞. In this case, we argue below that the
probability of winning a good at pooling is at least x > 0 if v = 0. Type θˆs is equal to θp and
all types above θˆs win an object with probability at least x in market s at a price which is at
least equal to bp. Then however, all θ > θˆs would select market s by Corollary C.1 because
bpx > −u(r|V = 0). This would however imply that information is aggregated in the auction
by Lemma B.5 which leads us to a contradiction.
Continuing with Case 2, we now argue that the expected fraction of objects remaining at
pooling if v = 0 is at least x and therefore the probability of winning an object by bidding
the pooling bid is at least x if v = 0. Note that lim Pr(Pns ≤ bnp |V = 1) = 1 implies
that κs − F¯s(θp|V = 1) ≥ 0 by the LLN. The fact that all types θ > θp select market s
implies that κs − F¯s(θp|V = 1) = κs − F¯ (θp|V = 1) ≥ 0. Therefore, we find θp ≥ θFs (1).
MLRP implies that κs − F¯ (θp|V = 1) > κs − F¯ (θp|v = 0). Also, θp ≥ θFs (1) implies that
κs− F¯ (θp|V = 0) ≥ κs− F¯ (θFs (1)|V = 0) = x hence the expected fraction of goods left over to
pooling is at least x. The expected fraction of bidders who submit the pooling bid is at most
1. Therefore, the fact that the probability of winning at pooling is at least x follows from the
argument in Lemma B.2.
Claim D.2. Suppose that lim
√
n|F¯ns (θns (1)|v) − F¯ns (θns (0)|v)| → ∞. If there is pooling by
pivotal types, then lim Pr(Pns ≤ bnp |V = 1) = 1.
Proof. We prove this claim by looking at two mutually exclusive cases.
Case 1: lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |1) − F¯ns (θns (1)|1)| → ∞. If lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |1) − F¯ns (θns (1)|1)| → ∞,
then lim Pr(Pns ≤ bnp |V = 1) = 1 because of our maintained assumption (in the definition of
pooling by pivotal types) that lim Pr(Pns = bnp |1) > 0.
Case 2: lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |1)−F¯ns (θns (1)|1)| = ∆ <∞. Note lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |1)−F¯ns (θns (1)|1)| =
∆ <∞ and lim√n|F¯ns (θns (0)|1)−F¯ns (θns (1)|1)| =∞ imply that lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |1)−F¯ns (θns (0)|1)| =
∞ and hence that lim Pr(Pns < bnp |V = 1) = 0. Therefore, lim inf
√
n(F¯ns (θ
n
s (0)|0)−F¯ns (θnp |0)) ≤
lim inf
√
n(κs−F¯ns (θnp |0)) = +∞. Also, lim sup
√
n(κs−F¯ns (θnp |1)) ≤ a for some finite constant
a.43
We now prove that
lim
Pr(bnp wins|Pn = bnp , V = 1)
Pr(bnp wins|Pn = bnp , V = 0)
= 0
and therefore any bidder would prefer slightly outbidding the pooling bid. Let Xn denote
43Note that lim
√
n(F¯ns (θ
n
s (0)|0)− F¯ns (θnp |0)) = +∞ implies that lim
√
n(F¯ns (θ
n
s (0)|v)− F¯ns (θns (1)|v)) = +∞.
Therefore, lim F¯ns (θns (1)|1) ≥ κs. Because if lim F¯ns (θns (1)|1) < κs, then θns (1) = θns (0) = 0 for all n sufficiently
large contradicting that lim
√
n(F¯ns (θ
n
s (0)|v)− F¯ns (θns (1)|v)) = +∞.
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the total number of bidders who submit the pooling bid, let X¯nv = E[Xn|V = v], and let Gn
denote the total number of goods left to be allocated to bidders who submit the pooling bid,
i.e, Gn is equal to k minus the number of bidders who submit a bid greater than the pooling
bid.
Below we provide an upper bound for the posterior likelihood ratio that conditions on
winning an object at a bid equal to the pooling bid:
lim
Pr(bnp wins|Pns = bnp , V = 1)
Pr(bnp wins|Pns = bnp , V = 0)
(D.2)
= lim
E[Gn/Xn|Pns = bnp , V = 1]
E[Gn/Xn|Pns = bnp , V = 0]
(D.3)
≤ lim
E[ Gn
(1−δ)X¯n1
|Pns = bnp , V = 1, Xn ≥ (1− δ)X¯n1 ] + Pr[Xn ≤ (1− δ)X¯n1 |Pns = bnp , V = 1]
E[ Gn
(1+δ)X¯n0
|Pns = bnp , V = 0, Xn ≤ (1 + δ)X¯n0 ] Pr[Xn ≤ (1 + δ)X¯n0 |Pns = bnp , V = 0]
(D.4)
= lim
E[ Gn
(1−δ)X¯n1
|Pns = bnp , V = 1] + Pr[Xn ≤ (1− δ)X¯n1 |Pns = bnp , V = 1]
E[ Gn
(1+δ)X¯n0
|Pns = bnp , V = 0] Pr[Xn ≤ (1 + δ)X¯n0 |Pns = bnp , V = 0]
(D.5)
≤ lim E[G
n|Pns = bnp , V = 1] + (1− δ)X¯n0 e−
δ2X¯n1
2
E[Gn|Pns = bnp , V = 0]
(
(1 + δ)X¯n0
(1− δ)X¯n1
)
(D.6)
≤ (1 + δ)
(1− δ)l(θi = 0) lim
E[Gn|Pns = bnp , V = 1] + (1− δ)X¯n1 e−
δ2X¯n1
2
E[Gn|Pns = bnp , V = 0]
(D.7)
=
(1 + δ)
(1− δ)l(θi = 0) lim
E[Gn|V = 1]/√n
Pr[Pns = b
n
p |V = 1]E[Gn|Pns = bnp , V = 0]/
√
n
(D.8)
= 0 (D.9)
The numerator in inequality D.4 is obtained by observing thatXn ≥ (1−δ)X¯n1 in each term
in the expectation, Pr[Xn ≥ (1− δ)X¯n1 |Pns = bnp , V = 1] ≤ 1 and E[G
n
Xn |Pns = bnp , V = 1, Xn ≤
(1− δ)X¯n1 ] ≤ 1. The reasoning for the denominator in inequality D.4 is similar. Note that for
any δ ∈ (0, 1), Pr[Xn ≤ (1− δ)X¯n1 |V = 1] ≤ e−
δ2X¯n1
2 and Pr[Xn ≥ (1 + δ)X¯n0 |V = 1] ≤ e−
δ2X¯n0
2+δ
by Chernoff’s Inequality (see Lemma A.1). Therefore, lim Pr[Xn ≥ (1 − δ)X¯n1 |V = 1] = 1
and lim Pr[Xn ≤ (1 + δ)X¯n0 |V = 1] = 1. Equality D.5 is obtained from D.4 by noticing that
lim Pr[Xn ≥ (1− δ)X¯n1 |Pns = bnp , V = 1] = 1 because lim Pr[Xn ≥ (1− δ)X¯n1 |V = 1] = 1 and
lim Pr[Pns = b
n
p |V = 1] > 0. Therefore,
lim
E[ Gn
(1−δ)X¯n1
|Pns = bnp , V = 1]
E[ Gn
(1−δ)X¯n1
|Pns = bnp , V = 1, Xn ≥ (1− δ)X¯n1 ]
= 1
for the term in the numerator and the reasoning for the denominator is similar. Inequality D.6
follows from inequality D.5 via Chernoff’s inequality introduced in Lemma A.1. Inequality D.7
follows because we have (1+δ)X¯
n
0
(1−δ)X¯n1
≤ 1l(θi=0) by MLRP. Inequality D.8 follows from D.7 since we
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have
limE[Gn|V = 1] = lim Pr[Pns < bnp |V = 1]E[Gn|Pns < bnp , V = 1]
+ lim Pr[Pns = b
n
p |V = 1]E[Gn|Pns = bnp , V = 1]
+ lim Pr[Pns > b
n
p |V = 1]E[Gn|Pns > bnp , V = 1]
= lim Pr[Pns = b
n
p |V = 1]E[Gn|Pns = bnp , V = 1]
because E[Gn|Pns > bnp , V = 1] = 0 by definition and Pr[Pns < bnp |V = 1] → 0 because of our
initial contradiction assumption lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |1) − F¯ns (θns (1)|1)| = ∆ < ∞. Dividing both
the numerator and denominator by
√
n and evaluating the limit lim(1 − δ) X¯n1√
n
e−
δ2X¯n1
2 = 0
delivers inequality D.8. Finally, we reach the conclusion in equation D.9 because we have
E[Gn|V = 1]/Pr[Pns = bnp |V = 1]
√
n ≤ a < ∞ since lim sup√n(κ − F¯ns (θnp |1)) ≤ a for some
a and because lim Pr[Pns = bnp |V = 1] > 0 by assumption. Moreover, we now argue that
E[Gn|Pns = bnp , V = 0]/
√
n → ∞. This is because lim inf√n(κ − F¯ns (θnp |0)) = +∞ implies
that lim Pr[Gn ≥ A√n|V = 0] = 1 for all A > 0 and therefore lim Pr[Gn ≥ A√n|Pns = bnp , V =
0] = 1 for all A > 0. Hence, we find limE[Gn|Pns = bnp , V = 0]/
√
n ≥ A for any A > 0.
Claim D.3. Suppose that lim
√
n|F¯ns (θns (1)|v) − F¯ns (θns (0)|v)| → ∞. If there is pooling by
pivotal types, then lim Pr(Pns < bnp |v = 0) = 0. This claim and the previous two claims
together imply that there cannot be pooling by pivotal types. Therefore, lim
√
n|F¯ns (θns (1)|1)−
F¯ns (θ
n
s (0)|1)| <∞.
Proof. We will prove this claim by looking at two mutually exclusive cases.
Case 1:lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |0)−F¯ns (θns (0)|0)| → ∞. In this case lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |0)−F¯ns (θns (0)|0)| →
∞ and our initial assumption that lim Pr(Pns = bnp |0) > 0 together imply that lim Pr(Pns <
bnp |0) = 0.
Case 2: lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |0) − F¯ns (θns (0)|0)| → ∆ < ∞. Note that lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |0) −
F¯ns (θ
n
s (0)|0)| → ∆ <∞ and lim
√
n|F¯ns (θns (0)|1)−F¯ns (θns (1)|1)| → ∞ imply that lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |1)−
F¯ns (θ
n
s (1)|1)| → ∞. Therefore, lim inf
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |1) − F¯ns (θns (1)|1)| = lim inf
√
n(F¯ns (θ
n
p |1) −
κs) = +∞. Also, lim sup
√
n(F¯ns (θ
n
p |0)− κs) ≤ a for some positive a. Also, note lim Pr[Pns =
bnp |1] = 1 because lim Pr[Pns ≤ bnp |1] = 1 by the previous claim and because lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |1)−
F¯ns (θ
n
s (1)|1)| → ∞ and lim Pr[Pns = bnp |1] > 0 together imply lim Pr[Pns < bnp |1] = 0.
We now prove that
lim
Pr(bnp loses|Pns = bnp , V = 0)
Pr(bnp loses|Pns = bnp , V = 1)
= 0.
Let Un denote the number of bidders who submit the pooling bid who do not get allocated
an object, i.e., Un = Xn −Gn. Below we provide an upper bound for the posterior likelihood
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ratio that conditions on winning an object at a bid equal to the pooling bid:
lim
E[UnXn |Pns = bnp , V = 0]
E[UnXn |Pns = bnp , V = 1]
= lim
Pr(bnp loses|Pns = bnp , V = 0)
Pr(bnp loses|Pns = bnp , V = 1)
(D.10)
≤ lim
E[ Un
(1−δ)X¯n0
|Pns = bnp , V = 0, Xn ≥ (1− δ)X¯n0 ] + Pr[Xn ≤ (1− δ)X¯n0 |Pns = bnp , V = 0]
E[ Un
(1+δ)X¯n1
|Pns = bnp , V = 1, Xn ≤ (1 + δ)X¯n1 ] Pr[Xn ≤ (1 + δ)X¯n1 |Pns = bnp , V = 1]
(D.11)
≤ lim E[U
n|Pns = bnp , V = 0] + (1− δ)X¯n0 e−
δ2X¯n0
2
E[Un|Pns = bnp , V = 1]
(
(1+δ)X¯n1
(1−δ)X¯n0
)
(D.12)
≤ (1 + δ)l(θi = 0)
(1− δ) lim
E[Un|Pns = bnp , V = 0] + (1− δ)X¯n0 e−
δ2X¯n0
2
E[Un|Pns = bnp , V = 1]
(D.13)
=
(1 + δ)l(θi = 0)
(1− δ) lim
E[Un|Pns = bnp , V = 0]/
√
n
E[Un|Pns = bnp , V = 1]/
√
n
= 0
The numerator in inequality (D.11) is obtained by observing that Xn ≥ (1 − δ)X¯n0 in each
term in the expectation, Pr[Xn ≥ (1 − δ)X¯n0 |Pns = bnp , V = 1] ≤ 1 and E[U
n
Xn |Pns = bnp , V =
0, Xn ≤ (1 − δ)X¯n0 ] ≤ 1. The reasoning for the denominator in inequality D.11 is similar.
Inequality D.12 is obtained via Chernoff’s inequality using a logic analogous to the argument
for lim Pr(Pns ≤ bnp |V = 1) = 1. Inequality (D.13) follows because we have (1+δ)X¯
n
1
(1−δ)X¯n0
≥ 1l(θi=0) by
MLRP. Finally, we reach the conclusion in equation D.9 because we have lim inf
√
n(F¯ns (θ
n
p |1)−
κs) = +∞ and lim Pr(Pns = bnp |V = 1) = 1 together imply that
limE[Un|Pns = bnp , V = 1]√
n
=
limE[Un|V = 1]√
n
≥ lim inf n(F¯
n
s (θ
n
p |1)− κs)√
n
= +∞
showing that the denominator diverges. Moreover, lim sup
√
n(F¯ns (θ
n
p |0)− κs) ≤ a for some a
implies that lim Pr[Un ≤ √na|0] = 1. However, lim Pr[Un ≤ √na|V = 0] = 1 and Pr[Pns =
bnp |V = 0] > 0 together imply that lim Pr[Un ≤
√
na|V = 0] = 1. Therefore, we find that
limE[Un|Pns = bnp , V = 1]/
√
n ≤ a showing that the numerator converges to at most a and
thus establishing the bound.
Claim D.4. Fs(1|v) ≥ κs for v = 0, 1.
Proof. Assume not, i.e., that Fs(1|1) < κs. Note that Fs(1|1) < κs implies that Fs(1|0) < κs
because the pivotal types are arbitrarily close by the argument above. However, if Fs(1|v) < κs
for v = 0, 1, then all types would opt for market s because u(r|1) < u¯ < 1 and because the
price in market s is equal to zero with probability one in both states.
Claim D.5. If E[u(r|V )|θi = 0] < 0, then Fs(1|v) > κs for v = 0, 1 .
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that E[u(r|V )|θi = 0] < 0 and Fs(1|v) = κs for some v. If
Fs(1|v) = κs for some v, then Fs(1|v) = κs for all v because θs(1) = θs(0) by the argument
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further above. However, if Fs(1|v) = κs, then any type θ such that Fs[θ|v] > Fs[θs(v)|v] = 0
who bids in the auction wins an object with probability one in both states. To see this
note that Fs[θ|v] > Fs[θs(v)|v] implies that lim Pr[Pns ≤ bns (θ)|V = v] = 1. Moreover,
lim Pr[bns (θ) wins|Pns ≤ bns (θ), V = v] = 1. This follows because the winning chances are
smallest if this type submits a pooling bid but even in this case Fs(1|v) = κs and Lemma
B.2 together imply that lim Pr[bns (θ) wins|Pns ≤ bns (θ), V = v] = 1. Therefore, such a type
wins an object with certainty at a price equal to limE[Pns |v] in state v = 0, 1. However, if
limE[Pns |0] < −u(r|0), then all θ′ < θ would select market s by Corollary C.1. However, this
is incompatible with Fs(1|v) = κs, v = 0, 1. Similarly, if limE[Pns |V = 0] > −u(r|0), then all
θ′ > θ would select market s by Corollary C.1. This is again incompatible with Fs(1|v) = κs,
v = 0, 1. Therefore, limE[Pns |0] = −u(r|0). However, limE[Pns |0] = −u(r|0) implies that
limE[1− Pns |V = 1] = u(r|1) in order to ensure that there are types willing to select the op-
tions as assumed. However, if limE[Pns |V = 0] = −u(r|0) and limE[1 − Pns |V = 1] = u(r|1),
then any type θ > 0 such that E[u(r|1)|θi = θ] < 0 has a negative equilibrium payoff. This is
because any such type wins an object for sure in market s at a price equal to limE[Pns |V = v]
in state v = 0, 1 and limE[v − Pns |θi = θ] = E[u(r|V )|θi = θ] < 0.
D.3. Example where All Types Pool. The following example presents an example where
the pivotal types do not converge to each other but information aggregation nevertheless fails
because the pivotal types submit the same pooling bid. In the equilibrium that we construct,
the failure of information aggregation is particularly severe as the auction clears at the same
pooling price with probability one in both states. However, as we pointed out in Proposition
3.2, the existence of this type of pooling equilibria relies on V ar[u(r|V )] remaining large and
such equilibria no longer exist when 2
√
V ar[u(r|V )] < u¯. The mechanics of this example
works is similar to the construction in Lauermann and Wolinsky (2014).
Example D.1. Assume that the signals satisfy Definition 3.3 (i.e., the signals are binary) and
agents have access to an exogenous outside option with u(r|0) = −c and u(r|1) = c. Below
we construct an equilibrium sequence with the following properties:
i. There is a cutoff type θn such that all types [0, θn) bid in the auction and all types [θn, 1]
take the outside option and moreover limF (θn|v) > κ for v = 0, 1
ii. All types submit the same pooling bid bn, i.e., bn(θ) = bn for all θ ∈ [0, θn),
iii. Let b = lim bn. The auction price P is equal to b for both V = 0 and V = 1 almost
surely.
For the example assume that fhfl = 2,
1−fh
1−fl =
1
2 and that κ =
1
3 . Let c = 0.9. Fix b
n ∈
(0.44, 0.5). Suppose that all θ ≤ 1/2 bid the pooling bid bn in the auction and all θ > 1/2 opt
for the outside option. There are two constraints that need to be satisfied in order for this to
be an equilibrium. Below we argue that these constraints are satisfied for sufficiently large n
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i. The first constraint requires that bidders do not want to outbid the pooling bid. Let
b = lim bn. The probability of winning an object at the pooling bid converges to 1/2 if
v = 0 and 1 if V = 1 because the mass of people submitting the pooling bid converges
to 2/3 if v = 0 and 1/3 if V = 1. Therefore, the pooling bid converges to a value which
satisfies the following equality
−2
3
1
2
b+
1
3
(1− b) ≥ 0.
This implies that the pooling price b ≤ 1/2. Note that no bidder would want to outbid
the pooling bid because they win an object with probability one at the pooling bid.
ii. The second constraint ensures that people self-select as described above. The value we
have chosen for the outside option ensures that bidders who receive the high signal prefer
the outside option to bidding in the auction. This is because their payoff from the outside
option is equal to 0.3. In contrast, if they bid in the auction, the receive a payoff of
−1
3
1
2
b+
2
3
(1− b) = 2
3
− 5
6
b
at the limit when n is large. Note that 23 − 56b > 0.3 if b > 0.44 as we have assumed.
Also, note that types who receive the low signal would never choose the outside option
because the expected value is negative for them.
iii. Note that this example is not a knife-edge example and can be sustained for many
parameter value as long as V ar[u(r|V )] is sufficiently large. In particular, if κ = 1/3− ,
then a similar equilibrium could be sustained for sufficiently small .
E. Endogenous Outside Option Proofs
In this section we provide proofs for all our findings that relate to endogenous outside
options except for the equilibrium construction which is in Section F.
E.1. Information Aggregation and Non-Aggregation Results
Proof of Theorem 4.1, Item i. Fix an equilibrium sequence H. Assume, on the way to a
contradiction, that information is aggregated in market s along this sequence. Note that
limn E [Pnr |V = 0] ≥ c > 0 by assumption. The fact that information is aggregated in market
s implies that limn E [Pns |V = 0] = 0 and that limn E [Pns |V = 1] = 1 . Note that if θ > θˆr,
then lim anr (θ) = 1 by Lemma C.2 because limn E [Pnr |V = 0] > 0 and limn E [Pns |V = 0] = 0.
Let θ∗ denote the type as introduced by Definition 4.2. Note that θˆr ≤ θ∗ because if
θˆr > θ
∗, then limn E [Pnr |V = 1] = c because θFr (1) ≤ θ∗ by Definition 4.2. However, if
limn E [Pnr |V = 1] = c, then limun(r, bnr (θ)|θ) > 0 = limun(s, b|θ) for all b and all θ ∈ (θ∗, θˆr)
contradicting that θˆr ≤ θ∗.
Suppose that Fs(1|1) ≥ κs. Lemma C.3 shows that if lim anr (θ) = 1 for all θ > θ∗ and
if κs > κ∗(θ∗), then θns (0) − θns (1) ≥ 0 for all n sufficiently large. If Fs(1|1) ≥ κs, then
θns (0) − θns (1) ≥ 0 for all n sufficiently large however contradicts our initial assumption that
information is aggregated in market s. This is because information aggregation in market s
57
implies, by Lemma B.4, that θns (1)− θns (0) > 0 for all n sufficiently large. On the other hand
if Fs(1|1) < κs, then Pns → 0 in state v = 1 showing that information is not aggregated.
Proof of Theorem 4.1, Item ii. For any equilibrium sequence pick a subsequence H such that
the sequence of numbers E[Pnm|V = v] have a limit for each m ∈ M and each v. We will
show that for any such convergent sequence we have E[Pnm|V = v]→ v for all m ∈M and all
v = 0, 1 which, in turn, implies that Pnm
p→ V for m ∈M .
Step 1. The equality limE[Pnm|V = 0] = 0 and the inequality limE[Pnm′ |V = 0] > 0 cannot
be jointly satisfied.
Let B ⊂M be the set of markets such that limE[Pnm′ |V = 0] > 0. The fact limE[Pnm′ |V =
0] > 0 implies that Fm′(1|0) ≥ κm′ for all m′ ∈ B because otherwise Pnm′
p→ 0 by the law of
large numbers. The facts that limE[Pnm|V = 0] = 0 for m /∈ B and limE[Pnm′ |V = 0] > 0 for
m′ ∈ B together imply that lim anB(θ) = 1 for all θ > θˆ := minm′∈B θˆm′ by Lemma C.2. The
fact that lim anm′(θ) = 1 for all θ > θˆ implies that
FB(1|1)− FB(θˆ|1) = F (1|1)− F (θˆ|1) > F (1|0)− F (θˆ|0) = FB(1|0)− FB(θˆ|0).
This, in turn, implies that there is at least one marketm′ ∈M such that Fm′(1|1)−Fm′(θˆ|1) >
Fm′(1|0) − Fm′(θˆm′ |0). For this market, Fm′(1|1) − Fm′(θˆ|1) > Fm′(1|0) − Fm′(θˆm′ |0) implies
that Fm′(1|1) > κm′ because Fm′(1|0) ≥ κm′ . However, if Fm′(1|1) − Fm′(θˆ|1) > Fm′(1|0) −
Fm′(θˆm′ |0) and if Fm′(1|1) > κm′ , then we conclude, by Lemma B.5, that Pnm′
p→ 0 if v = 0.
This contradicts limE[Pnm′ |V = 0] > 0.
Step 2. The inequality limE[Pnm|V = 0] > 0 for all m ∈M is not possible.
The inequalities imply that Fm(1|0) ≥ κm for all m ∈ M . Also, MLRP implies that
there is at least one market where Fm′(1|1) ≥ Fm′(1|0) and θm′(1) > θm′(0). The facts that
Fm′(1|0) ≥ κm′ and θm′(1) > θm′(0) together imply that Fm′(1|1) > κm′ . For this market,
however, Lemma B.5, implies that Pnm
p→ 0 in state V = 0 contradicting the assumption that
limE[Pnm|V = 0] > 0.
Step 3. The above two steps have established that limE[Pnm|0] = 0 for all m ∈ M in any
equilibrium. We now show that limE[Pnm|V = 0] = 0 for all m ∈M implies that Pnm p→ V for
all m ∈M .
The fact that limE[Pnm|0] = 0 implies that limun(m, bnm(θ)|θi = θ, V = 0) = 0 for all θ.
Moreover, limun(m, bnm(1)|θi = 1, V = 1) = 1− limE[Pnm|V = 1] for each m ∈ M . Each type
θ can mimic type 1’s bidding strategy and obtain a payoff identical to type 1 if V = 1. Such a
type would obtain a payoff equal to zero in the low state at the limit regardless of the strategy
that she uses. Therefore,
limun(m, bnm(θ)|θi = θ, V = 1) ≥ limun(m, bnm(1)|θi = θ, V = 1)
for each θ. However, a symmetric argument from the perspective of type 1 implies that
limun(m, bnm(θ)|θi = 1, V = 1) ≤ limun(m, bnm(1)|θi = 1, V = 1) for each θ. These two
inequalities and noting that limun(m, b|θi = θ, V = 1) = limun(m, b|V = 1) for each θ shows
limun(m, bnm(θ)|V = 1) = limun(m, bnm(1)|V = 1) for each θ. Therefore, if there is a positive
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mass of bidders in any two markets m′ 6= m, then we must have that limun(m|θi = θ, V =
1) = 1− limE[Pnm|V = 1] = 1− limE[Pnm′ |V = 1] for all θ.
In any equilibrium total expected utility plus the total revenue must be at most equal to
the total available surplus, that is,
lim
∫
[0,1]
un(θ)dF (θ) +
∑
m
limE[Pnm|V = 1]
2
min{Fm(1|1), κm} ≤
∑
m
min{Fm(1|1), κm}1
2
.
Noting that lim 2un(θ)f(θ) = f(θ|1) limu(m, bm(θ)|V = 1) = f(θ|1)(1− limE[Pnm|V = 1]) and
substituting into the above we obtain∫
[0,1]
(1− limE[Pnm|V = 1])dF (θ) ≤
∑
m
min{Fm(1|1), κm}(1− limE[Pnm|V = 1])
1− limE[Pnm|V = 1] ≤
∑
m
min{Fm(1|1), κm}(1− limE[Pnm|V = 1])
Using the fact that 1 − limE[Pnm|V = 1] = 1 − limE[Pnm′ |1] to simplify we obtain (1 −
limE[Pnm|V = 1])(1 −
∑
m min{Fm(1|1), κm}) ≤ 0 showing that 1 − limE[Pnm|V = 1] = 0 for
any market that attracts bidders.
If one of the markets, say r, has no bidders, then following the logic above, we obtain
1 − limE[Pnm|V = 1] = 0 for all markets m which attract a positive mass of bidders. This,
however, contradicts that market r has no bidders because each bidder can submit a bid equal
to zero in market r and obtain a payoff equal to 1 > 0 in state V = 1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1, Item iii. Let xv = F [θ′′|v]−F [θ′|v] > 0 for v = 0, 1 where 1−F [θ′′|1] =
κs + κr and 1− F [θ′|0] = κs + κr. If κs < κ∗(θ∗) and if c < c¯, then information is aggregated
in market s where
c¯ = x0b > 0
and where
b =
l(θ)(1− κsκs+x1 )
(1− x0) + l(θ)(1− κsκs+x1 )
> 0.
Assume that information is not aggregated in market s. We will prove this claim by looking
at three distinct cases.
Case 1. Suppose that Fs(1|0) > κs and θs(0) ≥ θs(1). This implies that Fr(1|1) > Fr(1|0)
and θr(1) > θr(0). Also, κs < κ∗ implies that Fr(1|1) > κr by Lemma C.3. However,
Fr(1|1) > Fr(1|0), θr(1) > θr(0) and Fr(1|1) > κr together imply that limE[Pnr |1] = 1 by
Lemma B.5. This however, is not possible because any type θ > θr(1) who selects market r
would have strictly negative profits because limE[Pnr |V = 0] ≥ c > 0 .
Case 2. Suppose that Fs(1|0) ≤ κs. We must also have Fs(1|1) ≤ κs because if Fs(1|1) >
κs, then information would be aggregated in market s by Lemma B.5.
First, suppose Fs(1|1) ≤ Fs(1|0) ≤ κs. If Fs(1|1) ≤ Fs(1|0) ≤ κs, then Fr(1|1) ≥ Fr(1|0),
θr(1) > θr(0) and Fr(1|1) > κr which in turn implies that limE[Pnr |V = 1] = 1 by Lemma
B.5. However, we argued that this is not possible above.
Alternatively, suppose Fs(1|0) < Fs(1|1) ≤ κs. If Fs(1|0) < Fs(1|1) ≤ κs, then limE[Pns |V =
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0] = 0. We observe that limE[Pns |0] = 0 and limE[Pnr |0] ≥ cr together imply that lim anr (θ) =
1 for all θ > θ∗ by Lemma C.2. Also, Fr(1|1) > κr because Fs(1|1) ≤ κs. This line of rea-
soning implies that limE[Pnr |V = 1] = 1 by Lemma B.5 because lim anr (θ) = 1 for all θ > θ∗
and Fr(1|1) > κr. However, we argued that limE[Pnr |V = 1] = 1 is not compatible with
equilibrium behavior as was argued further above.
Case 3. Suppose that Fs(1|0) > κs and θs(0) < θs(1). In order for information to not ag-
gregate in market s it must be that Fs(1|0) > Fs(1|1). This implies that Fr(1|1) > Fr(1|0) and
θr(1) > θr(0). This implies that Fr(1|1) ≤ κr because otherwise we would have limE[Pnr |V =
1] = 1 by Lemma B.5.
Information non-aggregation implies that there is pooling by pivotal types (see definition
B.1)
Step 1. lim Pr(bn wins, Pns = bn|V = 0) ≥ x0 and lim Pr(bn wins, Pns = bn|V = 1) ≤
κs
κs+x1
. These bounds follow from Lemma B.2.
Step 2. The pooling bid b ≥ b
For each θ who submits the pooling bid, submitting the pooling bid must be at least as
profitable as submitting a bid slightly higher than the pooling bid, i.e., submitting a bid bn+ 
for any  > 0 (also see the analogous argument provided for Claim D.1). Therefore:
− lim Pr(bn wins, Pn = bn|V = 0)b
+ lim Pr(bn wins, Pn = bn|V = 1)(1− b)l(θ) ≥ −b+ (1− b)l(θ).
The pooling bid b ≤ 1. Therefore, for the above inequality to hold we must have 0 ≤ b.
Therefore, using the facts that lim Pr(bn wins, Pn = bn|V = 0) ≥ x0 and lim Pr(bn wins, Pn =
bn|V = 1) ≤ κsκs+x1 we obtain
−bx0 + κs
κs + x1
(1− b)l(θ) ≥ −b+ (1− b)l(θ)
b ≥ l(θ)(1−
κs
κs+x1
)
(1− xl) + l(θ)(1− κsκs+x1 )
Note that 1 > b > 0.
Step 3. If −bx0 < −c, i.e., if c < c¯, then all θ > θˆs select market s. This is because
limu(s, bn|V = 0) ≤ −bx0. Also, limu(r, b′|V = 0) = −c < 0 for any b′ ≥ c and limu(r, b′|V =
0) = 0 for any b′ < c. However, then Lemma C.2 implies that θ > θˆs = lim θnp select market s
because there is always a type θ′ ∈ [θ, θˆs] who submits the pooling bid. However, if as(θ) = 1
for all θ > θˆs, then information is aggregated in market s by Lemma B.5.
E.2. Information Aggregation Failure with Multiple Markets.
Theorem E.1. Suppose that MLRP is satisfied. Let κ∗ denote the cutoff defined by Definition
3.2. If c > 0 and if
∑
m∈M\r κm > κ
∗, then information is not aggregated in any market
m ∈M in any sequence of equilibria H.
Proof. Fix an equilibrium sequence H. Let I ⊂M denote the set markets where information
is aggregated along the equilibrium sequence and let N ⊂ M denote the set of markets such
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that limE[Pnm|0] > 0. Thus I ∩ N = ∅. Assume, on the way to a contradiction, that I 6= ∅,
i.e., assume that information is aggregated in some market. Let θˆ := minm∈N θˆm. Note that
r ∈ N .
If θ > θˆ, then lim anM\I(θ) = 1 by Lemma C.2 because limE[P
n
m|V = 0] > 0 for all m ∈ N
and limE[Pnm|V = 0] = 0 for all m ∈ I.44 We show below that this selection implies that
θI(0) > θI(1). However, if θI(0) > θI(1), then there exists m ∈ I such that θm(0) > θm(1).
However, information aggregation in this market m implies that θns (1) − θns (0) > 0 for all n
sufficiently large by Lemma B.4 which contradicts the inequality θm(0) > θm(1).
We now show that θI(0) > θI(1). Because no θ > θˆ bids in any of the markets in I, we
find using the reasoning in Lemma C.3 that the following inequality is satisfied:
FI(θˆ|1)− FI(θI(1)|1)
FI(θˆ|0)− FI(θI(1)|0)
≤W (
∑
I
κm, θˆ).
Let ∆1 = θˆr− θˆ and ∆2 = F (θˆr|1)−F (θˆ|1). We haveW (θˆ,
∑
I κm) = W (θˆr−∆1,
∑
m6=r κm−
∆2) ≤W (θˆr,
∑
m6=r κm) where the inequality is satisfied because any choice α for the program
W (θˆr −∆1,
∑
m 6=r κm−∆2) is also feasible for W (θˆr,
∑
m6=r κm). Our initial assumption that∑
m∈M κs > κ
∗ implies that W (θˆr,
∑
m6=r κm) < 1.
E.3. Characterization.
Proof of Proposition 4.1 . Let x := κs − F¯ (θFs (1)|0). Note that θFs (1) is the pivotal type
under the assumption that all types are in market s. Therefore, x is independent of n and the
equilibrium under consideration. Moreover, the constant x > 0 due to MLRP. Define
c¯ := min
{
x
l(0)(1− κr − κs)
1 + l(0)(1− κr − κs) ,Pr[v = 1|θi = θ
F
s (1)]
}
. (E.1)
Claim E.1. We show that Fr(1|0) < Fr(1|1) ≤ κr. This step in conjunction with Claim E.5
establishes item i.
Proof. In the two paragraphs below we will argue that Fr(1|0) < Fr(1|1). If Fr(1|0) < Fr(1|1),
then we must have Fr(1|1) ≤ κr. This is because Fr(1|0) < Fr(1|1) and Fr(1|1) > κr together
imply that Pnr → 1 if v = 1 by Lemma B.5. But this is not possible because all the bidders in
market r would then earn negative profits.
First, suppose that Fr(1|0) > Fr(1|1). This implies that Fs(1|0) < Fs(1|1). There are two
cases: Fs(1|1) > κs and Fs(1|1) ≤ κs. If Fs(1|1) > κs, then Pns → 0 when v = 0 by Lemma
B.5 and if Fs(1|1) ≤ κs, then again Pns → 0 when v = 0 because Fs(1|0) < κs. However, if
Pns → 0 when v = 0, then ar(θ) = 1 for all θ > θˆr by Lemma C.2. However, if Fr(1|0) < κr,
then ar(θ) = 1 for all θ > θˆr implies that Fr(1|1) > Fr(1|0) which contradicts our initial
assumption. On the other hand if Fr(1|0) ≥ κr, then Fr(1|1) > κr However, Fr(1|1) > κr and
ar(θ) = 1 for all θ > θˆr together imply that Pnr → 1 if v = 1 by Lemma B.5 which is not
possible.
44As before, for a set of markets B ⊂ M we define FB(θ) := H ([0, θ]×B × [0,∞)) and aB(θ) as the
Radon-Nikodym derivative of FB with respect to F .
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Second, suppose that Fr(1|0) = Fr(1|1). There are two cases to consider: Fr(1|1) > κr
and Fr(1|1) ≤ κr. If Fr(1|1) > κr, then Pnr → 1 when v = 1 by Lemma B.5 which is not
possible. Alternatively, If Fr(1|1) ≤ κr, then Fs(1|1) > κs. However, Fs(1|0) = Fs(1|1) and
Fs(1|1) > κs together imply by Lemma B.5 that Pns → 0 if v = 0. However, as argued
previous, if Pns → 0 when v = 0 and if Fr(1|0) ≤ κr, then almost all types in market r win an
object when v = 0 at a price which is at least c. Therefore, ar(θ) = 1 for all θ > θˆr by Lemma
C.2. Thus, we conclude that Fr(1|1) > Fr(1|0) because ar(θ) = 1 for all θ > θˆr. However, this
contradicts that Fr(1|0) = Fr(1|1) as we initially assumed.
Claim E.2. We now argue that limn→∞
√
n|F¯ns (θns (1)|v) − F¯ns (θns (0)|v)| ∈ (0,∞) for each
v = 0, 1. This step proves item vi.
Proof. Suppose instead that lim
√
n|F¯ns (θns (1)|v)−F¯ns (θns (0)|v)| → ∞ for some v and note that
this implies lim
√
n|F¯ns (θns (1)|v) − F¯ns (θns (0)|v)| → ∞ for each v = 0, 1. We will argue below
that if c < c¯, then pooling by pivotal types (see Definition B.1) cannot be sustained. However,
if there is no pooling by pivotal types and if lim
√
n|F¯ns (θns (1)|1) − F¯ns (θns (0)|1)| → ∞, then
information is aggregated by Lemma B.4. Therefore, once we conclude that pooling by pivotal
types cannot be sustained, this conclusion and Theorem 4.1’s finding that information is not
aggregated together imply that lim
√
n|F¯ns (θns (1)|1)− F¯ns (θns (0)|1)| <∞.
In the proof of Proposition 3.2 we showed that if there is pooling by pivotal types, then
lim Pr(Pns ≤ bnp |V = 1) = 1 and lim Pr(Pns < bnp |V = 0) = 0. Below we will show that if
lim Pr(Pns ≤ bnp |V = 1) = 1 and lim Pr(Pns < bnp |V = 0) = 0, then there cannot be pooling by
pivotal types and thereby establish that lim
√
n|F¯ns (θns (1)|1)− F¯ns (θns (0)|1)| <∞.
Claim E.3. If lim Pr(Pns ≤ bnp |V = 1) = 1 and lim Pr(Pns < bnp |V = 0) = 0, then
bp ≥ l(0)(1− κr − κs)
1 + l(0)(1− κr − κs) .
Proof. Suppose that there is pooling by pivotal types and lim Pr(Pns ≤ bnp |V = 1) = 1 and
lim Pr(Pns < b
n
p |V = 0) = 0. Let lim bnp = bp. We first argue that the pooling price
bp ≥ l(0)(1− κr − κs)
1 + l(0)(1− κr − κs) .
For any type θ who submits the pooling bid, the pooling bid must be at least as profitable as
submitting a bid slightly higher than the pooling bid, i.e., a bid bnp + for any  > 0. Therefore:
Pr(bnp wins|V = 1, Pns = bnp ) Pr(Pns = bnp |V = 1)(1− bnp )l(θ)
− Pr(bnp wins|V = 0, Pns = bnp ) Pr(Pns = bnp |V = 0)bnp ≥
− bnp Pr(Pns = bnp |V = 0) + (1− bnp ) Pr(Pns = bnp |V = 1)l(θ),
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where we ignore  as this constant is arbitrarily small. Rearranging we find that
bnp
1− bnp
≥ Pr(b
n
p loses|V = 1, Pns = bnp ) Pr(Pns = bnp |V = 1)
Pr(bnp loses|V = 0, Pns = bnp ) Pr(Pns = bnp |V = 0)
l(θ)
≥ Pr(b
n
p loses, P
n
s = b
n
p |V = 1)
Pr(bnp loses, P
n
s = b
n
p |V = 0)
l(θ = 0) ≥ l(θ = 0) lim Pr(bnp loses, Pns = bnp |V = 1)
There are two possibilities: either Fs(θp|1) = 0 or Fs(θp|1) > 0.
Suppose that Fs(θp|1) = 0. In this case, Lemma B.2 and Fs(θp|1) = 0 together imply that
lim Pr(bnp loses, P
n
s = b
n
p |V = 1) = 1−
κs − (Fs(1|1)− Fs(θp|1))
Fs(θp|1)− Fs(θp|1)
=
Fs(1|1)− κs
Fs(θp|1)
≥ Fs(1|1)− κs ≥ 1− κr − κs
where the last inequality is satisfied because Fr(1|1) ≤ κr by the previous step further above.
Therefore, we find
bp ≥ (1− κr − κs)l(0)
1 + (1− κr − κs)l(0)
Suppose instead that Fs(θp|1) > 0. This implies that
− lim Pr(bnp wins, Pns ≤ bnp |V = 0)bnp + Pr(bnp wins, Pns ≤ bnp |V = 1)(1− bnp )l(0) ≤ 0,
rearranging we find that
bp
1− bp ≥ lim
Pr(bnp wins, P
n
s ≤ bnp |V = 1)
Pr(bnp wins, P
n
s ≤ bnp |V = 0)
l(0)
However, the inequality we obtained further above for any type θ submitting the pooling bid
showed
bp
1− bp ≥ lim
Pr(bnp loses, P
n
s = b
n
p |V = 1)
Pr(bnp loses, P
n
s = b
n
p |V = 0)
l(0) = lim
Pr(bnp loses, P
n
s ≤ bnp |V = 1)
Pr(bnp loses, P
n
s ≤ bnp |V = 0)
l(0)
However,
max{Pr(b
n
p wins|V = 1, Pns ≤ bnp )
Pr(bnp wins|V = 0, Pns ≤ bnp )
,
Pr(bn loses|V = 1, Pns ≤ bn)
Pr(bn loses|V = 0, Pns ≤ bn)
}Pr(P
n
s ≤ bn|V = 1)
Pr(Pns ≤ bn|V = 0)
≥ 1.
Therefore, if Fs(θp|1) > 0, then bp ≥ l(0)1+l(0) > l(0)(1−κr−κs)1+l(0)(1−κr−κs) .
The previous argument provided a lower bound on the pooling price. We now argue that
it is not possible to pool at such a high pooling price if c < c¯.
Claim E.4. Suppose that c < c¯. If lim Pr(Pns ≤ bnp |V = 1) = 1 and lim Pr(Pns < bnp |V = 0) = 0,
then there is no pooling by pivotal types.
Proof. Note that any type θ > θp that bids in market s wins an object with probability one
and pays a price at least equal to bp if V = 0. However, then we find that all θ > θp would
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select market s by Lemma C.1 because bp > c. We now look at two cases to show that pooling
by pivotal types is not possible if lim Pr(Pns ≤ bnp |V = 1) = 1 and lim Pr(Pns < bnp |V = 0) = 0.
Case 1. lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |v) − F¯ns (θns (0)|v)| < ∞. If lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |v) − F¯ns (θns (0)|v)| < ∞,
then the type θˆs defined in Definition B.3 is equal to θp. Moreover, any type θ > θp selects
market s by the argument in the previous paragraph. This however, leads to a contradiction
because if all θ > θp select market s and if lim |F¯ns (θnp |v)−F¯ns (θns (0)|v)| = 0, then θs(1) > θs(0)
by MLRP and hence θs(1) > θp contradicting that lim Pr(Pns ≤ bnp |V = 1) = 1.
Case 2. lim
√
n|F¯ns (θnp |v) − F¯ns (θns (0)|v)| = ∞. In this case, we argue below that the
probability of winning a good at pooling is at least x > 0 if v = 0. Type θˆs is equal to θp and
all types above θˆs win an object with probability at least x in market s at a price which exceeds
bp. Then however, all θ > θˆs would select market s by Lemma C.1 because bpx > c¯ > c. This
would however imply that information is aggregated in the auction by Lemma B.5 which leads
us to a contradiction.
Continuing with Case 2, we argue that the expected fraction of objects remaining at pooling
if V = 0 is at least x and therefore, the probability of winning an object from pooling is at least
x if V = 0. Note that lim Pr(Pns ≤ bnp |V = 1) = 1 implies that κ− F¯s(θp|V = 1) ≥ 0. The fact
that all types θ > θp select market s implies that κ− F¯s(θp|1) = κ− F¯ (θp|1) ≥ 0. Therefore,
we find θp ≥ θFs (1). MLRP implies that κ− F¯ (θp|1) > κ− F¯ (θp|0). Also, θp ≥ θFs (1) implies
that κs − F¯ (θp|0) ≥ κs − F¯ (θFs (1)|0) = x hence the expected fraction of goods left over to
pooling is at least x. The expected fraction of bidders who submit the pooling bid is at most
1. Therefore, the fact that the probability of winning at pooling is at least x follows from the
argument in Lemma B.2.
Claim E.5. We show lim
√
n|Fnr (1|1)− κr| <∞. This claim completes the proof of item i.
Proof. In Claim E.1 we showed that Fr(1|0) < Fr(1|1) ≤ κr. If lim
√
n|Fnr (1|1)−κr| =∞, then
Pr(Pr = c|v) = 1 for v = 0, 1. Therefore any type can make strictly positive profit by bidding c
in market r because c < c¯ implies that (1−c)l(0)−c > 0. Let θnp = sup{θ : bns (θ) = bns (θs(1))},
θnp = inf{θ : bns (θ) = bns (θs(1))} and θi = lim θni , i = 0, 1. Note that if F¯s(θ|1) > F¯s(θp|1) for
any type with as(θ) > 0, then limun(s, bns (θ)|1) = 0. The profit of such a type is zero, i.e.,
limun(s, bns (θ)|1) = 0. We show this in the next paragraph. However, such a type can make
strictly positive profit by bidding c+ for  > 0 sufficiently small. Therefore, F¯s(θ|1) ≤ F¯s(θp|1)
for all θ with as(θ) > 0 and hence F¯s(θp|1) = F¯s(0|1). Therefore, θs(0) > θp. Note that
F¯s(θp|1) = F¯s(0|1), κs < F¯s(0|1) and θp ≥ θs(1) together imply that F¯s(θp|1) > F¯s(θp|1).
Similarly, if F¯s(θp|1) ≥ κs, then lim Pr(bns (θs(1)) wins, Pns = bns (θs(1))|1) = 0 by Lemma B.2.
Again we find that limus(bns (θ)|1) = 0 for any θ ∈ [θp, θp] however any such type can make
strictly positive profit by bidding in market r. Therefore, F¯s(θp|1) < κs which implies that
lim Pr(Pns = b
n
s (θs(1))|V = v) = 1 for all v = 0, 1. This implies that there is pooling by pivotal
types. However, in Claim E.4, we argued that there is no such sequence of pooling intervals.
We now argue if F¯s(θ′|1) > F¯s(θp|1) for any type with as(θ′) > 0, then limun(s, bns (θ′)|1) =
0. Note that bns (θ′) < bns (θs(1)) for all n because F¯s(θ′|1) > F¯s(θp|1). Let θ˜n = sup{θ : bns (θ) =
bns (θ
′)} and θ˜ = lim θ˜n. If F¯s(θ˜|1) > F¯s(θp|1), then lim Pr(bns (θ′) wins, Pns = bns (θ′)|1) = 0
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by the law of large numbers. Otherwise, if F¯s(θ˜|1) = F¯s(θp|1), then lim Pr(bns (θ′) wins, Pns =
bns (θ
′)|1) = 0 by Lemma B.2.
Claim E.6. The profits are equal across states and markets. In particular, limE[Pnr |V = 1] =
limE[Pns |V = 1] and limE[Pnr |V = 0] = limE[Pnr |V = 0] = c. This claim establishes item iv.
Proof. If c < E[Pnr |V = 0], then ar(θ) = 1 for all θ > θˆr by Lemma C.2. This implies that
θs(0) > θs(1) because κs > κ∗(θ∗) and because θˆr = θ∗. However, this contradicts step 2
above.
Further below we show any type θ > θs(1) who submits a bid in market s wins an object
with probability one if v = 0. If c > E[Pnr |V = 0], then as(θ) = 1 for all θ > θs(0) by Lemma
C.2. However, this implies that θs(1) > θs(0) again contradicting step 2 further above.
However, limE[Pnr |V = 0] = limE[Pnr |V = 0] = −c implies that we must have limE[Pnr |V =
1] = limE[Pns |V = 1] in order to have any type bid in the two markets.
We now complete the proof by showing that for any type θ′ > θs(0),
lim Pr(bns (θ
′) wins, Pns ≤ bns (θ′)|V = 0) = 1.
Suppose that θ′ > θs(0) and lim Pr(bns (θ′) wins, pns ≤ bns (θ′)|V = 0) < 1. The law of large
numbers implies that lim Pr(Pns ≤ bns (θns (0))|V = 0) = 1. Moreover, monotonicity of bidding
implies that bns (θ′) ≥ bns (θns (0)). Therefore, it must be the case that bns (θ′) = bns (θns (0)) for all
n sufficiently large. Let
θnp = inf{θ : bns (θ) = bns (θs(0))} and θnp=sup{θ:bns (θ)=bns (θs(0))}.
Our assumption that lim Pr(bns (θ′) wins, pns ≤ bns (θ′)|V = 0) < 1 implies that θp < θs(0)
because otherwise all bidders in the pooling region would win a good with probability one
by Lemma B.2. Hence there must be a sequence of pooling regions (θnp , θnp ) such that θp <
θs(0) = θs(1) < θ
′ ≤ θp. However, Claim E.4 above established that such a sequence does not
exist.
Claim E.7. For any type θ that bids in market r we have bnr (θ) → 1. The argument for this
claim is straightforward if bidding is atomless in market r. The argument below shows that
bnr (θ)→ 1 in any equilibrium sequence even if there are atoms in the bidding function.
Proof. For any  > 0, pick θn such that Pr(Y n−1r (nκr) ∈ (0, θn)|V = 1) ≤  and recall that
we use the convention that Y n−1r (nκr) = 0 if there are fewer than nκr + 1 bidders in market
r. We argue that lim bnr (θ) = 1 for any θ > lim θn. Note that lim Pr(Pnr ≥ bnr (θn)|V = 1) > 0
and that lim
√
n(F¯nr (θ
n|v)− κr) = a for some a. If we let
δ =
κr
Fnr (1|0)
− 1
then, applying Chernoff’s Inequality we find
Pr(Pnr ≥ bnr (θn)|V = 0) ≤ e−
δ2nFnr (1|0)
2+δ .
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Therefore,
Pr(Pnr = b
n
r (θ
n), bnr (θ
n) loses|V = 0) ≤ Pr(bnr (θn) loses|V = 0)
≤ Pr(Pnr ≥ bnr (θn)|V = 0) ≤ e−
δ2nFnr (1|0)
2+δ
Any type θn in this sequence can ensure winning an object by submitting a bid equal to one
in the auction. Therefore, we obtain the following inequality which has type θn’s equilibrium
payoff on the left hand side and θn’s payoff from submitting a bid equal to one on the right
hand side:
(1− E[Pnr |bnr (θn) wins, V = 1]) Pr(bnr (θn) wins|V = 1)l(θn)− cPr(bnr (θn) wins|V = 0) ≥
(1− E[Pnr |bnr (θn) wins, V = 1]) Pr(bnr (θn) wins|V = 1)l(θn)− cPr(bnr (θn) wins|V = 0)+
(1− E[Pnr |bnr (θn) loses, V = 1]) Pr(bnr (θn) loses|V = 1)l(θn)− Pr(bnr (θn) loses|V = 0)
Therefore,
(1− E[Pnr |bnr (θn) loses, V = 1]) Pr(bnr (θn) loses|V = 1)l(θn)− Pr(bnr (θn) loses|V = 0) ≤ 0.
(1− E[Pnr |bnr (θn) loses, V = 1])−
e−
δ2nFnr (1|0)
2+δ
Pr(bnr (θ
n) loses|V = 1) ≤ 0
We consider two cases: (1) lim Pr(Pnr = bnr (θn)|V = 1) = 0 and (2) lim Pr(Pnr = bnr (θn)|V =
1) > 0.
Suppose that lim Pr(Pnr = bnr (θn)|V = 1) = 0. Then lim Pr(Pnr > bnr (θn)|V = 1) =
lim Pr(Pnr ≥ bnr (θn)|V = 1) > 0 and Pr(bnr (θn) loses|V = 1) = lim Pr(Pnr ≥ bnr (θn)|V =
1) > 0. Therefore, using the inequality above we conclude limE[Pnr |bnr (θn) loses, V = 1] =
limE[Pnr |Pnr ≥ bnr (θn), V = 1] = 1. Thus, lim bnr (θ) = 1 for almost all θ > lim θn.
Instead, suppose that lim Pr(Pnr = bnr (θn)|V = 1) > 0. If lim Pr(Pnr = bnr (θn)|V = 1) > 0,
then further below we argue that Pr(Pnr = bnr (θn), bnr (θn) loses|V = 1) ≥ A√n for some constant
A for all sufficiently large n. Therefore,
0 ≥ (1− bnr (θn)) Pr(Pnr = bnr (θn), bnr (θn) loses|V = 1)l(θn)− Pr(bnr (θn) loses|V = 0)
0 ≥ (1− bnr (θn))−
e−
δ2nFnr (1|0)
2+δ
A√
n
for sufficiently large n. Taking limits, we find that lim bnr (θn) = 1 and thus lim bnr (θ) = 1 for
all θ ≥ lim θn.
We now show that if lim Pr(Pnr = bnr (θn)|V = 1) > 0, then Pr(Pnr = bnr (θn), bnr (θn) loses|V =
1) ≥ A√
n
, for some constant A, for all sufficiently large n. Let θnp = inf{θ : bnr (θ) = bnr (θn)}
and θnp = sup{θ : bnr (θ) = bnr (θn)}. Let θn∗ be such that
Pr[Y nr (nκr) ∈ [θn∗ , θnp ]|V = 1] =
Pr(Pnr = b
n
r (θ
n)|V = 1)
2
=
Pr[Y nr (nκr) ∈ [θnp , θnp ]|V = 1]
2
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Let X be the random variable which is equal to the expected number of bidders with types in
the interval [θnp , θn∗ ] who bid in market r. We claim that
Pr(Pnr = b
n
r (θ
n), bnr (θ
n) loses|V = 1) ≥ Pr(P
n
r = b
n
r (θ
n)|1)
2
E[X|Y nr (nκr) ∈ [θn∗ , θnp ], V = 1]
n
.
This inequality is satisfied because Y nr (nκr) ∈ [θn∗ , θnp ] implies that Pnr = bnr (θn); conditional
on the event Y nr (nκr) ∈ [θn∗ , θnp ], at least X bidders, who submitted the same bid as θn, are
not allocated objects, and there are at most n bidders who submit the same bid as θn.
Our assumption of lim Pr(Pnr = bnr (θn)|V = 1) > 0 implies that lim
√
nFnr [[θ
n
p , θ
n
p ]|V =
1] > 0 and thus lim
√
nFnr [[θ
n
p , θ
n∗ )|V = 1] > 0. Note that
E[X|Y nr (nκr) ∈ [θn∗ , θnp ], V = 1] ≥ n(1− κr)An
where An = F
n
r [[θ
n
p ,θ
n∗ )|1]
1−Fnr [[θn∗ ,1]|1] . Let A =
1
2 lim
Pr(Pnr =b
n
r (θ
n)|V=1)
2
√
nAn. Note that A > 0 because
lim
√
nFnr [[θ
n
p , θ
n∗ )|1] > 0. Thus,
lim
E[X|Y nr (nκr) ∈ [θn∗ , θnp ], V = 1]√
n
≥ lim(1− κr)
√
nAn > 0
The inequality above and lim Pr(Pnr = bnr (θn)|V = 1) > 0 together imply that
E[X|Y nr (nκr) ∈ [θn∗ , θnp ], V = 1]
Pr(Pnr = b
n
r (θ
n)|V = 1)
2
≥ A√n
for all sufficiently large n. Therefore, we conclude that Pr(Pnr = bnr (θn), bnr (θn) loses|V = 1) ≥
A/
√
n for all n sufficiently large.
Claim E.8. The price in market r converges to c almost surely if V = 0 and converges to a
random variable Pr(1) if V = 1. The random variable Pr(1) is equal to c with probability
q > 0 and is equal to 1 with the remaining probability.
Proof. The fact that the price converges to c almost surely if V = 0 follows from the law of large
numbers and the fact that Fr(1|0) < κr. Also, note that lim
√
n|Fnr (1|1) − κr| < ∞ implies
that Pr(1) is equal to c with probability q > 0. With the remainder of the probability, i.e., with
probability 1 − q, the auction clears at the bid of some type θ. However, the previous claim
showed that bnr (θ) → 1 for all θ. Therefore, the auction price is equal to 1 with probability
1− q.
F. Equilibrium Construction.
F.1. Endogenous Outside Option. In what follows we construct an equilibrium with the
properties outlined in Proposition 4.2. We first define the market selection and the bidding
strategies in the two markets below. After we defined these objects, we argue that there is an
equilibrium where all types behave according to these strategies.
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In what follows we consider sequences {θn0 , θn1 , θnp } such that types (θn0 , θn1 ] select market
s, types θ /∈ (θn0 , θn1 ) select market r and types (θn0 , θnp ) submit the pooling bid. Suppose that
(θn0 , θ
n
1 ) bid in market s, let
∆ns :=
√
n
(1− κs)κs
2(fh − fl)(θn1 − 12 − κs2 )
(1− fl) (F.1)
i.e,
∆ns =
√
n
(1− κs)κs (F¯
n
s (θ
n
s (0))|1)− F¯ns (θns (1)|1)) =
√
n
(1− κs)κs (F¯
n
s (θ
n
s (0))|1)− κs)
Let
∆nr =
√
n
(1− κr)κr (2fh(1− θ
n
1 ) + 2(1− fh)θn0 − κr), (F.2)
i.e., ∆nr =
√
n
(1−κr)κr (F¯
n
r (1|1) − κr). Note that since the mapping between {θn0 , θn1 } and
{∆nr ,∆ns } is linear and one-to-one we use the two sequences {θn0 , θn1 } and {∆nr ,∆ns } inter-
changeably. We use ∆m = lim ∆nm and θi = lim θni , i = 0, 1, p.
Also we define the bidding function in market r as
bnr (θ) = β
n
r (θ) (F.3)
for θ ≤ θn0 and θ ≥ θn1 ; and we define the bidding function in market s as
bns (θ) =
βns (θ) if θ ∈ [θnp , θn1 )bnp if θ ∈[θn0 ,θnp ) (F.4)
where βm is the function introduced in definition 2.5.
Lemma F.1. For any vector (∆s, ∆¯s,∆r, ∆¯r) ∈ R4 and  > 0, any sequence (∆ns ,∆nr ) ∈
[∆s, ∆¯s] × [∆r, ∆¯r] with lim ∆nm = ∆m, if θ ∈ (θn0 , θn1 ) select market s and θ /∈ (θn0 , θn1 ) select
market r, then there exists N(∆s, ∆¯s,∆r, ∆¯r, ) such that for all n > N(∆s, ∆¯s,∆r, ∆¯r, ) the
following are true:
i. There is a unique type θnp (∆ns ,∆nr ) such that
l(Y n−1s (κsn) = θ
n
p , θi = θ
n
p ) = l(Y
n−1
s (κsn) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ], θi = θnp ).
Moreover, θnp (∆ns ,∆nr ) is a continuous function of ∆ns and ∆nr .
(a) If we define
z0(θp(∆s,∆r)) = lim
√
n
(F¯ns (θ
n
p (∆
n
s ,∆
n
r )|0)− κs)√
κs(1− κs)
,
then z0(θp(∆s,∆r)) is increasing in ∆s.
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(b) There is loser’s curse at the pooling interval (θn0 , θ
n
p ], i.e.,
Pr(bnp wins|V = 1, Y n−1s (κsn) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ])
Pr(bnp wins|V = 0, Y n−1s (κsn) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ])
> 1.
ii. In market s,
∂
∂θ
l(Y n−1s (κsn) = θ, θi = θ) > 0
for all θ ≥ θnp . In market r,
∂
∂θ
l(Y n−1r (κrn) = θ, θi = θ) > 0
for all θ.
iii. There exists a unique pooling bid
bnp (∆
n
s ,∆
n
r ) <
l(Y n−1s (κsn) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ], θi = θnp )
1 + l(Y n−1s (κsn) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ], θi = θnp )
such that bidding according to function bns (θ) is an equilibrium in market s. The pooling
bid bnp (∆ns ,∆nr ) is a continuous function of (∆ns ,∆nr ). Moreover,
lim bnp (∆
n
s ,∆
n
r ) = lim
l(Y n−1s (κsn) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ], θi = θnp )
1 + l(Y n−1s (κsn) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ], θi = θnp )
.
iv. If bidders bid according to bns (θ) and bnr (θ) in markets s and r, respectively, then
|un(m, bnm(θ)|θ,∆ns ,∆nr )− u(m|θ,∆s,∆r)| < 
for all θ and m where the functions u(m|θ,∆s,∆r) are defined as below. Let
u(s|θ,∆s,∆r) :=
0 if θ ≤ 12fh−fl
(fh+fl)(1−fh)
∫∞
−∞
l(x)
1+l(x)dΦ(x,−z0(θp)) otherwise
where
l(x) = φ(
1− fh
1− fl x−∆s)/φ(x)
Φ(x,−z0(θp)) is a censored standard normal distribution that is censored below −z0(θp),
i.e., the density is equal to the standard normal φ(x) for x > −z0(θp) but has an atom
of size Φ(x) at x = −z0(θp); and let
u(r|θ,∆s,∆r) :=

1−fh
2−fh−fl (1− Φ(∆r))(1− cr)−
1−fl
2−fh−fl cr if θ ≤ 12
fh
fh+fl
(1− Φ(∆r))(1− cr)− flfh+fl cr otherwise
Proof. Item i is proved in Lemma F.5 and F.6. Item ii is proved in Lemma F.7.
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For item iii note that if the pooling bid is equal to
l(Y n−1s (κsn) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ], θi = θnp )
1 + l(Y n−1s (κsn) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ], θi = θnp )
then type θnp would strictly prefer to bid at the pooling bid as we have
Pr(bnp wins|V = 1, Y n−1s (κsn) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ])
Pr(bnp wins|V = 0, Y n−1s (κsn) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ])
> 1
by construction. If on the other hand the pooling bid is equal to zero, then θnp would rather
bid just above the pooling bid and win with probability one if the price is equal to the pooling
bid. Therefore, there exists a bid that leaves θnp indifferent between bidding right above the
pooling bid and bidding the pooling bid. This bid is unique because it is the solution to a
single linear equation. Moreover, bnp (∆ns ,∆nr ) is continuous because θnp (∆ns ,∆nr ) is continuous
by item i.
For types θ ≥ θnp bidding according to function bns (θ) is compatible with equilibrium because
∂
∂θ l(Y
n−1
s (κsn) = θ, θi = θ) > 0 for all θ ≥ θnp by item ii. Also, the pooling bid converges to
lim
l(Y n−1s (κsn) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ], θi = θnp )
1 + l(Y n−1s (κsn) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ], θi = θnp )
because the probability of winning and therefore the profit at pooling converges to zero.
Item iv. The fact that lim ∆nm = ∆m for m ∈ {r, s} implies that there are fewer bidders
than goods in market r with probability one in state 0 by the law of large numbers. Therefore,
the price in state V = 0 is equal to cr with probability one. The fact that agents bid according
to bnr (θ), lim ∆nr = ∆r, and the central limit theorem together imply that the price in state
V = 1 is equal to 1 with probability Φ(∆r) and equal to cr with probability 1 − Φ(∆r).
These imply that the limit utilities are given by the function u(r, br(θ)|θ,∆s,∆r). Moreover,
the central limit theorem implies that un(r, bnr (θ)|θ,∆ns ,∆nr ) converges to u(r, br(θ)|θ,∆s,∆r)
uniformly for any (∆ns ,∆nr ) ∈ [∆s, ∆¯s]× [∆r, ∆¯r].
In market s, the probability that the price is equal to the pooling price is equal to
Φ(−1−fh1−fl z(θp) − ∆s) and Φ(−z(θp)) in states V = 1 and V = 0, respectively. Also, the
probability that the price occurs at the bid of a type x standard deviations away from θs(0) is
equal to φ(1−fh1−fl x −∆s) and φ(x) in states V = 1 and V = 0, respectively. Both of these as-
sertions follow from the central limit theorem. The bids βns (θn) of a sequence of types θn, who
are each x standard deviations away from θns (0), converge uniformly to
l(x)
1+l(x) by Proposition
A.2. Therefore, the expected price in state V = 0 at the limit is given by
ps(∆s) :=
∫ ∞
−∞
l(x)
1 + l(x)
dΦ(x,−z(∆s)). (F.5)
Types θ < 12 are indifferent between the pooling bid and a bid strictly larger than the pooling
bid. Also, types θs(1) < θ < 12 win an object with probability one in both states by the law
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of large numbers. Moreover, payoff at pooling converges to zero and this implies that
limun(s, bns (θ)|θ,∆ns ,∆nr ) =
1− fh
2− fh − fl (1− limE[P
n
s |V = 1])−
1− fl
2− fh − fl ps(∆s) = 0
if θ < 12 . Therefore solving for 1− limE[Pns |V = 1] delivers
1− limE[Pns |V = 1] =
1− fl
1− fh ps(∆s).
Moreover,
limun(s, bns (θ)|θ,∆ns ,∆nr ) =
fh
fh + fl
(1− limE[Pns |V = 1])−
fl
fh + fl
ps(∆s)
for any θ > 12 and substituting
1−fl
1−fh ps(∆s) for (1− limE[Pns |V = 1]) implies that
limun(s, bns (θ)|θ,∆ns ,∆nr ) =
fh − fl
fh + fl(1− fh)ps(∆s) = u(s|θ,∆s,∆r).
Furthermore, the central limit theorem implies that the convergence is uniform for any (∆ns ,∆nr ) ∈
[∆s, ∆¯s]× [∆r, ∆¯r].
We now use the Lemma F.4 to prove that there is a sufficiently large N such that the
equilibrium described in Proposition 4.2.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. The proof will proceed as follows: we will first find values (∆∗s,∆∗r)
which ensures that all types are indifferent between the two markets at the limit. Then, we
pick a rectangle [∆s, ∆¯s]× [∆r, ∆¯r] that contains (∆∗s,∆∗r) and we show that there is (∆ns ,∆nr )
in this rectangle such that all types are indifferent between the two markets for all n larger
than a cutoff N given the market selection defined by (∆ns ,∆nr ).
We now find (∆∗s,∆∗r). Pick ∆∗r as the unique value that satisfies the following equation
1− fh
2− fh − fl (1− Φ(∆
∗
r))(1− c) =
1− fl
2− fh − fl c.
This equality ensures that the low types make zero profit in market r. The equality above
has a solution if 1−crcr >
1−fl
1−fh , i.e., if c smaller than a threshold. Moreover, the solution to the
equation is unique because Φ is strictly increasing.
Pick ∆∗s as the unique value that satisfies the following equation (see equation (F.5) for
the limit price’s formula)
limE[Pns |V = 0] = ps(∆∗s) =
∫
l(x)
1 + l(x)
dΦ(x,−z(∆∗s)) = c.
This equality in conjunction with the equality that defined ∆∗r ensures that all types are
indifferent between the two markets. The function
∫ l(x)
1+l(x)dΦ(x,−z(∆)) is decreasing in ∆
and therefore the equation above has a unique solution for all c smaller than a threshold.
To see this note that l(x) is a monotone increasing function by Lemma F.7. Moreover, if
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∆ > ∆′, then z(∆) > z(∆′) and therefore Φ(x,−z(∆′)) first order stochastically dominates
Φ(x,−z(∆)). This implies that∫
l(x)
1 + l(x)
dΦ(x,−z(∆)) <
∫
l(x)
1 + l(x)
dΦ(x,−z(∆′)).
We now construct the rectangle [∆s, ∆¯s] × [∆r, ∆¯r]. Pick ∆¯s > ∆∗s such that ps(∆¯s) = c/2
and pick ∆s < ∆∗s such that ps(∆s) = 2c. Also, pick ∆¯r and ∆r sufficiently close to ∆∗r such
that
fh
fh + fl
(1− Φ(∆r))(1− c)−
fl
fh + fl
c < 2c
fh − fl
(fh + fl)(1− fh) , (F.6)
fh
fh + fl
(1− Φ(∆¯r))(1− c)− fl
fh + fl
c >
c
2
fh − fl
(fh + fl)(1− fh) . (F.7)
We now show that there is (∆ns ,∆nr ) in the rectangle that leaves all types indifferent between
the two markets. Define the correspondence
Γ := Γns × Γnr : [∆s, ∆¯s]× [∆r, ∆¯r] =⇒ [∆s, ∆¯s]× [∆r, ∆¯r]
such that
Γns (∆
′
s,∆
′
r) =

∆¯s if un(s, bns (1)|θi = 1,∆′s,∆′r) > un(r, bnr (1)|θi = 1,∆′s,∆′r)
[∆s, ∆¯s] if un(s, bns (1)|θi = 1,∆′s,∆′r) = un(r, bnr (1)|θi = 1,∆′s,∆′r)
∆s if un(s, bns (1)|θi = 1,∆′s,∆′r) < un(r, bnr (1)|θi = 1,∆′s,∆′r)
Γnr (∆
′
s,∆
′
r) =

∆¯r if un(r, bnr (0)|θi = 0,∆′s,∆′r) > un(s, bns (0)|θi = 0,∆′s,∆′r)
[∆r, ∆¯r] if un(r, bnr (0)|θi = 0,∆′s,∆′r) = un(s, bns (0)|θi = 0,∆′s,∆′r)
∆r if un(r, bnr (0)|θi = 0,∆′s,∆′r) < un(s, bns (0)|θi = 0,∆′s,∆′r)
where bns (1) and bnr (1) are the bids submitted by type θi = 1, i.e., highest bids submitted, in
markets s and r respectively. Similarly bns (1) and bnr (1) are the bids submitted by type θi = 0
in markets s and r respectively. These bidding functions are formally defined in equations
(F.3) and (F.4).
Note that the correspondence Γ is upper-hemi continuous, compact and convex valued.
Therefore, the correspondence has a fixed point by Kakutani’s Theorem. Also, in the claim
just below we argue that there exists an N such that for all n > N any fixed point of the
correspondence occurs in the interior of the domain, i.e., ∆ns ∈ (∆s, ∆¯s) and ∆nr ∈ (∆r, ∆¯r)
and therefore,
un(s|θi = θ,∆ns ,∆nr ) = un(r|θi = θ,∆ns ,∆nr )
which implies that the fixed point is an equilibrium.
Claim F.1. There is an N such that for all n > N any fixed point of the correspondence occurs
in the interior of the domain.
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Proof. Note that there exits an N(∆s, ∆¯s,∆r, ∆¯r, ) such that∣∣un(bnm(θ)|θi = θ, ∆¯s,∆r)− u(m|θi = 1, ∆¯s,∆r)∣∣ < 
for all n > N(∆s, ∆¯s,∆r, ∆¯r, ) by the Lemma (F.1), item iv.
In order to show that the fixed point occurs in the interior, we show that it does not occur
at an edge of the rectangle. We show this by focusing on four cases which correspond to the
four edges of the rectangle.
Case 1: Suppose that (∆s,∆r) ∈ Γn(∆¯s,∆r) and note that
u(s|θi = 1,∆s,∆r) = 2c
fh − fl
(fh + fl)(1− fh) > u(r|θi = 1,∆s,∆r)
=
fh
fh + fl
(1− Φ(∆r))(1− c)− fl
fh + fl
c
for all ∆r ∈ [∆r, ∆¯r]. This follows from (F.6). Therefore, un(s, bns (1)|θi = 1,∆s,∆r) >
un(r, bnr (1)|1,∆s,∆r) for ∆r ∈ [∆r, ∆¯r] and all n > N(∆s, ∆¯s,∆r, ∆¯r, ) for sufficiently small
 by the Lemma (F.1), item iv. However, this implies that Γns (∆s,∆r) = ∆¯s a contradiction.
Case 2: Suppose that (∆¯s,∆r) ∈ Γn(∆¯s,∆r) and note that
u(s|1, ∆¯s,∆r) = c
2
fh − fl
(fh + fl)(1− fh) < u(r|1, ∆¯s,∆r)
=
fh
fh + fl
(1− Φ(∆r))(1− c)− fl
fh + fl
c
for all ∆r ∈ [∆r, ∆¯r]. This follows from equality (F.7). Therefore, un(s, bns (1)|θi = 1, ∆¯s,∆r) <
un(r, bnr (1)|θi = 1, ∆¯s,∆r) for ∆r ∈ [∆r, ∆¯r] and all n > N(∆s, ∆¯s,∆r, ∆¯r, ) for sufficiently
small  by the Lemma (F.1), item iv. However, this implies that Γns (∆¯s,∆r) = ∆s a contra-
diction.
Case 3: Suppose that (∆s,∆r) ∈ Γn(∆s,∆r) and note that 0 = u(s|θi = 0,∆s,∆r) for
all (∆s,∆r) ∈ [∆s, ∆¯s] × [∆r, ∆¯r] by construction. The fact that ∆r < ∆∗r implies that
u(r|θi = 0,∆s,∆r) > 0. Therefore, u(r|θi = 0,∆s,∆r) > u(s|θi = 0,∆s,∆r) = 0. Hence,
un(r, bnr (0)|θi = 0,∆s,∆r) > un(s, bns (0)|θi = 0,∆s,∆r)
for ∆s ∈ [∆s, ∆¯s] and all n > N(∆s, ∆¯s,∆r, ∆¯r, ) for sufficiently small  by the Lemma (F.1),
item iv. However, this implies that Γnr (∆s,∆r) = ∆¯r a contradiction.
Case 4: suppose that (∆s, ∆¯r) ∈ Γn(∆s, ∆¯r). The fact that ∆¯r > ∆∗r implies that u(r|θi =
0,∆s, ∆¯r) < 0. Therefore, u(r|θi = 0,∆s, ∆¯r) < u(s|θi = 0,∆s, ∆¯r) = 0. Hence,
un(r, bnr (0)|θi = 0,∆s, ∆¯r) < un(s, bns (0)|θi = 0,∆s, ∆¯r)
for ∆s ∈ [∆s, ∆¯s] and all n > N(∆s, ∆¯s,∆r, ∆¯r, ) for sufficiently small  by the Lemma (F.1),
item iv. However, this implies that Γnr (∆s, ∆¯r) = ∆r a contradiction.
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F.2. Exogenous Outside Option. We now prove Proposition 3.3. This proposition can
be proved by applying Lemma F.1 where we take θn0 = 0. If θn0 = 0, then all the conclusions
of Lemma F.1 with respect to market s remain valid because ∆ns is independent of θn0 and
depends only on θn1 .
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Suppose that [0, θn1 ] bid in market s where θn1 > 1/2. We will show
that we can choose this type so that all types θ ∈ [1/2, 1] are indifferent between the two
markets. Also, all types θ ∈ [0, 1/2] prefer market s as their payoff from option r is negative.
The payoff of a type θ ∈ [1/2, 1] from submitting a bid in market s is arbitrarily close to
u(m, bm(θ)|θi = θ,∆s) =
∫ ∞
−∞
l(x)
1 + l(x)
dΦ(x,−z(∆s)) fh − fl
(fh + fl)(1− fh)
by Lemma F.1. If ∆s is large then this payoff is close to zero because the price in the low
state is close to zero. Moreover, if ∆s is small then∫ ∞
−∞
l(x)
1 + l(x)
dΦ(x,−z(∆s)) fh − fl
(fh + fl)(1− fh)
is a positive number which strictly exceeds the expected payoff of a type θ in market r.
Therefore, there is a ∆s which leaves the types θ ∈ [1/2, 1] indifferent between the two markets
by the intermediate value theorem because the function under consideration is continuous.
Also, there exists an N such that for all n > N , there exists a ∆ns such that types in θ ∈ [1/2, 1]
are indifferent between the two markets. This is because un(m, bnm(θ)|θi = θ,∆ns ) converges
to u(m, bm(θ)|θi = θ,∆s) uniformly by Lemma F.1, the function un(m, bnm(θ)|θi = θ,∆ns ) is
continuous in ∆ns and hence the intermediate value theorem delivers results.
F.3. Intermediate Results. In this subsection we fix (∆s, ∆¯s,∆r, ∆¯r) ∈ R4 and consider
sequences {θn0 , θn1 , θnp } such that types (θn0 , θn1 ] select market s, types θ /∈ (θn0 , θn1 ) select market
r and types (θn0 , θnp ) submit the pooling bid. Note that since the mapping between {θn0 , θn1 }
and {∆nr ,∆ns } is linear and one-to-one we use the two sequences {θn0 , θn1 } and {∆nr ,∆ns } inter-
changeably. Along the sequences, we assume that ∆nm ∈ [∆m, ∆¯m]. We define the type θ∗n
such that
F¯ns (θ
∗n|1) = F¯ns (θ∗n|0)
(1− fh)(θns (0) + ∆ns − θ∗n) = (1− fl)(θns (0)− θ∗n)
In words, there is the same mass of types above type θ∗n in market s in both states. We
assume that {θn0 , θn1 , θn} converges and therefore θ∗n converges.
For any θn we define:
znv (θ
n) =
√
n(F¯ (θn|v)− κs)√
F¯ (θn|v)(1− F¯ (θn|v)) .
In the sequences that we consider, we assume that znv (θn) < 2znv (θ∗n), i.e., we assume that
θn is greater or equal to θ∗n − a/√n for some finite and positive a. Moreover, we assume
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that znv (θn) > −∞. In what follows we say a function xn(∆r,∆s, θ) converges uniformly to
x(∆r,∆s, θ) if for every  there is an N such that for all n > N we have
|xn(∆r,∆s, θ)− x(∆r,∆s, θ)| ≤ 
for all (∆s,∆r) ∈ [∆s, ∆¯s] × [∆r, ∆¯r] and all −∞ < znv (θ) < 2znv (θ∗). We note that there is
an N and a positive constant A such that Pr(Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θ0, θ)|v) ≥ A > 0. This is because
lim znv (θ
∗n) is uniformly bounded below by some finite z∗ and Pr(Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θ0, θ)|v) ≥
Φ(z∗) > 0.
Let Xn denote the total number of bidders who submit the pooling bid and let
X¯nv := E[Xn|V = v] = n(1− fv)(θn − θn0 ).
We let Gn denote the total number of goods left to be allocated to bidders who submit the
pooling bid, i.e, Gn is equal to k minus the number of bidders who submit a bid greater than
the pooling bid and let
G¯nv := E[Gn|V = v, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn)].
Definition F.1. Let
hn(θ; ∆nr ,∆
n
s , v) :=
bi(nκ− 1;n− 1, F¯s(θ|v))
Bi(nκ− 1;n, F¯s(θ|v))−Bi(nκ;n, Fs(1|v))
Bi(k;n, p) and bi(k;n, p) represent the CDF and PDF for the binomial distribution with k
successes out of n tries where the success probability is equal to p. Note that Fns (1|v) =
F ((θn0 , θ
n
1 ]|v) and F¯s(θ|v) = F ((θ, θn1 ]|v).
The function hn is continuously differentiable in θ, ∆nr and ∆ns . This is because (1) the
cutoffs θn1 and θn0 are linear functions and hence continuously differentiable functions of ∆nr
and ∆ns ; (2) The cumulative distribution function F (·|v) is continuously differentiable at any
θ 6= 12 ; and (3) The functions Bi(k;n, p) and bi(k;n, p) are continuously differentiable in p.
Lemma F.2. The expected number of goods allocated to types who submit a pooling bid con-
ditional on the price equaling the pooling is as follows:
G¯nv√
npv(1− pv)
= hn(θn; v)
√
npv(1− pv)− znv (θn)/n ≥ 0
where we have suppressed reference to (∆nr ,∆ns ), n is a function that converges uniformly to
1 and pv = F¯s(θnp |v).
Proof. Let λs(v) = Fs(1|v), n = Bi(k − 1;n, pv)/(Bi(k − 1;n, pv) − Bi(k;n, λs(v))). The
expected number of goods available to types who pool
G¯nv =
∑k−1
i=0 C(n, i)p
i
v(1− pv)n−i(k − i)∑k−1
i=0 C(n, i)p
i
v(1− pv)n−i −
∑k
i=0C(n, i)λs(v)
i(1− λs(v))n−i
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We simplify the numerator as follows:
k−1∑
i=0
C(n, i)piv(1− pv)n−i(k − i)
= k
k−1∑
i=0
C(n, i)piv(1− pv)n−i −
k−1∑
i=0
iC(n, i)piv(1− pv)n−i
= k
k−1∑
i=0
C(n, i)piv(1− pv)n−i − pn
k−1∑
i=1
C(n− 1, i− 1)pi−1v (1− pv)n−i
= k
k−1∑
i=0
C(n, i)piv(1− pv)n−i − pn
k−2∑
i=0
C(n− 1, i)piv(1− pv)n−i−1
= kBi(k − 1;n, pv)− pn (Bi(k − 1;n, pv)− (1− pv)bi(k − 1;n− 1, pv))
Where the last equality follows because:
Bi(k − 1;n, pv) =
k−1∑
i=0
C(n, i)piv(1− pv)n−i
=
k−2∑
i=0
C(n− 1, i)piv(1− pv)n−i−1 + (1− pv)C(n− 1, k − 1)pk−1v (1− pv)n−k
= Bi(k − 2;n, pv) + (1− pv)bi(k − 1;n− 1, pv)
Therefore, we find
G¯nv = npv(1− pv)
(
hn(θnp ; v)−
pv − κs
pv(1− pv)
1
n
)
= npv(1− pv)hn(θn; v)− z
n
v (θ
n)
n
√
npv(1− pv)
The above derivation implies that
√
npv(1− pv)hn(θn; v)− z
n
v (θ
n)
n ≥ 0 for all (θn, v).
Lemma F.3. The following converges uniformly√
pv(1− pv)
(
hn(θn; v)
√
npv(1− pv)− znv (θn)/n
)
→
√
κs(1− κs) (h(zv)− zv)
where
h(zv) =
φ(zv)
1− Φ(zv)
is the reciprocal Mill’s ratio (or the hazard function) for the standard normal (see Sampford
(1953) for details) and zv = lim znv (θn).
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition A.2 and from the fact that n → 1 uniformly.
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Lemma F.4. We have the following
Pr(bnp wins|V = 1, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn])
Pr(bnp wins|V = 0, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn])
→
(
1− fl
1− fh
)(
h(z1)− z1
h(z0)− z0
)
(F.8)
l(Y n−1s (k) = θn, θi = θn)
l(Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn], θi = θn)
→ (1− fh)
(1− f1)
h(z1)
h(z0)
(F.9)
d
dθ lnh
n(θn; ∆nr ,∆
n
s , 1)
d
dθ lnh
n(θn; ∆nr ,∆
n
s , 0)
→ (1− fh)
(1− f1)
h(z1)− z1
h(z0)− z0 (F.10)
where the convergence is uniform.
Proof. We first show that equation (F.9) is satisfied. Note that
l(Y n−1s (k) = θ
n, θi = θ
n) =
(
1− fh
1− fl
)2 bi(k − 1;n− 2, F¯s(θn|1))
bi(k − 1;n− 2, F¯s(θn|0))
and
l(Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn], θi = θn) =
1− fh
1− fl
(
Bi(k − 1;n− 1, F¯ns (θn|1))−Bi(k;n− 1, Fns (1|1))
Bi(k − 1;n− 1, F¯ns (θn|0))−Bi(k;n− 1, Fns (1|0))
)
Therefore,
l(Y n−1s (k) = θn, θi = θn)
l(Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn], θi = θn)
=
(
1− fh
1− fl
)
hn(θn, 1)
hn(θn, 0)
.
Thus, equation (F.9) follows from Lemma F.3.
We now show that equation (F.10) is satisfied. Through direct computation (and suppress-
ing reference to ∆s and ∆r) we find
d lnhn(θ; v)
dp
= − 1− fv
hn(θ; v)
×(
nbi(k − 1;n− 1, p)2
(Bi(k − 1;n, p)−Bi(k;n, Fns (1|v))2
− pn− k
p(1− p)
bi(k − 1;n− 1, p)
(Bi(k − 1;n, p)−Bi(k;n, Fns (1|v)))
)
where we define p = F¯ns (θ|v) and use the facts that ddθ F¯ns (θ|v) = −(1−fv), ddpbi(k−1;n−1, p) =
− pn−kp(1−p)bi(k−1;n−1, p), ddpBi(k;n, Fns (1|v)) = 0, and ddp(Bi(k−1;n, p)−Bi(k;n, Fns (1|v))) =
−nbi(k − 1;n− 1, p). Rearranging we find
d lnhn(θ; v)
dθ
= −(1− fv)n
(
hn(θ; v)− F¯
n
s (θ|v)− κs
F¯ns (θ|v)(1− F¯ns (θ|v))
)
Hence, equation (F.10) again follows from Lemma F.3.
We now turn to equation (F.8). In order to show that equation (F.8) is satisfied, below we
establish the following intermediate result:
Pr(bnp wins|V = v, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn]) =
G¯nv
X¯nv
δn =
G¯nv
n(θn − θn0 )(1− fv)
δn
where δn → 1 uniformly. Therefore, once we establish this intermediate result, equation (F.8)
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follows from Lemma F.2, Lemma F.3 and the fact that δn → 1 uniformly.
We now prove that
Pr(bnp wins|V = v, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn]) =
G¯nv
X¯nv
δn
where δn → 1 uniformly.
For any positive constant δ < 1, let q = Pr[Xn ≤ (1 − δ)X¯nv |Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn], V = v].
We have Pr[Xn ≤ (1− δ)X¯nv |V = v] ≤ e−
δ2X¯nv
2 by Chernoff’s Inequality (see Lemma A.1) and
Pr[Xn ≤ (1−δ)X¯nv |V = v, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn]] Pr(Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn]|V = v) ≤ Pr[Xn ≤ (1−δ)X¯nv |V = v]
Therefore,
Pr[Xn ≤ (1− δ)X¯nv |V = v, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn]] ≤ Ae−
δ2X¯nv
2
where 1/Pr(Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn]|V = v) ≥ Φ(C) = A for sufficiently large n. Below we provide
an upper bound for Pr(bnp wins|V = v, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn]):
Pr(bnp wins|V = v, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn])
= E[
Gn
Xn
|Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn], V = v]
≤ E[ G
n
(1− δ)X¯nv
|Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn], V = v,Xn ≥ (1− δ)X¯nv ](1− q) + q (F.11)
≤ E[ G
n
(1− δ)X¯nv
|Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn], V = v,Xn ≥ (1− δ)X¯nv ] +Ae−
δ2X¯nv
2 (F.12)
≤ E[G
n|Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn], V = v]
(1− δ)X¯nv (1−Ae−
δ2X¯nv
2 )
+Ae−
δ2X¯nv
2 (F.13)
=
G¯nv
n(θn − θn0 )(1− fv)
 1
(1− δ)(1−Ae− δ
2X¯nv
2 )
+
n(θn − θn0 )Ae−
δ2X¯nv
2
G¯nv

Inequality F.11 is obtained by observing that Xn ≥ (1− δ)X¯n1 in each term in the expec-
tation, Pr[Xn ≥ (1− δ)X¯nv |Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn], V = v] ≤ 1 and E[G
n
Xn |Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn], V =
v,Xn ≤ (1− δ)X¯nv ] ≤ 1. For inequality F.13 we use the facts that
E[Gn|Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn], V = v,Xn ≥ (1− δ)X¯nv ](1− q) ≤ E[Gn|Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn], V = v]
and 1− q ≥ 1−Ae− δ
2X¯nv
2 .
Below we provide a lower bound for Pr(bnp wins|V = v, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn]). For any
positive constant δ < 1, let q = Pr[Xn > (1 + δ)X¯nv |Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn], V = v]. We have
Pr[Xn > (1 + δ)X¯nv |V = v] ≤ e−
δ2X¯nv
2+δ by Chernoff’s Inequality (see Lemma A.1). Therefore,
Pr[Xn > (1 + δ)X¯nv |V = v, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn]] ≤
e−
δ2X¯nv
2+δ
Pr(Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn]|V = v)
≤ Ae−
δ2X¯nv
2+δ
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because 1/Pr(Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn]|V = v) ≥ Φ(C) = A for all n sufficiently large. Using a
similar logic as in the upper bound we obtain the following
Pr(bnp wins|V = v, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn])
≥ E[Gn|Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn], V = v,Xn ≤ (1 + δ)X¯nv ]
(1−Ae−
δ2X¯nv
2+δ )
(1 + δ)X¯nv
≥ (1−Ae−
δ2X¯nv
2+δ )
E[Gn|Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn], V = v]
(1 + δ)X¯nv
− nAe
− δ
2X¯nv
2+δ
(1 + δ)X¯nv
=
G¯nv
n(θn − θn0 )(1− fv)
(
1−Ae−
δ2X¯nv
2+δ
) 1
(1 + δ)(1− e− δ
2X¯nv
2+δ )
+
nAe−
δ2X¯nv
2+δ
G¯nv
 (F.14)
Therefore,
G¯nv
n(θn − θn0 )(1− fv)
(
1−Ae−
δ2X¯nv
2+δ
) 1
(1 + δ)(1− e− δ
2X¯nv
2+δ )
+
nAe−
δ2X¯nv
2+δ
G¯nv

≤ Pr(bnp wins|V = v, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn])
≤ G¯
n
v
n(θn − θn0 )(1− fv)
 1
(1− δ)(1−Ae− δ
2X¯nv
2 )
+
n(θn − θn0 )Ae−
δ2X¯nv
2
G¯nv

Hence there exists a δn such that
Pr(bnp wins|V = v, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θn]) =
G¯nv
n(θn − θn0 )(1− fv)
δn
where
(
1−Ae−
δ2X¯nv
2+δ
) 1
(1 + δ)(1− e− δ
2X¯nv
2+δ )
+
nAe−
δ2X¯nv
2+δ
G¯nv
 ≤ δn
≤
 1
(1− δ)(1−Ae− δ
2X¯nv
2 )
+
n(θn − θn0 )Ae−
δ2X¯nv
2
G¯nv

Moreover, for any arbitrary δ ∈ (0, 1), the lower-bound converges uniform to 1/(1+ δ) and the
upper-bound converges uniformly to 1/(1− δ). Therefore, δn → 1 uniformly.
Lemma F.5. There exist an N such that
l(Y n−1s (k) = θ
n
p , θi = θ
n
p ) = l(Y
n−1
s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ], θi = θnp )
has a unique solution θnp (∆s,∆r) for all n > N , Moreover, θnp (∆s,∆r) is a continuous function
of ∆s and ∆r; and z0(θp(∆s,∆r)) is increasing in ∆s.
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Proof. The equality
l(Y n−1s (k) = θ
n
p , θi = θ
n
p ) = l(Y
n−1
s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ], θi = θnp )
can be expressed as follows:
gn(θnp ; ∆
n
s ,∆
n
r ) = ln
1− fh
1− fl + lnh
n(θnp ; ∆
n
s ,∆
n
r , 1)− lnhn(θnp ; ∆ns ,∆nr , 0) = 0.
Recall that θ∗n is such that F¯ns (θ∗n|1) = F¯ns (θ∗n|0). We will show that gn(θ; ∆ns ,∆nr ) is
increasing in θ, that gn(θ∗n) < 0 and that gn(θ′′n) > 0 for sufficiently large θ′′n. Also, the
function gn(θ; ∆ns ,∆nr ) is clearly continuously differentiable in all three of its arguments (see
Definition F.1). Therefore, by the implicit function theorem (see Rudin (1964), Theorem 9.28),
we will conclude that there is a unique θnp (∆s,∆r) which satisfies the required equation and
θnp (∆s,∆r) is continuous in both of its arguments. This will establish the first part of the
lemma.
Lemma F.4 implies that
d
dθ lnh
n(θn; 0)
d
dθ lnh
n(θn; 1)
→ (1− fl)
(1− fh)
(h(z0)− z0)
(h(z1)− z1)
uniformly. The fact that h′(z) < 1 (see Sampford (1953)) implies that h(z) − z is decreasing
in z. Because z1 > z0 for any sequence of θn ≥ θ∗n and because h(z)− z is decreasing in z we
have that
(1− fl)
(1− fh)
(h(z0)− z0)
(h(z1)− z1) >
(1− fl)
(1− fh) > 1.
Therefore, uniform convergence implies that for any A > 0, there exists an N such that
lim
d
dθ
lnhn(θn; 1) = −(h(z1)− z1)(1− fh) > lim d
dθ
lnhn(θn; 0) = −(1− fl)(h(z0)− z0)
for all θn ∈ [θ∗n, θ′′ = A√
n
+ θ∗n] if n > N. This establishes that gn(θ; ∆ns ,∆nr ) is increasing for
all θ ∈ [θ∗n, θ′′ = A√
n
+ θ∗n] if n > N.
We now show that the constant A > 0 and N can be chosen sufficiently large such that
for all n > N we have ln 1−fh1−fl + lnh
n(θ
′′
; 1) > lnhn(θ
′′
; 0) where θ′′ = A√
n
+ θ∗n.
To see this, note that if θ′′ is large, i.e., if A is large, then zv < 0 and z1 − z0 is large.
Therefore,
hn(θ′′; 1)
hn(θ′′; 0)
→ h(z1(θ
′′))
h(z0(θ′′))
=
1− Φ(z1)
1− Φ(z0)e
− (z1−z0)(z1+z0)
2
is large. This is because 1−Φ(z1)1−Φ(z0) is close to one if zv are large and negative. Moreover,
e−
(z1−z0)(z1+z0)
2 is large because the exponent is large (since z1− z0 is large) and positive (since
z1 − z0 > 0 and z1 + z0 < 0). Hence, ln 1−fh1−fl + lnhn(θ
′′
; 1) > lnhn(θ
′′
; 0) for all n > N for
appropriately chosen A.
We now show that z0(θp(∆s,∆r)) is increasing in ∆s. The type z0 solves the following
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equation
ln ρ+ lnh(z0)− lnh(z1) = 0
where z1 = ρz0 + ∆s and ρ = 1−fh1−fl < 1. Therefore,
dz0
d∆s
=
h(z1)− z1
h(z0)− z0 − ρ(h(z1)− z1) ,
The numerator is positive by Sampford (1953); and the denominator is positive because h(z0)−
z0 > h(z1)− z1 (since h′(z) < 1 and z0 < z1) and because ρ < 1.
Lemma F.6. There exist an N such that for all n > N , there is loser’s curse at the pooling
interval (θn0 , θ
n
p ], i.e.,
Pr(bnp wins|V = 1, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ])
Pr(bnp wins|V = 0, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (θn0 , θnp ])
> 1.
Proof. Note that
Pr(bnp wins|V = 1, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (0, θnp ])
Pr(bnp wins|V = 0, Y n−1s (k) ∈ (0, θnp ])
→ 1− fl
1− fh
`(h(z1)− z1)
(h(z0)− z0)
uniformly by Lemma F.3. However,
1− fl
1− fh
`(h(z1)− z1)
(h(z0)− z0) =
h(z1)
h(z0)
`(h(z1)− z1)
(h(z0)− z0)
because 1−fl1−fh =
hn(θnp ,1)
hn(θnp ,0)
by construction (see Lemma F.5) for each n > N and because 1−fl1−fh =
hn(θnp ,1)
hn(θnp ,0)
→ h(z1)h(z0) uniformly. However,
h(z1)
h(z0)
`(h(z1)− z1)
(h(z0)− z0) > 1
because h(z)(h(z) − z) = h′(z), because h′(z) is increasing in z by Sampford (1953) and
because z1 > z0.
Lemma F.7. There exist an N such that for all n > N
∂
∂θ
l(Y n−1s (k) = θ, θi = θ) > 0
for all θ ≥ θnp and
∂
∂θ
l(Y n−1r (k) = θ, θi = θ) > 0
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for all θ. Moreover, if zn0 (θ
n)→ z0, then
√
n
∂
∂θ
√
nl(Y n−1s (k) = θ
n, θi = θ
n)→ d
dz
l(z0) =
d
dx
(
φ(1−fh1−fl z0 −∆s
φ(z0)
))
and l′(z) > 0 for all z > z0(θp).
Proof. Calculating ( ∂∂θ ln l)/n explicitly we find
∂
∂θ l(Y
n−1
s (k) = θ, θi = θ)
nl(Y n−1s (k) = θ, θi = θ)
= (1− κs)( f(θ|1)
1− F¯ns (θ|1)
− f(θ|0)
1− F¯ns (θ|0)
) + κs(
f(θ|0)
F¯ns (θ|0)
− f(θ|1)
F¯ns (θ|1)
)
Note that
f(θ|0)
F¯ns (θ|0)
− f(θ|1)
F¯ns (θ|1)
≥ 0
by MLRP.
Suppose first that θ > 1/2. If θ > 1/2, then f(θ|1) = fh > f(θ|0) = fl and F¯ns (θ|1) >
F¯ns (θ|0). Therefore,
f(θ|1)
1− F¯ns (θ|1)
− f(θ|0)
1− F¯ns (θ|0)
> 0.
Suppose alternatively that θ ≤ 12 . If θ ≤ 12 , then f(θ|v) = 1− fv, F¯ns (θ|v) = 2fv(θn1 − 12) +
2(1− fv)(12 − θ) and 1− F¯ns (θ|v) = Fnr (1|v) + 2(1− fv)(θ − θn0 ). Therefore,
(
∂
∂θ
ln l)/n = − A
(1− F¯ (θ|1))(1− F¯ (θ|0)) +
B
F¯ (θ|0)F¯ (θ|1)
where
A = (1− κs)((1− fl)Fnr (1|1)− (1− fh)Fnr (1|0)),
B = κs(2fh(θ
n
1 −
1
2
)(1− fl)− 2fl(θn1 −
1
2
)(1− fh)).
The constant B is positive because fh/fl > (1 − fh)/(1 − fl). If F
n
r (1|1)
Fnr (1|0) ≤
1−fh
1−fl , then A ≤ 0
and hence the derivative is positive.
If alternatively, F
n
r (1|1)
Fnr (1|0) >
1−fh
1−fl , then A > 0. The fact that
A
(1−F¯ (θ|0))(1−F¯ (θ|0)) is strictly
decreasing in θ and B
F¯ (θ|0)F¯ (θ|1) is strictly increasing in θ implies that there is θ
′ such that for
all θ > θ′ we have ∂ ln ln > 0. Rewriting the derivative we find that
(
∂
∂θ
ln l)/n = (1− fh) F¯ (θ|1)− κs
F¯ (θ|1)(1− F¯ (θ|1)) − (1− fl)
F¯ (θ|0)− κs
F¯ (θ|0)(1− F¯ (θ|0)) .
Hence, θ′ is the unique type such that ( ∂∂θ ln l)/n = 0, that is
1− fh
1− fl =
zn0 (θ
′)
zn1 (θ
′)
√
F¯ (θ′|0)(1− F¯ (θ′|0))
F¯ (θ′|1)(1− F¯ (θ′|1)) .
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Note that
lim
zn0 (θ
′n)
zn1 (θ
′n)
√
F¯ (θ′n|0)(1− F¯ (θ′n|0))
F¯ (θ′n|1)(1− F¯ (θ′n|1)) =
z0(θ
′)
z1(θ′)
=
1− fh
1− fl .
We now show θnp > θ′n by showing that
h(z1)
z1
<
h(z0)
z0
.
This inequality is satisfied because z1 > z0 and because
d
dz
(
h(z)
z
) = zh′(z)− h(z)
< h(z)h′(z)− h(z)
= h(z)(h′(z)− 1) < 0
where the first inequality follows from h(z) > z and the final inequality follows from h′(z) < 1.
Hence,
hn(θ′n, 0)
hn(θ′n, 1)
>
1− fh
1− fl
for all n > N . Therefore, θnp > θ′n for all n > N by Lemma F.5.
For market r calculating the derivative explicitly we find
(
∂
∂θ
ln l)/n = (1− fh) F¯
n
r (θ|1)− κr
F¯nr (θ|1)(1− F¯nr (θ|1))
− (1− fl) F¯
n
r (θ|0)− κr
F¯nr (θ|0)(1− F¯nr (θ|0))
.
The argument further above implies that if ∂∂θ l(Y
n−1
r (k) = θ, θi = θ) > 0 for some θ, then the
derivative is positive for all θ′ > θ. However, noting that lim ∂∂θ l(Y
n−1
r (k) = 0, θi = 0) > 0
delivers the result.
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